Louis P. pointed out that shoe production in SE Asia for western companies
is often done through subcontractors. Bata Shoes has production and retail
worldwide and it tries to sell shoes locally based on the income of the avg.
worker so as to keep the shoes affordable. Everytime I go to Malaysia I pick
up a pair of Bata sandals for use back in Japan (where no one sells Bata).
Interestingly Bata is consistently rated a better company than Nike or
Reebok or Adidas, but it becomes most exploitative when it is producing for
such companies as those.

---------------
http://www.nikeworkers.org/reebok/compare.html

How does Reebok add up?

1. How does Reebok compare with other MNCs or footwear companies?

Since Reebok "contracts out" all shoe-making operations, the treatment of
the workers by the contractors is pretty much the same, whether it is Nike,
Reebok, adidas or Fila. It is a model based on the "lowest wage/least
rights" formula that concentrated almost all shoe production in Indonesia,
China and (later) Vietnam.

Another model -- NOT contracting out -- offers a different result. Bata
(based in Toronto) runs its own factories which produce cheap sneakers for
local markets. Ten years ago, the Bata factory in Jakarta had already had a
union contract for eighteen years and was paying triple the minimum wage.
Ironically, when Bata started to produce expensive shoes for export (for
Reebok and others) around 1993, a two-tier system developed and workers
making expensive shoes for export were treated as "contract" (temporary)
workers with far inferior conditions and lower wages. Still, a 1999 survey
done with the Urban Community Mission showed that there was less abusive
treatment in the 2 Bata factories, compared to the factories producing
exclusively for export. See full report of interviews with 4,000 Indonesian
workers:

Click here to find out more

There is another "mixed" model, represented by companies such as U.S.-based
New Balance and Saucony (Hyde Athletic). While both companies produce mostly
in China, a significant amount of production takes place in the U.S. This
means that some sports shoe workers earn more in two hours than Indonesians
can earn in a forty-hour week! (Converse also continued to make some sport
shoes in the U.S., until mid-2001.)

2. How does the cost/profit of a pair of Reeboks break down? Relation labour
costs/publicity?

Though the sports shoe business is highly competitive, profits are quite
good. It must be remembered that profits are taken by the contractor that
makes the shoes, by Reebok and by the retailer. The contractors that produce
for Reebok (mostly Taiwanese and Korean companies) have been very successful
for the past twenty to twenty-five years -- especially since the production
moved to China and Indonesia around 1987. Several years ago, the investment
giant Goldman Sachs bought a huge stake in Yue Yuen (one of these
contractors), giving an indication of profitability. These profits are
derived from a selling cost of around eight dollars (the labor cost being
just about one dollar). Last year, a Wall Street Journal article quoted a
Yue Yuen manager asking NOT to be quoted saying that Yue Yuen's profits were
better than the buyers' (Reebok or Nike) profits.

Next, profits are taken by Reebok. Gross margin before taxes is pretty
standard at 9%. The spending aimed at increasing sales -- the marketing
costs of shoe companies -- has been estimated at about ten percent of final
sales price, by Professor Robert J. Ross at Clark University. This is more
than TEN times what companies such as Wal-Mart spend on marketing and
promotion, Prof. Ross says. In addition, Reebok was severely criticized by
the pension fund managers for California's public employees ("Calpers") for
the ridiculously high salary paid to CEO, Paul Fireman during most of the
90s.

The standard practice of retailers such as FootLocker is to mark up the
shoes 100% over what it pays to Reebok. That is, a $50 pair of shoes will
sell for $100. If it does not sell for "full retail", it is discounted, of
course. During the sneaker industry's "boom" years (1992- 97), FootLocker
expanded rapidly, going from 2,000 shops to something like 7,000.

3. Who buys Reeboks, where and why? What alternatives are there to buying
Reeboks?

Currently, Reebok sells about 15% of the sports shoes sold in the world ・
about the same as adidas. Nike has well over 40% of the world-wide market.

Reebok had its greatest success with an "aerobics shoe" for women in the
late 1980s ・for a short time, the company was ahead of Nike. Since that
time, performance has been pretty dismal. Last year, a Boston Globe
columnist called Fireman "the worst CEO in America", in a column which
reviewed the company's performance over the past decade.

Reebok sales are strong in the U.S. and W. Europe; the demographic skews
slightly older than Nike痴. Alternatives for running shoes: the U.S.
magazine, "Consumer Reports" rated some New Balance and Saucony shoes above
Reebok and Nike. NB and Saucony shoes are usually cheaper, even though
overall labor costs are significantly higher.

4. To what extent is Reebok dependent on cheap labour countries? What is its
history in Indonesia?

Reebok, like Nike, based most production in N. Asia in the late-1970s, using
several contractor factories. Relations with Asian suppliers were often
fractious; this predatory model pitted contractors against one another and
price-cutting was fierce. In the late 1980s, when democratic reforms in
Taiwan and S. Korea signalled the end to the military-led suppression of
workers rights, Reebok's contractors headed to China and Indonesia.

Reebok has tried for years to convince observers that the company痴
operations in Indonesia differed in a meaningful way from the well-known
Nike example. In fact, conditions for workers making Nike and Reebok shoes
in Indonesia have been almost indistinguishable. For almost fifteen years,
the production of Nike and Reebok shoes there has gone on (sometimes
side-by-side) in some of the same factories.

Several years ago, I asked the two Reebok managers in charge of the
company's "Human Rights Production Practices" if they had ever talked with
the Reebok manager in charge of negotiating with contractors. My question
had to do with whether or not they had ever tried to figure the extra cost
to Reebok for the improvements we knew were most urgent. They had not.

What Reebok has been rather good at is hiring people from the human rights
"community" and putting the best possible image forward, even as the
company's contractors continued brutal cost-cutting practices. One example
of this 菟ublic relations・strategy is the 1999 Peduli Hak report, based on
interviews with over a thousand workers in one factory in Indonesia. Highly
qualified and respected researchers ・Indonesians and an Australian national
・wrote up the findings that gave a mostly-accurate portrayal of workers・
complaints. One very interesting flaw (others are noted in a critique that I
would be happy to share) was the report痴 assessment of workers・view of
trade union representatives. The previously mentioned UCM study found that
only about 5 per cent of workers believed that union leaders fought for
their interests in the factory; the Peduli Hak report put the positive
responses at over two-thirds of those surveyed. I am rather confident about
our (UCM) survey methodology. This unrealistically high union-support figure
casts doubt on the rest of the report ・in addition to misreporting the most
despicable part of the contracting-out system.

Research done by the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Cmte. on Reebok's China
operations

Click here to find out more

5. What kind of inter/national/ist labour, consumer and other protest is
there around Reebok? How does it relate to other internationalist campaigns?

Reebok has been spared the harsh scrutiny visited upon Nike. This is due to
two main reasons: 1) In the late-1980s, when the research on shoe production
began in earnest, Nike was the industry leader and, 2) When confronted with
evidence of worker abuse, Nike痴 CEO and spokespeople reacted in a very
hostile manner.

Several groups have included Reebok production facilities in 殿nti-sweat・
research. Notable among these are: Hong Kong Christian Cmte., Asia Monitor
Resource Center, National Labor Cmte., Workers Rights Consortium and
Christian Aid (U.K.). In addition, Junya Yimprasert of the Thai Labour
Campaign wrote a scathing account of her experience as a Reebok 杜onitor・
and the false promise of corporate 田odes of conduct.・

6. What is the nature and implications of Reebok's human rights activity?
How should labour and democratic movements respond?

There is but one criterion on which we should judge the integrity of
corporations that promise that workers are dealt with in dignity: are
contractors required to sit down and bargain with workers? In the Bata
collective labor agreement, for example, it was clear that there was a
completely different 田orporate culture・at work, because workers were given
都eniority increases・in different job classifications and length of service
was used to calculate holiday bonuses (up to eight or nine times monthly
wage). The seniority issue has been a longstanding grievance of Nike/Reebok
contract employees since we first started talking to them, thirteen years
ago.

With 田odes of conduct・corporations shifted the media痴 attention from:
workers fighting abusive contractors, to: what does this or that NGO think
of this company痴 adherence to 田ode・promises. The Clinton White House
helped to engineer this shift because the Nike example was such an
embarrassment.

Compiled by Jeff Ballinger

--------------------

C. Jannuzi

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