Was it not Lenin in Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism who noted the emergence of some then "unstable" international cartels as precursors of the next stage? I trust no one has missed the fact that this form of combine is now both stable and plentifull.
I cannot find the word "unstable" linked to cartel on searching for "unstable" through each of the chapters in the internet archive.
You are quite correct "unstable" does not exist in this context as a word, however the chapter 5 "DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG CAPITALIST ASSOCIATIONS" explores the notion as a whole and documents the collapse of a number of such international cartels, but even this is an aside.
Thank you very much for focussing attention on this chapter. You raise some important points about the way things have changed. This question should not necessarily be politically controversial because people can remain revolutionary, reformist or whatever according to their dispositions, but the nature of reality, should be discussible.
Revisiting this chapter no doubt too briefly, I am not sure however that I read Lenin as emphasising so much the collapse of cartels. Nor am I immediatly convinced therefore that the difference between 1916 and 2001 is that cartels were unstable then and are stable now. The proposition is a creative one for debate, but I would rather put my money on the question of territoriality.
Lenin in this chapter discusses cartels in electrics, oil, shipping, rail, steel, zinc, and dynamite.
In electricity he does not descibe any collapses but rather how a duopoly allowed an effective global monopoly. He also observed "the division of the world between two powerful trusts does not preclude *redivision* if the relation of forces changes as a result of uneven development, war, bankruptcy, etc.," Holding out the possibility of "redivision" is not identical to talking about their inherent instability, I would observe.
In oil he does not talk of instability but illustrates "how private and state monopolies are interwoven in the age of finance capital." What may be pertinent to questions of territory are that he noted that the US oil trust had "an excellent system of oil transportation adn distribution". Also one twist in the global struggle was when a director of Deutsche Bank launched a campaign for a German state monopoly. However even with the smaller scale of production in those days, Germany thought better of a oil monopoly based on its own territory [my comment].
Concerning shipping, again no mention of instability. With reference to the possibility of change, Lenin noted that the two main trusts, the German, and the Anglo-American, concluded an agreement for the division of the world and of profits for twenty years, "with the prudent provision for its annulment in the event of war" he adds drily, writing in 1917.
Concerning rail he describes a cartel of British, Belgian and German rail manufacturers during a severe industial depression, to reserve the home markets of each country and to divide up foreign markets according to a quota. "India was reserved entirely for Great Britain." I would note the relevance of the territorial issue obviously with rail. He does report a collapse of the cartel when two British firms retired from it and observes that "It is characteristic that agreement could not be achieved during subsequent boom periods." He does not discuss the reasons for this and it is obviously not the point of interest for Lenin in this chapter, but I would have to ask Greg whether such a collapse would be *less* likely today, if his hypothesis is correct about the main feature of the difference between 1917 and 2001.
Concerning steel there is no mention of a collapse but an account of how, in connection with rail production, in 1904 and 1905 a cartel was formed dividing up production (sales or profits?) according to a percentage across England, Germany, Belgium, France, Unites States, Austria, and Spain.
There is a brief mention of a zinc syndicate which precisely apportioned output among five groups of factories: German, Belgian, French, Spanish, and British.
And finally a quotation about a modern close alliance of all the German explosive manufacturers who, with the French and American dynamite manufacturers, divided the whole world among themselves, so to speak.
Having tried to look at this chapter, thanks to Greg's stimulating hypothesis, I do not think it can sustain or refute his argument. The instability of trusts would not have been a matter of interest to Lenin. He certainly presented evidence that they were substantial and significant influences on the shape of capitalism.
He certainly discussed change. He discussed a highly complex interaction between the cartel tendencies of the monopolies and state involvement, which I would not necessarily call "instability" in the way Greg does:
The instability lurks at the heart of the relationship between these monopolies and national financial capital which is something of a theme running through this work of Lenin.
I do agree however that the closing passage of the chapter clearly emphasises what Lenin wanted as the main point:
The critical passage is the last where Lenin in reference to the real conditions of his day remarks:
'The epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist associations grow up, based on the economic division of the world; while parallel to and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the "struggle for spheres of influence".'
I suggest that that his main point which differs somewhat from today is the issue of territorial division.
Why is that less important today?
I would obviously refer to the anti-colonial movement of the 20th century, but fundamentally the reason is related to the economic base, the development of the means of production. In many leading spheres capital can no longer compete merely on the basis of capturing the national market: production has to be wider than the national market.
I think there are probably also issues of how monopoly companies have reacted to populist anti-trust legislation. They now make secret alliances in more subtle ways than the crude cartels did at the end of the 19th century, which were bound to come unstuck from time to time in mutual recrimination.
I fully agree that whatever has changed does not automatically mean we should respect or hate Lenin any more or less. Lenin in this chapter refers to "the historico-economic meaning of what is taking place; for the forms of the struggle may and do constantly change in accordance with varying, relatively particular and temporary causes, but the substance of the struggle, its class content positively cannot change while classes exist."
True he we was strongly suggesting in this work written under the restrictions of censorship, a historically inevitable process, but it could be perfectly consistent with his method now to discuss retrospectively how the forms of control of economic production by monopoly finance capital have changed.
I rather agree with Greg when he observes
Even the concept of cartel seems dated in the context of international capital and of a bourgeoisie broken loose from the confines of national finance capital, for them Imperialist struggle between states is an anachronism, for them class war takes on a deadly meaning in an age of international civil war.
Perhaps one of the useful comparisons would be between Rockefeller's American Standard Oil Co. 1905, and bp ("beyond petroleum") 2001.
Chris Burford
London
