> > When Harry Truman ordered the Atomic bomb to be dropped on Japan,
I don't
> > think he "desired" that Japanese people die, but he knew as
certain as the
> > sun rises in the morning that people would die. In the historical
court of
> > moral inquiry, we can characterize Truman's conduct as anything
from heroic
> > to mass murder, but a determination that Truman did not commit
mass murder
> > cannot turn simply on whether or not Truman "desired" that anybody
die as
> > opposed to merely knowing that people would die -- his guilt or
innocence is
> > determined by the legitimacy of the justification for the act.
Similarly,
> > whether or not Stalin is guilty of the mass murder of Ukrainians
cannot
> > simply turn on whether he "desired" that people die, but whether:
(1) he
> > knew or should have known the consequences of his actions, and (2)
there was
> > no overriding justification for his actions.
> >
> > David Shemano
=========
For an excellent exploration of ethics dilemmas at the boundaries of
professional roles or institutionally sanctioned offices, see "Ethics
for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional
Life" by Arthur Applebaum. Legitimacy of justification sounds
redundant and on the edge of a regress argument.
Ian
