this is also a problem with "revealed preference theory." by the way, might not
Rumsfeld expect to gain in many other ways--new and strengthened contacts,
memoirs, etc.?
jeff wrote:
Note, however, the circularity of the argument as I've stated it. Mr. Rumsfeld
behaved as he did because of his utility function and we know what his utility
function is because of his behavior. Such circularity is a potential pitfall in
many rational choice arguments, including those from the Austrian economics camp
that hold that the only way we know what people's preferences are is to observe
their behavior in a market setting. Generally, I and other social scientists
would argue that it is fallacious to infer preferences from observed behavior.
Problems like these should cause us to raise the question of whether many
rational choice arguments can be properly falsified at all, even in principle.
If not, they clearly cannot be considered "scientific theories" in the good old
reliable positivist sense.
REFERENCES
Simon, Herbert A. "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with
Political Science." The American Political Science Review 79, No. 2. (June
1985): 293-304.
--
Jeffrey L. Beatty
Doctoral Student
Department of Political Science
The Ohio State University
2140 Derby Hall
154 North Oval Mall
Columbus, Ohio 43210
(o) 614/292-2880
(h) 614/688-0567
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
______________________________________________________
If you fear making anyone mad, then you ultimately probe for the lowest common
denominator of human achievement-- President Jimmy Carter
