Brad, I have thought more about this stuff than you ever will, and know more
about it that you can imagine. Tito was not "allowed" to develop by the US
in 1948; the Yugosolavs were supposed to be handed over to Stalin under the
terms of Yalta, but made clear that they would not go,a nd that Stalin would
have to invade, which the Russians were in no shape to do at the time. The
US wasn't unhappy to have cracks in the Bloc, although it didn't really
believe it; indeed; it didn't believe in the Sino-Soviet split until the
Nixon administration. And the analysis has to be contextual: in other
circumstances, say ones where thre US was not embroiled in a war in
Indochina and students were not tearing up the streets, the US might have
been willing to risk facing down the Russians over Czecho in the hopes of
splintering the Bloc further; but not whena nd where they were. The context
and content of Mylnar report shows, and tthis is my my main point, that
Brezhnev wasa sking the US's permission to destroy Dubcek, and he received
it. Your explanation for this, then? --jks
>
>>Wrong again, Brad. Brezhnev was not about to try to face down the US
>>in a nuclear confrontation like the Cuban Missile Crisis, which had
>>led to Khrushchev being iced (by B himseld and some pals); he was
>>basically asking LBJ's permission. Which LBJ, being happily involved
>>in Vietnam, was willing to give; he saw no advantage in letting
>>reform communsim develop...
>
>On the contrary. The U.S. saw lots of advantage in letting reform
>communism develop: consider U.S. policy toward Marshall Tito in the
>quarter-century after World War II.
>
>*Think* a little bit before you post, please.
>
>
>Brad DeLong
>
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