Thank you Chris for your kind reply. In spite of the danger of being seen as a complete hypocrite I disavow my claim to silence and re-enter discussion as far as I am able.
First a note on "Empire" I formed an impression based on what others had said and mere glance at the text itself, I admit to being hypersensitive of anything that smacks of a post-modernist tone and dismissed the book in my ignorance - I now intend to give it careful reading, those parts you referred me to (pages 229-230) have made a powerful impression that many gems might be found whatever else may also be there. Second, I have made the mistake of putting forward a conclusion as if it were a plain fact in regard to Lenin's view of international cartels. Although I have snipped your reply your reading is absolutely accurate in this regard - Lenin says nothing about the instability of such cartels and treats them as manifestations of the stage of capitalist development as it was in his time. My assertion as it stands forces a fair reading far too far and beyond reasonable acceptance (put this down to my incompetence). In my own defense, and putting forward a conclusion with out least a small amount of support, my reading derives from two sources from within the text and also a logical conclusion drawn from the concept of Imperialism itself. The first is Lenin's referring to "unstable" monopolies as precursors to monopoly capitalism in Chapter 1 (CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION AND MONOPOLIES) that after the crisis of 1873 cartels emerged as exceptions and were not durable, before this period such monopolies were described as embryonic and barely discernable during the apex of free competition (1860-70). The importance of this is that I believe that this parallels how Lenin discusses international cartels which in themselves seem to fall into two distinct overlapping groups. In Chapter 7 (IMPERIALISM AS A SPECIAL STAGE OF CAPITALISM) Lenin speaks of "the division of the world among the international trusts has just begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed." In this sense just as monopolies are the natural outcome of free competition, these trusts are the natural outcome of a world divided up by imperial powers. It is not difficult to conclude that there are two types of such trusts that could develop. A natural cartel which rests directly on the territories under the influence of this or that power (ie in parallel as Lenin remarked at the end of Chapter 5with and based on the divisions established by these world powers). But this also suggests other forms of trusts which are not so completely confined to these divisions - that is they reach beyond the alliances and territories of a particular power. I believe in Chapter 5 the collapses and instability (other than that of competing capital) seem related to this incompatibility (which I admit is not a strong argument by any means). At any rate in Chapter 5 (DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG CAPITALIST ASSOCIATIONS) begins by qualifying such "supermonolopies" temporally by stating that the creation of "spheres of influence" of big monopolies "naturally" gravitates towards international agreements amongst these associations and towards the formation of international cartels. It is the qualification of "towards" which I find harkens back to a similar approach when Lenin dealt with the rise of monopoly capital. Moreover, his special use of the term supermonopoly is only used in this context - the distinction between monopolies and supermonopolies seems strongly implied. The first impression is that he is looking at embryonic forms, or emergent forms. Certainly in the context of criticizing Kautsky who identified these as precursors of a further stage beyond imperialism (which Lenin does not attack, he simply points out how they grow from the contradictions of Imperialism). These points do not prove my conclusion as they rely on the context of the text and views of what this should be will vary, but to show that such a reading is not beyond reason. I make no pretense of having any direct quotes from Lenin to justify this particular view of the notion he elaborates but I would put forward that the interpretation is not at odds with what he has said. The real argument is this. Today we have a great many such supermonopolies the stability I ascribe to them derives from the fact that active imperialist competition has given way to a single superpower, insofar as this single power maintains itself there are no extraneous political forces (in terms of imperial ambitions) which can destroy them via external means (as in the case of a few of the examples in Chapter 5). The otherside of this is the natural instability of any such cross-parallel associations when Imperial powers are still in active contest - logically the various Imperial states will from time to time view such associations as against their interests and take action (very different from today when these supermonopolies are constantly wooed but never scolded). I hope this make some sense, Lenin in the last paragraph (Chapter5) qualifies the internationalism of the subject matter by stating that the then present international cartels are based on and in parallel to Imperial powers, however, his first paragraphs in the same chapter talk of Supermonopolies in a more generalised way (vis a vis Kautsky's rendition to them as a future cure all). I believe this makes clear sense only when conceding a logical instability of such international relationships during active imperialist competition - well that is at least the conclusion I have come to. Chris in this context, nothing disputes your excellent summary of the examples used by Lenin in Chapter 5. My point would only be that the question of instability adds some dimensions to these examples, and provides a conceptual way of distinguishing the past forms from the present. Obviously I do not expect anyone to swallow my conclusion as I have put it forward, the question is not whether I have provided enough weight of evidence (on such a basis I fail rather miserably), but whether this conclusion actually grows out of and adds to the original conception (in this I believe it does, without for a second believing that this was on Lenin's mind at the time, rather it is a question that could only be posed long after him and in a very changed context). At 06:40 27/09/01 +0100, you wrote: >At 26/09/01 10:19 +0800, Greg wrote: ><sniped> >I suggest that that his main point [Lenin's] which differs somewhat from >today is the issue of territorial division. > >Why is that less important today? > >I would obviously refer to the anti-colonial movement of the 20th century, >but fundamentally the reason is related to the economic base, the >development of the means of production. In many leading spheres capital >can no longer compete merely on the basis of capturing the national >market: production has to be wider than the national market. > >I think there are probably also issues of how monopoly companies have >reacted to populist anti-trust legislation. They now make secret alliances >in more subtle ways than the crude cartels did at the end of the 19th >century, which were bound to come unstuck from time to time in mutual >recrimination. > >I fully agree that whatever has changed does not automatically mean we >should respect or hate Lenin any more or less. Lenin in this chapter >refers to "the historico-economic meaning of what is taking place; for the >forms of the struggle may and do constantly change in accordance with >varying, relatively particular and temporary causes, but the substance of >the struggle, its class content positively cannot change while classes exist." > >True he we was strongly suggesting in this work written under the >restrictions of censorship, a historically inevitable process, but it >could be perfectly consistent with his method now to discuss >retrospectively how the forms of control of economic production by >monopoly finance capital have changed. I agree very much with what you say above - I am no economist (in fact I am very ignorant of just what the bourgeoisie get up to economically), politically and historically I believe there is more than enough reasons for some spring-cleaning and development in this area. Could I add one more point, or rather pose a question (based on my assumption that we have moved past Lenin's Imperialism into something else). The conjunction of development of national financial capital with states that were capable of Imperial ambitions made Imperialism and monopoly capitalism more or less the same thing (expressions of the dominant character of capital as it had developed, Imperialism being both a necessary and determining expression). However, if it is assumed that Imperialism has given way to super-imperialism there is no need to assume that super-imperialism is itself an expression of the dominant character of capital as it has developed (it may be a necessary expression without be a determining one). The notion of superimperialism is of capital moving past and above states (it has moved past the essential conjunction of native capital developing within a power strong enough to become imperial in order to express itself as national financial capital). Rather super-imperialism may be useful in order to understand the actions of states, but the nature of capital itself as the dominant social relation (now above and directing states) may well be better comprehended by other concepts. I state this as a mere proposition. And thanks again Chris for you kind and thoughtful reply. Greg Schofield Perth Australia
