[Where's Solon when you need him?]

>From Poor to Rich: Capital Is Flowing in the Wrong Direction
Philip Bowring International Herald Tribune
Wednesday, December 12, 2001



HONG KONG The Argentine currency and debt saga has dragged on for so
long that it is easy to think of it as a one-country crisis. But it
may be just the tip of the iceberg of an alarming imbalance in
liquidity between developed and developing countries. At a time when
the world needs a demand boost from countries in the best position to
grow - the developing world - capital is moving in the wrong
direction.

A liquidity shortage is being exacerbated by the volatility of capital
flows, forcing developing countries to maintain higher foreign
exchange reserves than previously deemed necessary.

According to the latest IMF data, 2001 will be the second year in a
row when there has been a net outflow of capital from the developing
countries to support consumption in the West. Overall, they are
expected to have a current account surplus of $20 billion after $60
billion in 2000.

The IMF has suggested that private capital flows to the developing
world could fall further in the next few months. The Bank for
International Settlements likewise has just reported a sharp fall in
lending to developing countries. Net debt of all developing countries
has fallen to $1.45 trillion. That compares with U.S. net foreign
debt, according to the Federal Reserve's quarterly data published on
Dec. 7, of $2.6 trillion. U.S. foreign debt per capita is now almost
three times that of Argentina.

Overall, international liquidity has increased rapidly in the last
three years mainly due to the U.S. trade deficit. Total foreign
reserves rose by 11 percent to $1.53 trillion, and the portion in
dollars climbed to 68 percent. However, most of this increase has been
accounted for by other industrial countries plus China. Even
developing countries which have seen their reserves grow remain
nervous. Those which, of their own volition or after IMF persuasion,
allow free capital flows fret over whether their reserves are big
enough to withstand sudden changes in market sentiment. For them,
seeking protection in larger reserves has become a habit restraining
them from the stimulus that their economies need.

Such caution is evident throughout Asia except in South Korea, where a
huge rise in reserves and OECD status have revived self-confidence in
the currency's stability. The rise in the dollar proportion of global
reserves has also increased other countries' sensitivity to the
dollar's value. The strength of the dollar has had a negative impact
on most of the developing world, not just economies with dollar-pegged
currencies such as Argentina.

Developing countries worry about the U.S. recession. And there is
increasing resentment at an international financial architecture which
imposes so many constraints on them but allows America to use the
position of the dollar to avoid reasonable monetary and balance of
payments discipline.

Broad money supply has grown by 13 percent in the United States in the
past year - double the European Central Bank's upper limit. The past
six months have seen the Federal Reserve create huge amounts of money
by increasing its holdings of U.S. government securities by $25
billion.

Japan and Europe are also being urged to push higher money growth.

In Asia, currency concerns have been a major cause of very low money
growth and hence of feeble domestic demand despite continued strong
trade balances.

Easy money in America may ensure that the recession is a shallow one.
But the ability to print money at will is coming under scrutiny and
must lead to pressure from developing countries for a boost to their
international liquidity via a new issue by the IMF of special drawing
rights.

That will, as in the past, be opposed by the West on the grounds that
it is both inflationary and an unjustified, unilateral transfer of
resources to the developing world. But with inflation allegedly dead,
and with global demand everywhere looking weak, a dose of global
monetary stimulus for the non-OECD world looks like a good idea for
everyone.

U.S. debt levels, the dismal demographics of Japan and Europe, the
volatility of free capital flows, the overweighting of the dollar in
international reserves, the unfair advantage that reserve currency
status gives to the three rich blocs all point to the need for a
formal boost to international liquidity in a way that spurs demand in
the developing world.

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