Hi Patrick

Interesting piece. But why did you lea ve Mattick and Kliman out of the 
analysis?

Paddy

Paddy Hackett

On 21 Jul 2013, at 23:53, Patrick Bond <[email protected]> wrote:

> Encyclopedia of Political Economy
> edited by Phillip Anthony O’Hara
> 
> Finance capital 
> 
> In 1910 a young medic, Rudolf Hilferding, published Finance Capital. In this 
> work he viewed finance capital as a specific historic phase of capitalism in 
> which there is an intimate connection between banking, commercial and 
> industrial interests and where the hegemony of high finance prevails. In 
> 1915, Bukharin used the phrase “the coalescence of industrial and bank 
> capital,” and in 1917, Lenin termed finance capital “the merging of 
> industrial with bank capital.” The terms used in these definitions are not 
> substantially different (Brewer 1980:103–9; Howard and King 1989: ch. 5). Nor 
> are they much different from modern-day conceptions of finance capital 
> (Sweezy 1972:143). These definitions each emphasize institutional power bloc 
> characteristics of finance, at the expense of drawing     attention to the 
> vulnerability implicit in financial relations. 
> 
> New forms of financial organization 
> 
> This was understandable, perhaps, since during the period from 1870 to 1920 
> it appeared that a new institutional form, “finance capital,” had achieved 
> hegemony over the entire world economy (Sweezy 1972:179). Evidence was found 
> in the concentration and centralization of the major financial institutions; 
> the organization of cartels of industrial capitalists, often by financiers; 
> the exercise of financial control over corporate development more generally; 
> and the powerful impetus of financiers in imperialism, manipulation of state 
> policies and the formation of ideologies. Indeed, many political economists 
> believed that banks and other financial institutions had actually pushed 
> capitalism into a new and perhaps final stage, the era of monopoly, 
> imperialist, finance capitalism. 
> 
> The leading Marxist theorists of the first decades of the twentieth century 
> (Hilferding, Kautsky, Bauer, Bukharin, Lenin and others) adopted this broad 
> argument, although there was conflict about whether this final stage was one 
> of strength or one of decay (Tickten 1986). However, the banks that were 
> supposedly at the center of power in this new era of capitalism suffered 
> tremendous bankruptcies, culminating in system-wide crashes that left the     
> financial system in tatters during the GREAT DEPRESSION of the 1930s. 
> Nonetheless, until then the theory of finance capital had much to recommend 
> it. Hilferding, for example, contended that the problem of rising 
> overaccumulation in highly concentrated branches and sectors of production 
> could be displaced, thanks to the coordination functions of finance capital, 
> into the more competitive, non-cartelized sectors of the economy. Thus for 
> Hilferding (1910:298), intensified uneven sectoral development during crisis 
> would not generate further destabilization of the economy, but rather 
> stabilization through deepening cartelization. The subsequent shakeout of the 
> smaller producers would permit the finance capital cartel to increase the 
> level of industrial concentration and survive the broader downturn. 
> 
> Institutional stability 
> 
> Indeed, Hilferding posited that several factors “militating against a banking 
> crisis” would combine with finance capital’s increasing range to ensure that 
> conditions of crisis could be ameliorated. Those factors included, first, the 
> ability of finance capital to manage and share risk effectively; second, the 
> belief that a strong gold reserve and other state regulatory policies could 
> shore up the creditworthiness of the system; third, a decline in the volume 
> and importance of speculative activity (at the powerful urging of key 
> institutions of finance capital); and fourth, the ability of joint-stock 
> companies to continue to produce during a downturn because production need 
> not realize an immediate return. 
> 
> Hilferding (1910:291) concluded that it was “sheer dogmatism to oppose the 
> banks’ penetration of industry…as a danger to the banks.” Hilferding 
> (1910:180) even expressed faith that the centralization and concentration 
> process would result in an “increasingly dense     network of relations 
> between the banks and industry…[which] would finally result in a single bank 
> or a group of banks establishing control over the entire money capital. Such 
> a ‘central bank’ would     then exercise control over social production as a 
> whole.” Bukharin (1917:73) also predicted a “gigantic combined enterprise 
> under the tutelage of the financial kings and the capitalist state, an 
> enterprise which monopolises the national market.” Politically this was 
> extremely important, for it justified seeking a route to socialism that 
> entailed the socialization of capitalist relations via finance. At one point 
> Hilferding (1910:368) even asserted that, “taking possession of six large 
> Berlin banks would mean taking possession of the most important spheres of 
> large scale industry, and would greatly facilitate the initial phases of 
> socialist policy during the transition period, when capitalist accounting 
> might still prove useful.” 
> 
> Hilferding was German Finance Minister later in his career (for a few weeks 
> in 1923, and in 1928–9), and was considered a reformist Marxist in the 
> Bernstein/Kautsky tradition. On this point his greatest subsequent rival, 
> Henryk Grossmann (1929:198), offered scathing comment: “Hilferding needed 
> this construction of a ‘central bank’ to ensure some painless, peaceful road 
> to socialism, to his ‘regulated’ economy.” Even as German Finance Minister 
> (under difficult circumstances in the late 1920s) Hilferding failed in any 
> such mission. Yet notwithstanding emerging problems with the finance capital 
> concept (such as the collapse, not strengthening, of financial empires), even 
> as late as 1931 Hilferding maintained his thesis (Sweezy 1942:298). 
> 
> Critique of “finance capital” 
> 
> Where did Hilferding go wrong in miscalculating the power of finance capital? 
> According to de Brunhoff, Hilferding made a critical mistake that led him to 
> dissociate money and the credit system (“money as an instrument of hoarding” 
> is ignored, she complained). “This dissociation has probably been one of the 
> reasons for the overestimation of the role of ‘finance capital’” (1976:xiv). 
> 
> Further objections emerge to the internal logic of Hilferding’s “finance 
> capital,” as well as to its contemporary relevance. He underplayed the extent 
> to which, for instance, finance was utilized for the financing of labor power 
> as against means of production     (especially through pension, insurance, 
> consumer credit and     government sources), and the rise in the social wage. 
> 
> In addition, Hilferding’s conclusion ran contrary even to much of his own 
> prior analysis. First, the same problems in the productive sector that lead 
> to falling profit rates also force banks to look further afield, 
> geographically and sectorally, in order to maintain lending and a healthy 
> deposit base, which brings added risk. Second, rather than declining in 
> importance, financial speculation tends to increase dramatically prior to the 
> climax of a crisis. Third, Hilferding’s argument that jointstock companies 
> were relatively immune from downturns was contradicted by his analysis of how 
> vital     credit was to the smooth operation of stock exchanges. As Sweezy 
> (1942:267) observed, “Hilferding mistakes a transitional phase of capitalist 
> development for a lasting trend.” The transitional phase was one of recovery 
> from the 1870s–1890s financial crises; these crises would emerge again during 
> the early 1930s and 1970s–1990s. 
> 
> See also: capitalism; capitalist breakdown debate; financial crises; 
> financial instability hypothesis; money, credit and finance: major 
> contemporary themes; monopoly capitalism; speculation 
> 
> Selected references 
> 
> Brewer, A. (1980) Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey, London: 
> Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
> 
> Bukharin, N.I. (1917) Imperialism and the World Economy, New York: Monthly 
> Review, 
> 1972. 
> 
> de Brunhoff, S. (1976) Marx on Money, New York: Urizen Books. 
> 
> Grossman, H. (1929) The Law of Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist 
> System, London: Pluto, 1992. 
> 
> Hilferding, R. (1910) Finance Capital, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. 
> 
> Howard, M.C. and King, J. (1989), A History of Marxian Economics, vol. 1, 
> Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
> 
> Lenin, V.I. (1917) Imperialism, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986. 
> 
> Sweezy, P. (1942) The Theory of Capitalist Development, New York: Monthly 
> Review, 
> 1968. 
> 
> –––(1972) “The Resurgence of Finance Capital: Fact or Fancy?,” Socialist 
> Revolution 1(8). 
> 
> Tickten, H. (1986), “The Transitional Epoch, Finance Capital and Britain: The 
> Political Economy of Declining Capitalism,” Critique     16. 
> 
> PATRICK BOND
> 
> _______________________________________________
> pen-l mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
_______________________________________________
pen-l mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l

Reply via email to