http://www.latimes.com/print/20010214/t000013418.html
Bush's Foreign Policy Team Is Split on How to Handle Hussein
Iraq: One side wants to use opposition to attempt to oust leader. The other
faction favors revamped sanctions.
By ROBIN WRIGHT, Times Staff Writer
Bush's Foreign Policy Team Is Split on How to Handle Hussein
Iraq: One side wants to use opposition to attempt to oust leader. The other
faction favors revamped sanctions.
By ROBIN WRIGHT, Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON--The Bush presidency's foreign policy priorities are still
under review, but already the new administration is experiencing its first
internal fractures over how to salvage U.S. policy toward Iraq.
Two distinct factions are emerging as President Bush's foreign policy
team debates the best way to follow through on the administration's pledge
to increase pressure on Baghdad, U.S. officials acknowledge.
The biggest difference between the two camps involves the depth of U.S.
support for controversial opposition forces that are attempting to mobilize
Iraqi exiles to oust the regime of President Saddam Hussein.
One faction, including representatives of Vice President Dick Cheney's
office, the Pentagon and Congress, advocates an aggressive strategy designed
to empower the Iraqi National Congress, or INC--the main opposition
group--to launch military operations against Hussein. The goal would be to
erode the Iraqi leader's power until he is forced, one way or another, from
office.
INC leaders, who arrived in Washington last week for talks with the new
administration and members of Congress, are already boasting of a larger
U.S. role in their activities.
"We are very confident that the Bush administration is going to help
us," Ahmad Chalabi, one of the group's six leaders, said in an interview.
"We want to work so we can initiate actions against Saddam on the ground.
We're talking about getting more military training and going back into the
country, and they've agreed to that."
The other administration faction, centered within the State Department,
favors a policy of "streamlined" sanctions against Iraq and more modest
support for the opposition, limited largely to intelligence, propaganda and
aid for displaced Iraqis.
The approach this side would prefer, its advocates say, stands a better
chance of enticing European and Arab allies back into a common policy fold.
Both groups share a goal of forcing Hussein to honor the terms of the
1991 Persian Gulf War cease-fire, especially his pledge to surrender all
weapons of mass destruction and stop threatening both his own people and
neighboring states.
But under Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who was chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff during Operation Desert Storm, the State Department is
wary of the INC and of the potential dangers of even low-level military
support that could become open-ended and increasingly costly, U.S. officials
say.
Over the weekend, Powell endorsed U.S. support for an INC mission that
would be limited to "public diplomacy" and humanitarian work.
"They can be effective in some of the public diplomacy actions they
have undertaken, in broadcasting or getting information to the Iraqi people
about the nature of their regime and what their leadership is costing them.
I think in terms of providing humanitarian relief," Powell said Sunday on
CBS-TV's "Face the Nation."
Powell said the administration would look at what else the Iraqi
opposition might do "that makes sense and supports our policies."
His Gulf War strategy gave rise to what has become known as the Powell
Doctrine, a military approach that calls for well-defined goals, a clear
exit strategy and deployment of enough forces to complete a mission as
quickly as possible. His strategy is intended in part to avoid the kind of
problems America experienced in Vietnam.
Key allies in the 38-nation coalition that went to war against Hussein,
including several neighboring governments, also don't support INC military
actions. Most have indicated that they would not provide the front-line
access needed to stage covert operations, U.S. and Arab officials say.
Many of these governments now advocate a policy of engagement with Iraq
as the best way to promote change.
Powell's team is confident that it can eventually win allied support
for a streamlined sanctions policy toward Baghdad. That would lift the most
punishing aspects of existing economic sanctions but leave in place an arms
embargo and U.N. control over Iraq's oil revenue to ensure that the Hussein
regime does not use its income to develop more weapons of mass destruction.
Powell has already discussed the policy shift with several European and
Mideast governments, and U.S. officials say he will hold further talks next
week during his first foreign trip as secretary of State--to the Mideast to
mark the 10th anniversary of the Gulf War's end.
But even if the Bush administration could win foreign support for a
more aggressive plan involving opposition forces, the State Department is
skeptical about the exiles' ability to stay united or have much impact,
officials say.
The INC's internal divisions were responsible for fighting that broke
out in 1996 among its rival Kurdish wings, opening the door for Hussein to
send troops to the northern Iraqi portion of the region known as Kurdistan.
Both the INC and the CIA station operating in the region were forced to flee
to Turkey.
The INC has developed a series of military options for U.S.
consideration. They include launching operations from Kurdistan, from a
newly created enclave in southern Iraq near the Kuwaiti border, and even
from Iran, according to sources within the group. But each would require
changing the rules of engagement--and U.S. air support--if Hussein
dispatched troops to squelch the resistance.
"We want U.S. backup . . . to act in participation with the U.S.
military," said Francis Brooke, the U.S. spokesman for the INC. "If Saddam
moves his armor in large numbers, then we would expect the U.S. military to
be prepared to pursue."
Under current rules of engagement, U.S. warplanes bomb areas only when
the planes are targeted by Iraq during flights over the two "no-fly" zones
established after the Gulf War in northern and southern Iraq.
The INC wants the Bush administration to declare "squares in the sand,"
or zones from which Iraq's military could not move without becoming targets
for American planes.
That strategy is designed mainly to undermine morale within the Iraqi
army and the elite Republican Guard, not to win big battles against
Baghdad's estimated 350,000-strong military machine. The INC would, however,
need significant training from the United States to pull it off, Chalabi
said.
"We want training to create an effective force so that we can act as a
catalyst to attract members of the Iraqi army to our side," Chalabi said.
The group is counting on past supporters who are joining the Bush
administration, such as Deputy Secretary of Defense-designate Paul
Wolfowitz, to push for a stronger U.S. role. It has also presented its
proposals to the Pentagon.
"We think we're in a strong position. In general, the Department of
Defense is organizing along our lines," said Brooke, the group's spokesman.
The State Department appears considerably less receptive. Group leaders
met Tuesday with Assistant Secretary of State Edward Walker. The discussion
centered on $29 million in U.S. funds earmarked to help opposition forces
air anti-Hussein broadcasts, investigate war crimes, ferret out intelligence
and distribute humanitarian aid supplies.
The funds, which were authorized during the Clinton administration,
have been on hold while the INC prepared specific proposals for their use. A
group spokesman said Tuesday that the money still has not been released.
A State Department official denied that the disagreement over Iraq
policy constitutes a major policy rupture, and said he had not heard of any
disagreements among the key U.S. foreign policy players.
But according to a well-placed U.S. official who requested anonymity,
Powell is clearly apprehensive about providing extensive U.S. support to the
INC.
"Powell knows that this is a feckless group of people whose dreams far
exceed their capabilities," the official said. "And he's not at all
enthusiastic about relying on them
-----Original Message-----
From: Forstater, Mathew <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Sunday, February 18, 2001 10:09 AM
Subject: [PEN-L:8263] RE: Re: RE: Re: Bush war
>Well, Cheney can also be seen to have regained access to a position where
he can
>exact revenge rooted in his position in Daddy B's administration. And then
>there's Powell... Maybe Dubba-you can appt Schwartz-cop Ambassador to
Iraq...
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Jim Devine [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>Sent: Saturday, February 17, 2001 6:41 PM
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: [PEN-L:8252] Re: RE: Re: Bush war
>
>
>I can't read their minds. But the continuity of the Bush-Clinton-Bush
>policies toward Iraq is pretty clear, while Clinton's policy of killing a
>bunch of Iraqi children, though much less dramatic than Bushie's recent
>attack, is pretty bloodthirsty. Besides, I bet it was Cheney who really
>made the executive decision. The government seems to fulfill the wet dream
>of some political scientists, separating the roles of "head of state" and
>"head of government," with Bushbaby as the largely-ceremonial President
>(the former) and Cheney as the hands-on Prime Minister (the latter). (A
>standard polisci critique of US government is that the two roles are merged
>in the Presidency.)
>
>Mat wrote:
>>while it is true that bombing continued under clinton, the reports from
the
>>pentagon made it clear that this was on a scale that had not been
>>undertaken for
>>some time, and the feeling i got was that other "routine" bombings were
not
>>being directed by the prez, whereas Dubba-u did have a say in this. i
could
>>imagine that the pentagon routinely has several proposals of differing
degrees
>>of harshness, and that Dubba-u is barely able to hold himself back. it
>>would be
>>naive i think to dismiss any possibility that the bad blood between daddy
bush
>>and saddam hasn't been transfered to Duba-u. i can just imagine Daddy B.
>>at the
>>first news getting himself into a frenzy and rushing into tell Barb "the
>>Bush's
>>are back in town, yippee!" He was not happy that 'desert storm' failed to
>>remove
>>Saddam. I think people like that must view themselves historically and
>>symbolically, they certainly saw a lot of symbolism in Dubba-u beating the
>>VP of
>>the man who beat Daddy. Does anyone know the specifics on exactly what the
>>Bush's direct material interest is in Iraq with respect to the oil
industry?
>
>Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~JDevine
>
