on 2/2/02 04:01 AM, Sabri Oncu at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >> Marx seemed to try to avoid moralism in Capital, but sometimes > he let his >> moral outrage creep in even though that violated his > methodological >> principles. I alway found his notion that capitalist were > merely the >> charactermasks of capital very attractive. Very much like > Bertold Brecht, >> he felt that they were just adopting a role that capitalism > gave them. > > In an article entitled "How did Marx invent the symptom?" in > "Mapping Ideology", Zizek qoutes Marx's phrase from Capital: > "They do not know it, but they are doing it" and then goes into > discussing Sloterdijk's thesis: "They know very well what they > are doing, but still, they are doing it." However attractive > Marx's notion is, what I observe both here in the US and back > home makes me agree with Sloterdijk. It appears to me that they > know what they are doing very well. > > On another note, thanks to all who participated in this > discussion. It has been most useful, at least to me, and I wish > that it doesn't stop here. > > Best, > Sabri > Sir Sabri Oncu MIYACHI TATSUO PSYCHIATRIC DEPARTMENT KOMAKI MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL KOMAKI CITY AICHI Pre. JAPAN
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Marx argued critique of civil society, not on basis of some morality Below is my critique on Zizek,etc. based on Marx's critique of fetishism > Marx’s critique of the fetishism In Theory & Psychology, Volume 9, Number 3 June 1999, the commodity fetishism, the ideology, the false consciousness, and the theory of need are separately argued. But these categories have a common cause and an inner connection. I begin with analyzing the value-form, especially the equivalent form of value, show the mysterious character of commodity-form, and finally show the critique of the fetishism of the commodity. As for the fetishism of the capital, and interest-bearing capital, I only point out the basic mechanism different from that of the commodity. But since some articles analyze the fetishism incorrectly, I reply these arguments. They are swayed by the sphere of the exchange and the circulation, and ignore the critique of the immediate production process and the fetishism of the capital, as a result, They legitimize the capitalist mode of production. 1. On the equivalent form of value In the value-form in Capital, Marx wrote about the equivalent form: The relative value-form of a commodity, the linen for example, express its value-existence as something wholly different from its substance and properties, as the quality of being comparable with a coat for example; this expression itself therefore indicates that it conceals a social relation. With the equivalent form the reverse is true. The equivalent form consists precisely in this, that the material commodity itself, the coat for instance, express value just as it is in everyday life, and is therefore endowed with the form of value by nature itself. Admittedly this hold good only within the value-relation, in which the commodity linen is related to the commodity coat as its equivalent. However, the properties of a thing do not arise from its relation to other things, they are, on the contrary, merely activated by such relations. The coat, therefore, seems to be endowed with its equivalent form its property of direct exchangeability, by nature,.just as its property of being heavy or its ability to keep us warm. Hence the mysteriousness (Ra¨tesellhafte-quoter) of equivalent form(Caipital,1,p.149) This is the first peculiarity of equivalent form from which use-value becomes the form of appearance of its opposite, value.(First substitution-Quidproquo) About the second peculiarity of equivalent form, Marx wrote: In order to express the fact that, for instance, weaving creates the value of linen through its general property of being human labour rather than in its concrete form as weaving, we contrast it with the concrete labour which produces the equivalent of linen, namely tailoring. Tailoring is now seen as the tangible form of realization of abstract human labour(Capital,1,p.150). In this substitution concrete labour becomes the form of manifestation of its opposite, abstract human labour. In this form, the relation of the abstract and the concrete is reverse. This is the second substitution(Quidproquo-quoter) . And the third peculiarity of equivalent form is that private labour takes the form of its opposite, namely labour in its directly social form: Because this concrete labour, tailoring, counts exclusively as the expression of undifferentiated human labour, it possesses the characteristic of being identical with other kinds of labour, such as the labour embodied in the linen. Consequently, although, like all other commodity-producing labour, it is the labour of private individuals, it is nevertheless labour in its directly social form. It is precisely for this reason that it presents itself to us in the shape of a product which is directly exchangeable with other commodities(Capital,1,p.150) This is the third substitution. 2. On the mysterious character(Das Geheimnisvolle-quoter) of the commodity-form About the mysterious character of commodity-form, Marx wrote: the mysterious character of the commodity-form therefore simply in the fact that commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own labour as objective characteristics of the products labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things(Dinge-quoter). Hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to sum total of labour as a social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers. Through this substitution, the products of labour become commodities, sensuous thing(Ding), which are at the same time suprasensible or social(Capital,1,p.164) To understand this Geheimnisvolle of this commodity-form have to be premised on understanding the Ra¨tesellhahte of equivalent form, and the problem is previously resolved in the part of value-form, in which the equivalent form seems to have its property of direct exchangeability by nature just as the material properties. So Ra¨tesellhafte of equivalent form meets the Geheimnisvolle of the commodity-form. 3. From equivalent form to money-form The purpose of analyzing the value-form is to show the origin of money-form by tracing the development of the expression of value. The degree of development of relative form of value, and that of the equivalent form, correspond. But we must bear in mind that of the development of the equivalent form is only the expression and the result of the development of the relative form. The simple or isolated relative form of value of one commodity converts some other commodity into an isolated equivalent. The expanded form of relative value, that expression of the value of one commodity in terms of all other commodities, imprints those other commodities with the form of particular equivalents of different kinds. Finally, a particular kind of commodity acquires the form of universal equivalent, because all other commodities make it the material embodiment of their uniform and universal form of value…The universal equivalent form is a form of value in general. It can therefore be assumed by any commodity. On the other hand, a commodity is only to be found in the universal equivalent form(form C), if, and in so far as, it is excluded from the ranks of all other commodities, as being their equivalent. Only when this exclusion becomes finally restricted to specific kind of commodity does the uniform relative form of value of the world of commodities attain objective fixedness and general social validity. The specific kind of commodity with those natural form the equivalent form is socially interwoven now becomes the money commodity, or serve as money… The only difficulty in the concept of the money form is that of grasping the universal equivalent form(Capital 1, p.139) And the difficulty in the concept of equivalent form is that of grasping simple value form between two commodities. In money-form, gold and silver are not seen as representing a social relation of production, but in the form of natural objects with peculiar social properties. This substitution makes the social relation of production being natural things. 4. Versachlichung der Personen and Personifizierung der Sache About Versachlichung der Personen, Marx wrote: Whence then, arise the enigmatic( ra¨tsellhafte-quoter) character of the product of labour as soon as it assumes the form of a commodity? Clearly, it arises from this form itself. The equality of the kinds of human labour takes on a physical form in the equal objectivity of the products of human labour as values; the measure of the expenditure of human labour-power by its duration takes on the form of the magnitude of the value of the products of labour; and finally the relationship between the producers, within which the social characteristics of their labour are manifested, take on the form of a social relation between the products of labour(Capital 1, p.164) And about Personfizierung der Sache: Commodities cannot themselves go to market and perform exchanges in the their own right. We must, therefore have recourse to their guardians, who are possessors of commodities. Commodities are things(Dinge-quoter) and therefore lack the power to resist man. If they are unwilling, he can use force; in other words, he can take possession of them. In order that these objects may enter into relation with each other as commodities, their guardians must place themselves in relation to once another as persons whose will resides in those objects, and must behave in such a way that each does not appropriate the commodity of the other, and alienate his own, except through an act to which both parties consent. The guardian must therefore recognize each other as owners of private property. This juridical relation, whose form is the contract, whether as part of a developed legal system or not, is a relation between two wills which mirror the economic relation. The content of this juridical relation( or relation of two wills) exist for one another merely as representative and hence owners, of commodities(Capital,1. P.178) In this context, subjectivity is on the side of commodity, not person. As guardian of commodity, person’s will resides in those objects, which become the subject of relation, and person merely act for commodities behavior. This substitution is the mode of unintentional government of person’s will. Therefore the bearer of commodities are not free person, but is ruled by commodities behavior This is the Personfizierung der Sache. 5. On the fetishism of commodity Versachlichung is followed by fetishism. Marx wrote: The mysterious(Geheimnisvolle) character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to sum total of labour as a social relations of objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers. Through this substitution, the products of labour become commodity…The commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of commodity and the material relations arising out of that. It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of the relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the product of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities(Capital,1, p.164) The appearance form of commodity relation produces the fantastic form of relation between things. Therefore Versachlichug produces Verdinglichung. Now, fundamentally speaking, Simple value form provide the basis of the fetishism as false semblance independently of this relation: We have already seen, from the simplest expression of value, x commodity A= y commodity B, that the thing in which the magnitude of the value of another thing is represented appears to have the equivalent form independently of this relation, as s social property inherent in its nature. We followed the process by which this false semblance became firmly established, a process which was completed when the universal equivalent form became identified with the natural form of a particular commodity, and thus crystallized into the money-form. What appears to happen is not that a particular commodity becomes money because all other commodities express their values in it, but, on the contrary, that that all other commodities universally express their values in a particular commodity because it is money. The movement through which this process has been mediated vanishes in its own result, leaving no trace behind( Capital,1,p.187) Thus Ding appear to have the social force by nature. The fetishism of commodity and money is completed. Now about fetishism of capital, and interest-bearing capital, this theme is beyond my argument, but the basic mechanism is not that of the fetishism of commodity and money, but I only point out that the substitution of relation of means of production and labour is the root of fetishism of capital in which the separation of means of production from producer occurs.. Thus, the fetishism is itself an ideology, which justify the capitalist mode of production. Marx wrote: We have already shown in connection with the most simple categories of the capitalist mode of production and commodity production in general, in connection with commodities and money, the mystifying character that transforms the social relations for which the material elements of wealth serve as bearers in the course of production into properties of these things themselves(commodities), still more explicitly transforming the relation of production itself into a thing(money). All forms of society are subject to this distortion(Capital,3,p.965) . 6. The fetishism and every day life consciousness On the basis of the fetishism, the actual producer’s consciousness is determined. Marx wrote: : It is also quite natural, on the other hand, that the actual agents of production themselves feel completely at home in these estranged and irrational forms of capitalist-interest, land-rent, labour-wages, for these are precisely the configuration of appearance in which they move, and with which they are daily involved(Capital,3,p.969) But, on the same time, on account of Versachlichung, the capitalist mode of production appear to them as overwhelming natural law, governing them irrespective of their will. Obeying natural law as such gravity is natural action, so false semblance of freedom is established.. But, on the other hand, since the social power that governs people is Sache, Deversachlichung movement emerges. Ecologies, consumer and worker’s cooperative, and many social movements generally pursuit Deversachlichung unconsciously or consciously to establish the new organization of society in which the social labour need not to receive the form private labour, and need not to mediate the product of labour in order to prove his own labour in abstract form as socially approved 7. Reply to argument of Martha Augoustinous on Ideology . M.Augoustinous argues about ideology. At first, she sends away the theories of ideology such as ideology as the set of political beliefs and value, ideology as system justification, ideology as false consciousness, and ideology as social cognition. And she adopts ideology as false consciousness as an ideological critique of society. About ideology as political beliefs , she says: By restricting the definition of ideology to a coherent system of political beliefs as embodied within rhetoric of western democratic political parties, this tradition of research focuses only upon formal political conflicts and the formal process of political decision-making. While this is a legitimate area of research and inquiry in itself, it fails to consider the everyday politics of ordinary person’s life, thereby stripping the concept of ideology of its critical component. (p.297) She correctly point out the limitation of ideology as political beliefs. Secondly, she argues about ideology as system justification “such theoretical perspectives have emerged largely from structural Marxist accounts of ideology”(p.297) on the basis of Marx’s German ideology. But this notion is “ criticized for being too economically determinist and reductionist”(p.298) But the theme of German ideology lies in critique of Hegelian tradition, and the understanding of class struggle emerging from material relation, separating its political, religious, ideological form. Thus, Marx said that it is necessary to separate the material conflict from its political,religious form to understand class-struggle. It is not reductionist theory. Thirdly, she argue about ideology as false consciousness The working classes were seen to have failed to recognize their ‘true’ economic and political interests by internalizing the bourgeois values of their oppressors. Ideology(falsity) was contrasted with science(truth). Many social theorists have seized on this vulgarized concept of ideology, equating it with all that is false, distorting and mystifying. Like the concept of false consciousness, the Gramiscian notion of hegemony has been to understand the widespread perceived legitimacy and support that contemporary capitalism and parliamentary democracy receive from the general public( Gramsci,1971)… The hegemonic process can be described as the way in which a particular world view or moral philosophical outlook diffuses throughout society, forming the basis of what is 299) She criticizes the notion of the false consciousness: The notion of false consciousness suggests that ideology itself is a matrix of falsefoods, a view which only a few Marxists would adhere to today. For example, Eagleton(1991) argues…’In short , successful ideologies must be more than imposed illusion, and for all their inconsistencies must communicate to their subjects a version of reality which is real and recognizable enough not to be simply rejected out of hand’ (p.300-301) But she and Eaglton don’t refer to the content of so-called reality. Since they don’t argue the content of the so-called reality, they cannot point out the false consciousness. Next, she criticizes the ideology as social cognition.: Jost(1995), for example, documents a body of social psychological research demonstrating that many disadvantaged and oppressed group in society hold beliefs which are contrary to their own self-and group interest; that is beliefs which justify, rationalize and legitimate their own subordination. These documented social psychological phenomena include: belief in a just world(Lerner,1980)-associated with a tendency among oppressed groups not to perceive their own injustice and disadvantage(Elster,1987); political fatalism and acquiescence-linked to beliefs about the futility of protest and the unlikelihood of social change(Cunningham,1987); actual resistance to change−reflected in phenomena such as cognitive conservatism(Greenwald,1980), and behavioural compliance; the tendency for society’s victims to blame themselves(Janoff-Bulman, 1992) or to blame and scapegoat other disadvantaged persons or groups(Tajfel, 1978); identification with and preference for ‘the oppressor’ or more powerful outgroups(Hinke&Brown, 1990) ;and finally, the justification of social roles and the legitimation of existing inequities between different social groups(Jost&Banaji, 1994)” She criticizes the social cognition that “Psychological accounts of false consciousness primarily locate distortions and mystification within the perceptual and cognitive domain of the individual subject. The individual subject is viewed as failing to perceive reality accurately and failing to recognize his or her true self-and group-based interests. Such individualistic approaches to subjectivity fail to acknowledge that reality construction is not an isolated cognitive task involving the direct and unmediated perception of the world. People are constantly and actively engaged in a complex and socially situated process of constructing reality, but they do this by using the cultural and ideological resources that are available to them( Gergen,1982; Harre´ 1983; Shotter, 1984).(p.301-302) But by social cognitionist, important documents are observed. The problems here are not criticize them as individualist but to interpret their observations from the perspective of Versachlichung and the fetishism of Sachen( commodity, money and capital). The fetishism attribute the capitalist mode of production to a socio-natural property. Under this fantastic form, individual adapts to the relation as if adapt to natural law. But on the other hand, The bearer of the commodity reside their will in the commodity, the subjectivity is on the side of commodity. In the market, the commodity of high productivity has high price, and the converse is true, so that commodity form allows the bearer of commodity to recognize their value in so far as their abstract labour, and treat the concrete person’s labour discriminately. Labour’s price is in fact reproductive cost of labourer, but for the fetishism, it appears to arise from labour’s use value. Since labourer’s natural differences such as skin’s color, or labour’s characteristics appear to decide the price of labour, many discrimination occurs within the working class. Besides, on the oppressed side of social relation, the oppressed drive to oppose to the social relations, but this opposition appear to unnatural such as to oppose the gravity in the person swayed by the fetishism of Sachen, so that the opposition turns upon to himself or the same groups. And discriminations within the working class occur. Finally, She adopt the notion of the false consciousness as an ideological critique of society: Marx later writings which located ideology not in peoples minds or their consciousness, but in the social and material reality of capital itself.(p.305) She quotes Eagleton who says: Marx is not claiming that under capitalism commodities appear to exercise a tyrannical sway over social relation; he is arguing that they actually do(p.305) She also quote Geras who says: If then the social agents experience capitalist society as something other than it really is, this is fundamentally because capitalist society presents itself something other than it really is(p.305) She says that mystification , then, is embedded in the very nature of capitalist society, in reality itself, and not in the minds of people. But her and Eagleton’s argument surrenders the fetishism of capital, because they approve the Sachen’s tyrannical social force as if natural disaster. While Marx’s critique of fetishism is to criticize the socio-natural appearance form of social relation as fantastic form of a relation between things which is derived from mysterious character of commodity-form, they surrender the fetishism of Sachen. In addition, their notion of reality is unclear. What is the content of the reality.? According to her argument, paradoxically,the false consciousness is the consciousness of the reality, so she must returns back to the beginning with interpreting the so-called reality. 8.Reply to argument of Michael Billig on commodity fetishism and of Brenda Goldberg on a psychology of need and the abstraction of Value Michael Billig argue that for fetishism of commodity, social forgetting occurs, and in late capitalism or consumer capitalism, postmodern, consumer capitalism has lost its capacity to retain its own past. Along side what Jameson calls a ‘historical amnesia’, a sociological amnesia can be detected. The very term ‘consumer capitalism’ exemplifies this absent-mindednes: .My memory can include the production of my self through my consumption: I can tell stories of how I acquired the means to be my present self. But I have little or nothing to say about the production of my jealously owned commodities…My sense of being a possessive self is not derived from my relation with those who produce the means of these pleasure. Quite contrary, it is to be derived from the relation between my commodities, conceived as material object, and the commodities of others. It is precisely this type of relationship which Marx identified at fetishist.(p.319-320) To remember Marx is to remember the condition of daily exploitation. We should remember that the fetishized commodities whose daily consumption is so important to us and to our sense of ourselves are produced by unnamed ‘Others’. Our routines of life , not to mention our habits of interpretation, distract us from this remembering. Thanks to such routines, we can habitually forget that our many possessions have been produced by the labour of repressed Others.(p.327) Firstly, his reading of fetishism of commodity is incorrect. He says: the value of a commodity derives from the labour which has produced the commodity. Instead of understanding the value of the commodity in terms of the social relation of which have produced it, the commodity’s value is understood in relation to other commodities, such as money or the goods that money can purchase. In this way, the labour expended in the production is forgotten in the everyday understanding of the value of commodity. The social character of labour appears ‘ as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour. Consequently, ‘ a definite social relation between men assumes…the fantastic form of a relation between things’ …He(Marx-quoter) wrote that ‘ the determination of the magnitude of value by labour-time7 becomes secret’ and, thus, money ‘actually conceals, instead of disclosing, the social character of private labour’(p.315) In the first place, value of commodity don’t derives from labour, but abstract labour. In the value form, the characteristics of abstract labour is expressed by equivalent form of value. And that the social character of labour appears as objective character stamped upon the product of that labour is the substitution(Quidproquo) of relation. Similarly, Brenda Goldberg’s understanding of fetishism of commodity is incorrect. She says: the abstract concept of value, which is the most basic form of exchange, two commodities stand, as it were, eye to eye( or ‘I’ to ‘I’),caught in a specular relationship. In order for the two objects, commodity ‘A’ and commodity ‘B’, to be exchanged they must express a relation of both relative and equivalent value. Since commodity ‘A’ cannot express its own value, it must seek its value through the bodily form of opposing image. One commodity can only have value when compared to another commodity, which stand in relation to itself in a different qualitative form, and so a second object, commodity ‘B’, must serve as the physical embodiment through which the value of ‘A’ is expressed. Within this elementary form of exchange there is a division of roles, one commodity taking the active ‘A’ and one the passive ‘B’ role. The function of the passive object is to act as a mirroring surface reflecting back the other value. Second, however, for two commodities to be deemed exchangeable, they must also some identical or equivalent substance. The substance which is common to both elements is , according to Marx, abstract human labour power. The expanded form of value occurs when the social network of commodity relations develops such that commodity ‘A’ can find its relative and equivalent value in a variety of other commodities(p.357) Firstly, relation of commodities is not premised on real exchange, or exchange process. Marx, at first, analyzed one commodity, and reduced it to abstract labour.as crystals of this social substance which is value. Then, he analyze the value form, in which this social substance appear. Because commodities possess an objective character as values only in so far as they are all expressions of an identical social substance, human labour, that their objective character as values is therefore purely social. From this it follows self-evident that it can only appear in the social relation between commodity and commodity. In the simple form of value, two commodity play two different parts. The linen express its value in the coat; the coat serves as material in which that value is expressed. The relative form of value and the equivalent form are two inseparable moments, which belongs to and mutually condition each other; but at the same time, they are mutually exclusive or opposed extremes, i.e. poles of the expression of value. Thus, commodity ‘A’ cannot play both roles in the same time, which Goldberg suggest to be possible. Because he cannot analyze the peculiarity of the equivalent form of value, he says: the commodity are all relative to each other” “ In order to give unity and true abstraction to the system, a third element is needed(p.358) This confused explanation is derived from disregarding the analysis the equivalent form of value. Now about social amnesia, Billig point out the relation of consumption and production. But he ignores the fetishism of the capital. About the labour process and the valorization process, Marx wrote: The labour process, as we have just presented it in its simple and abstract elements, is purposeful activity aimed at the production of use values. It is an appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirement of man. It is the universal condition for the metabolic interaction between man and nature, everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence, and it is therefore independent of every form of that existence….The labour process, when under the control of the capitalist consumes labour power, exhibits two characteristic phenomena. First, the worker works under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour belongs….Secondly, the product is the property of the capitalist and not that of the worker, its immediate producer(Capital.1.p.290-291) But for the fetishism of the capital, the valorization process appear to the simple labour process, so that workers appear to work in a socio-natural production process. Since Billig is swayed by the sphere of commodity exchange, the true relationship of commodity exchange and the immediate process of production of surplus-value is vague. His insistence that to remember Marx is to remember the condition of daily exploitation ignores the force of the fetishism of capital and confuse the level of commodity consumption with commodity production. Commodity consumption is not necessarily followed by social amnesia. Rather, social amnesia may occurs from the process of accumulation of capital in which : As soon as this metamorphosis has sufficiently decomposed the old society throughout its depth and breadth, as soon as the workers have been turned into proletarians, and their means of labour into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, the further socialization of labour and the further transformation of the soil and other means of production into socially exploited and therefore communal means of production, takes on a new form.(Capital.1.p.928) If society maintains communal character, social, historical memory don’ t vanish. In capitalist society, in which individuals are reciprocally alienated , collective and historical memory is impossible. Now, Billig’s argument on repression and social amnesia ignores the the critique of fetishism of immediate process of production even its mysterious form, so that he legitimize the capitalist mode of production in general and fail to explain the reason of social amnesia. Likewise, Goldberg’s argument on commodity confuses the fantastic form of relation between things with fetishism of capital. Since her understanding of value-form is incorrect, she fails to grasp the Versachlicung der personen und Personifizihrung der Sache. In the Personifizihrung der Sache, the Sache governs person’s will. .Person only act for commodity’s behaviour. And she says: as Marx also observed, although it is during the production stage that exploitation occurs and ‘surplus’ value is created, this exploitation can only full express itself and reap its ‘return’ when the commodity passes into the realm of circulation and consumption(p.364) Here, she is swayed by the false semblance of the capital circulation. Capital circulation, commodity-capital, productive-capital, and money-capital only realize, not ‘express’ or ‘emerge’. Nevertheless she says: It is in the sphere of circulation that the class and race interests ’ hidden’ within the independent body of commodity are ‘personified’ and psychology’s subjects are metamorphosed through its form in an assessment of their ‘value(p.364) In the sphere of exchange, commodity-value only realize, and in the circulation, three forms of capital only realize. She sees in the sphere of circulation the class and race interest, but it is incorrect. Marx wrote: the value and surplus-value contained in these commodities must first be realized in the circulation process. Both the restoration of the values advanced in production, and particularly the surplus-value contained in the commodities, seem not just to be realized only in circulation but actually to arise from it. This appearance is reinforced by two circumstances in particular: firstly, profit on alienation, which depends on cheating, cunning, expertise, talent and a thousand and one market conjunctures; then the fact that a second determining element intervenes here besides labour-time, i.e. the circulation time. Even though this functions simply as negative limit on the formation of value and surplus-value, it gives the appearance of being just as positive a ground as labour itself and of involving a determination independent of labour that arise from the nature of capital. In Volume 2, of course, we had to present this sphere of circulation only in relation to determination of form it produces, to demonstrate the further development of the form of capital that takes place in it.(Capital,3,p.966) In contrast with this argument, she ignores the critique of immediate production. As a result, she legitimize the capitalist mode of production process as well as Billig. After all, Billig and Goldberg consider that the exchange process conceal the exploitable character within the sphere of immediate production process. But, important is to understand how to be possible to conceal the exploitable character of capitalist mode of production within the sphere of immediate production process. The fetishism of capital make it possible. In this article, I tried to show Marx’s critique of the fetishism of commodity, and it is itself ideology which justify the world of commodity in which commodity appears as socio-natural thing.. As for the fetishism of the capital and interest-bearing capital, I only pointed out the basicmechanism. The some articles about the fetishism of commodity and ideology are insufficient. My reply shows these incorrectness.