I don't think the conclusions there are exremely interesting but there is some useful information in the below Startfor "analysis".
Sabri ++++++++++++ Venezuela: Rumored U.S. Involvement Could Hurt Bush Administration 14 April 2002 Summary Human intelligence sources in Venezuela and Washington told STRATFOR April 14 that the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. State Department may have been involved separately in the events that took place in Caracas between April 5 and April 13. If the information is correct, the reinstatement of President Hugo Chavez less than 48 hours after he was toppled by a civilian-military coup could have disastrous implications for the Bush administration's policy in Latin America. Analysis Several human sources told STRATFOR on April 14 that the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency may have had a hand in the tumultuous events that occurred between April 5 and April 13 in Caracas, culminating in President Hugo Chavez's brief ouster and his return to power. Although these sources may have had their own motivations for making the allegation, it is possible -- if the Chavez regime produces convincing evidence of U.S. government involvement in the failed coup -- that it could poison Washington's relations with governments throughout Latin America. Efforts to win regional support for increased U.S. military support to Colombia, and to other Andean ridge countries battling the twin threats of international drug trafficking and nominally Marxist insurgencies, would be set back significantly in Latin America and Washington. The Bush administration's efforts to pursue more free trade agreements in the region also would be undermined. Chavez could strengthen his own political base in Venezuela if he can quickly prove U.S. involvement in attempts to topple his 3-year-old regime. This also would give a tremendous boost to Chavez's leadership status and credibility with populist and nationalist groups across Latin America that view the United States as a threat and that oppose U.S.-style capitalist democracy. The U.S. government has a long history of interfering with Latin American regimes viewed as unfriendly or dangerous to U.S. national security interests in the region. Although the Bush administration tried very hard in the past week to distance itself from the chaos in Venezuela, many governments in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia viewed Washington's cautious silence on Venezuela with considerable skepticism. However, if STRATFOR's sources are correct, the skepticism may have been justified. Our sources in Venezuela and the United States report that the CIA had knowledge of, and possibly even supported, the ultra-conservative civilians and military officials who tried unsuccessfully to hijack interim President Pedro Carmona Estanga's administration. Sources in Venezuela identified this group as including members of the extremely conservative Catholic Opus Dei society and military officers loyal to retired Gen. Ruben Rojas, who also is a son-in-law of former President Rafael Caldera. Caldera, who governed from 1969 to 1973 and from 1994 to 1998, founded the Christian Democratic Copei party. STRATFOR's sources say this ultra-conservative group planned to launch a coup against the Chavez regime on Feb. 27, but the action was aborted at the last minute as a result of strong pressure from the Bush administration, which warned publicly that it would not support or recognize any undemocratic efforts to oust Chavez. Separately, STRATFOR's sources report, the State Department was quietly supporting the moderate center-right civilian-military coalition that sought Chavez's resignation by confronting his increasingly authoritarian regime with unarmed, peaceful people power. The April 11 protest by nearly 350,000 Venezuelans was the largest march against any government in Venezuela's history, and even without violence the momentum likely would have continued building in subsequent days. U.S. policymakers who supported the civic groups seeking Chavez's departure believed their numbers eventually would reach a sufficiently large critical mass to force a change in Chavez's policies or even trigger a regime change. However, the violence that killed 15 people and injured 350 -- including 157 who suffered gunshot wounds inflicted by pro-Chavez government security forces and civilian militia members -- united the previously leaderless and disarticulated center-right opposition and gave moderates in the armed forces (FAN) what they perceived as a legitimate reason to oust Chavez immediately. Sources in this center-right group tell STRATFOR that the videotapes of pro-Chavez gunmen firing indiscriminately into the front ranks of marching protesters were "more than enough" to legally justify a regime change. The conservative civilian-military group timed its coup-within-a -coup perfectly, using Carmona's swearing-in ceremony as the platform from which to hijack what was supposed to be a moderate center-right transition government -- a government that would reach out to the moderate left that is led by former Interior and Justice Minister Luis Miquilena. STRATFOR's sources inside this group report that 23 members of the president's Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) block in the National Assembly had committed late April 11, after the violence, to vote for Chavez's removal from power. Additionally, given that Vice President Diosdado Cabello was responsible for organizing and coordinating the Bolivarian Circles from Miraflores presidential palace, it was felt that he and other senior Chavez regime officials could have been removed legally from the government with the help of Miquilena's votes in the National Assembly and his strong influence over the Supreme Court. However, Carmona Estanga destroyed that possibility and irreparably fractured the center-right coalition that named him to the presidency when he announced the dissolution of the National Assembly, fired the entire Supreme Court and sacked the attorney general, comptroller general and the public defender, who were appointed by Chavez. The dissolution of the National Assembly was repudiated unanimously by every political and civic organization in the country. The powerful Venezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV) promptly withdrew its support from Carmona without making any announcements in that regard, STRATFOR sources said, and the tenuous anti-Chavez coalition within the FAN collapsed almost immediately. Moreover, tensions between the moderate and mainly army faction led by Gen. Efrain Vasquez Velasco and the ultra-conservatives flared rapidly as the right-wingers, through the new interim defense minister, sought to break up Vasquez Velasco's base of support within the army by transferring some his key associates to other commands. The picture painted by STRATFOR's sources in Venezuela and the United States is of two parallel U.S. operations that were executed separately by the State Department and CIA. While the State Department sought discreetly and quasi-officially to support the anti-Chavez moderates in an effort to build a viable political center, the CIA was at least aware of the ultra-conservative plot to hijack Carmona's short-lived presidency. If the sources are correct, the Bush administration's carefully laid plans soon may backfire.
