>--- Original Message --- >From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Chris Lowe) >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Date: 1/14/02 5:53:25 PM > >[P.S. to those on the cc list, this is a letter to the editor of a new >newsletter from Foreign Policy in Focus, a joint project of the >Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. I >wrote it and am cc'ing it because I am concerned about what the newsletter >may portend about a shift in "progressive" approaches to Africa policy in >the context of "the war on terrorism." If you don't know what this is >about but would like to, I will forward the newsletter in question. If >it's not of interest, sorry for the spam. CL] > > >Dear Tom Barry, > >A few years ago, I think while I was still at the African Studies Center at >Boston University, we had some correspondence about FPIF. > >I saw today's (inaugural?) issue of Self-Determination Conflict Watch >through a distribution on the NuAfrica listserv. I am considering whether >to subscribe. > >However, I have to say that I was surprised and troubled by the content of >SDCW. Nearly all of the pieces placed heavy uncritical reliance on the >concept of "failed state." This recent political science term of art in my >view often is a code word for "we don't know what the hell is happening." >It is also a term with a great deal of potential, in its inexactness, for >providing justifications for virtually any sort of intervention, as well as >virtually any sort of refusal to intervene, and for blaming any bad >consequences of either actions or inactions on those who are "failing," to >the exclusion of great power (and especially U.S. as global quasi-hegemon) >responsibility for their own actions or inactions, or indeed the "failure." > > >Likewise I was troubled by the fact that nearly the only explanatory >factors expressed overtly for African conflicts were either personal >ambitions of leaders, or ethnic conflicts. The only one which inched >beyond that was the piece on "warlordism." Its argument that key parties >in various conflicts may have a stake in perpetuating conflict is an >important one for progressives to grapple with. But as written, the >piece's main implications seemed to be that the U.S. should wash its hands >of such such conflicts, could in fact do so, and that the question of any >historical U.S. responsibility should be ignored. > >As a more minor point on the same piece, unqualified "increased trade >liberalization" is not a "cherished goal" for me when it comes to Africa, >and I would not have thought for FPIF -- are you changing your views on >this? The laundry-list of stated U.S. policy goals is exactly the sort of >thing I normally look to FPIF to disaggregate and analyze for its internal >contradictions. What does that absence of such critical analysis portend >for your future? > >Frankly the pieces I saw in this issue did not strike me as "progressive." >They seemed to me to be pieces that could have been published comfortably >in the New Republic. They advanced points that could be comfortably >cherry-picked by Tom Friedman for opportunistic neoliberal purposes, by >William Safire or others in support of narrow nationalist interventionist >U.S. policies, or by Pat Buchanan and others for narrow national chauvinist >isolationist purposes. In other words, they exhibit the same uncritical >conceptual incoherence as the "policy" debates allowed in the op-ed >sections of the quasi-official mainstream U.S. media. > >If the authors are in fact progressive, I urge you to encourage them to >write more incisively critical pieces. Or give them space to express more >complex ideas, if that is the problem. Or I urge you to find other >writers, if these pieces do accurately reflect their approaches. Unless >FPIF is changing direction. If that is so, please say so. > >I was surprised not to find more analysis of how it is that "warlords" in >"failed states" manage to benefit from those conflicts. Where is mention, >never mind analysis, of the open, black and gray markets in items such as >weapons, conflict diamonds, oil and so on? Where is mention, never mind >analysis, of the internal relationships of patronage, clientelism and >exclusion/exploitation that draw or force peasants, workers, migrant >peasant workers, and those utterly dispossessed by war to seek crumbs and >protection in groupings articulated either through ethnic representations >or personalistic "ideological" loyalties or both? > >And thus, by extension, where is analysis of how "failed states" articulate >with the international state system and more particularly with global >markets (especiallys since we are told that one of the features of >so-called globalization is the decline of states and the autonomy of market >actors/ corporations)? Why are ethnicity and personalistic politics >treated as "natural" givens not requiring explanation, rather than dynamics >that can be analyzed? > >Given the absence of those things, I was not surprised by the absence of >any reflection on policy options that would address such problems, such as >reining in the arms traffic, sanctioning transnational economic entities >that deal with "warlords," seeking ways to structure aid so as to undermine >ethnic chauvinism and personalistic clientelism, and so on. Nor was I >surprised by lack of attention to the parallelisms and possible >interactions between "warlord" interest in continued conflict and >neoliberal interest in continued debt, blind-eye attitudes toward >corruption, limited development and acceptance of social suffering in poor >countries. > >Perhaps these absences are indicative of where SDCW is going. If so, again >I urge you to say so openly. > >If they are not, I would like to ask you for address, over time, to at >least a couple of key issues. First, please provide critical examination >of the concept of "failed state," its potential abuses, its function in >mainstream op-ed "policy" discourses, and its inadequacy for accounting for >the differences among the societies lumped under that rubric. Second, >please seek writers who can think concretely and creatively about policy >options that would enable engagement with the vast numbers of people who >are being killed, hurt, battered, crushed, dispossessed, maimed, starved, >raped, terrorized, impoverished and so on by what you describe. > >It is true enough that there are interests in the persistence of conflicts >-- although I missed analysis of those elements of those interests which >lie "at home" in the U.S. and the North/West, and in "the international >community." But there is also a huge interest, if usually a highly >disrupted, disorganized and disspirited interest, among those being harmed, >in ending the conflicts. > >The real basis of any progressive policy has got to be to find ways to >connect with the popular interest in ending conflict, to support people's >self-organization in that interest, and to provide them resources >sufficient to allow that interest to overcome the interest of blood >profits. > >On that basis, this first issue was a great disappointment. It also is a >matter of concern if it signals that FPIF, IRC and IPS are going to move >into greater acceptance of mainstream academic/journalistic U.S. >international relations jargons and thereby of the limits of conventional >IR analytical discourses, given the extant paucity of critical resources >even without such a shift. > >Chris Lowe >(independent Africa scholar, Portland, OR >Ph.D. African history, Yale University) > > > > >
