September 25, 2002

Center for Economic and Policy Research

Paying the Bills in Brazil:
Does the IMF's Math Add Up?

By Mark Weisbrot and Dean Baker

Executive Summary (full paper is at www.cepr.net)

The IMF has recently approved a $30 billion loan
to Brazil, with the idea that the government
should eventually be able to stabilize its growing
public debt burden at a sustainable level. This
paper looks at the trajectory of the country's
debt to assess whether such an outcome is likely.
The evidence indicates that Brazil is extremely
unlikely to reach a sustainable level of debt
service, and return to a normal growth path, until
a partial default has allowed the country to write
off some of its debt.

Brazil's public debt rose from 29.2 percent of GDP
in 1994 to nearly 62 percent of GDP at present.
(See Figure 1). The budget deficit is currently
running at about 6 percent of GDP for 2002. The
real interest rate on Brazil's debt has averaged
16.1 percent over the last eight years
(1994-2001). With interest rates at this level,
deficits quickly grow through time; as this year's
deficit increases next year's interest burden, the
debt burden becomes explosive.

The paper examines several possible scenarios for
Brazil's debt (see Figure 2):

·                    Assuming a 16.1 percent
annual real interest rate for the future, the same
as its average over the last eight years: This
scenario is explosive, with the debt-to-GDP ratio
quickly reaching implausible levels.[2] By 2009,
the debt is projected to exceed 100 percent of
GDP. It would be more than 188 percent of GDP by
2016. Of course these levels would not be reached;
along this path, financial markets would demand
ever higher risk premiums, which would raise the
interest rate to higher levels yet, and default
would cut short the process of accelerating debt
accumulation.

·                    The implicit real interest on
the public debt for the first six months of 2002
was 15.5 percent, or 33.5 percent at an annual
rate. If we take an extremely conservative
estimate for the 2nd half of the year, and project
an annual rate of 21.0 percent for the year 2002,
the debt is rapidly explosive. If we assume annual
interest rates at the (underestimated) 21.0
percent rate for 2002, the ratio of debt-to-GDP
would reach more than 100 percent in 2007. By
2012, the ratio of debt-to-GDP would pass 200
percent. On this path, which may best represent
Brazil's current situation, the financial markets
will very quickly give up hope that Brazil will be
able to repay its debt in full.

·                    Assuming, as an optimistic
scenario, that the real interest rate falls to 10
percent over the next two and a half years and
stays at this level (real rates this low were
achieved only once in the last eight years): the
debt-to-GDP ratio will still rise to extremely
high levels. By the end of 2010 it would reach
almost 80 percent of GDP. By 2016, it would have
grown to almost 90 percent of GDP. As in the other
scenarios, these projections assume that the
interest rate does not rise, even though the
debt-to-GDP ratio grows substantially. This is
almost impossibly optimistic, as investors would
surely become increasingly concerned about the
probability of default as the debt-to-GDP ratio
continued to rise.

The paper also considers the possibility of
stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio by running
larger primary budget surpluses (see Figure 3).
This would require such huge primary budget
surpluses that it would not be potentially
achievable.

There is also the possibility that the central
bank could switch to a much lower short-term
interest rate policy -- the nominal rate is
currently still high at 18 percent -- and thereby
eventually lower the interest burden of the debt.
This would be difficult for a number of reasons,
including the exchange rate risk, and the risk of
default -- which is difficult to reverse now that
the debt-to-GDP ratio is so high. But in any case,
a trajectory that includes a new central bank
policy with much lower short-term interest rates
is not on the agenda, and is definitely not part
of the IMF's current loan agreement. Therefore the
projections included in this paper would cover the
range of possibilities that could be expected if
Brazil continues its current policies.

On the basis of current policies, as well as past
and present economic data, a scenario under which
Brazil's debt burden stabilizes at a sustainable
level would have to be regarded as an extremely
low-probability event. It would depend on Brazil's
economic and fiscal policy meeting targets that
could not be regarded as plausible, and/or a world
in which international financial markets behaved
very differently than they have in the past. If
the IMF cannot produce a credible intermediate or
long-range projection under which Brazil could
stabilize its debt service at a sustainable level,
then the purpose of this $30 billion loan
agreement is questionable.

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