Here is a relevant part of the article, Cheers, Ken Hanly
Rosenberg offers two possible reasons why the agency is moving slowly and claiming publicly that it has no suspects yet. One is a fear that damaging and embarrassing details about secret U.S. biodefense programs might become public. As she explains, "Anybody with the expertise and background of the likely perpetrator has very likely been involved in a whole series of secret projects." So, she continues, the FBI may not want to apprehend the likely suspect "because if he is arrested, he may very well threaten to disclose some of this information." The other possible reason she offers is the need to acquire sufficient, definitive evidence to convict the perpetrator, whom she and the FBI believe is a male. "I see no reason, however, for doing the dumb things that the FBI is doing." Among "the smokescreen of silly activities" Rosenberg cites are FBI letters to 32,000 U.S. microbiologists seeking information, when only about 200 of them are or have been associated with biodefense research, and thousands of flyers sent to central New Jersey residents asking them if they recognize handwriting that was likely disguised by the perpetrator. If those activities are attempts "to deflect the suspect from thinking the FBI is after him," they are not going to fool him, Rosenberg says. Nor, she says, are the FBI's public utterances that it "really has no idea who did it, when I know it has been given names and some information that makes a few people, at least, significant, serious suspects." Although press reports say Rosenberg knows who the perpetrator is, she insists she does not. "I have information about a very likely suspect whom, I believe, is probably the perpetrator. Whether the FBI has the same view of it, I don't know. But I do know the FBI is interested" in this person. Rosenberg offers a portrait of the likely suspect on FAS's website. The FBI also describes him on its website link called Ameritrax. She believes a middle-aged American carried out the anthrax attacks, although she says she "can't rule out ... an accomplice." Indeed, other experts argue that the only way to explain the geographic diversity of the attacks is to assume more than one person carried them out. >From her sources inside the biodefense program, Rosenberg has come to believe that the suspect worked at a U.S. military research facility, most likely USAMRIID, in the mid-1990s. She posits that he now likely works for a Washington, D.C., area defense contractor. On the FAS website, Rosenberg writes that the suspect probably knows William C. Patrick III and "has probably learned a thing or two about weaponization from him, informally." Patrick developed biological weapons at Fort Detrick before the U.S. program was shut by President Richard Nixon in 1969. A Dec. 3, 2001, New York Times article describes a classified report dated February 1999 that discusses responses to a mail-delivered anthrax attack. According to the Times article, Patrick wrote the report for a contractor working for a federal agency. Rosenberg speculates that if the perpetrator of last fall's anthrax terror had access to materials he used in the attacks, he also must have security clearance or some other means of accessing classified information. He might have read the classified report "and used it as a model for the attack," she concludes. She has gone even further by suggesting on BBC's "Newsnight" program of March 3 that a secret CIA field project to test the ramifications of sending anthrax through the mail went badly awry. Her premise is that the person selected to carry out the test might have decided to use it for his own – not CIA – purposes and targeted the media and the Senate. On the BBC program, reporter Susan Watts said that Patrick denied being the author of the 1999 classified report. And the CIA told "Newsnight," in a statement read after the program was broadcast, that it rejects Rosenberg's theory out of hand and knows of no project to test the impact of letter-delivered anthrax. The FBI tried "to convince me that it was, in fact, doing its job. Maybe the FBI is doing its job as it sees it. I think it is doing it in a terribly inefficient way." WHY, THEN, did the suspect carry out the attacks? Rosenberg believes his motive is personal, that he is angry at some government agency or policy. A secondary motive akin to "increasing the scope and power of the biological defense program would probably be to his liking," she says. "He undoubtedly, since he's involved in it, stands to gain by increasing the biodefense program," she adds. She rather doubts that he got the anthrax from his current place of employment. Instead, she, like others, suggests that "he probably got the Ames stain from USAMRIID, but that is just a guess." He might have taken the anthrax when he left USAMRIID. Or, she says, "he might have gotten it since then because I am told that people who have worked there in the past, people who are known, can go and come freely." Until Sept. 11, 2001, security was not tight at USAMRIID, Rosenberg says. Making weapons-grade anthrax, she suspects, "is or has been part of his job because he is so good at it." If he did it on his own, Rosenberg says, he "came up with a superb preparation." Many knowledgeable people have been quoted as saying it was as good as or even better than the anthrax the U.S. made before 1969. Still, it's a puzzlement. How could he make such deadly anthrax without harming himself or others and without being discovered? "Suppose," Rosenberg answers, "this was his job. Suppose he's been doing this, knows how to make it, is a real expert at it." Evidently, she says, "he has developed ways of doing it safely, or ways of protecting himself." It's possible to buy portable, disposable containment units, she explains ----- Original Message ----- From: "Charles Jannuzi" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, April 14, 2002 11:35 PM Subject: [PEN-L:24920] Re: Barbara Rosenberg on the Anthrax Inquiry > The page exceeded its limits. I don't suppose you could give us a summary, > Ken? Earlier on LBO-Talk and this list I said that instead of 9-11 perps or > Arab-hating nut cases at Ft. Detrick, the perpetrator(s) might well have > been ones working in companies, and they had financial motives (though this > still might mean at least former employees from Ft. Detrick). > > And likely companies worth investigating are BioPort, where pharmaceutical > researchers and scientists were encouraged to put their retirement into its > stock (though it is not a publicly traded company). And the other suspicious > company is the recently bankrupt and recently sold IT Group, which had the > contract for cleaning up DC in the event of an anthrax attack. It also > worked with Wackenhut to set up some sort of anthrax traning course at Univ. > of Findlay in Ohio. > > Both companies can be linked to Carlyle Group without hardly trying. BioPort > had CG people on its board, and IT Group is or at least was 25% owned by > Carlyle Group and lucratively sold to Shaw Group. > > Charles Jannuzi >
