"...the left was ecstatic..." In New Jersey, leftists were dancing in the streets. I saw it on T.V.
On Tue, Dec 1, 2015 at 7:35 AM, Louis Proyect <[email protected]> wrote: > If you read the "anti-imperialist" bilge about the rise of ISIS, you'd > think that it was a conspiracy planned out in advance by American, > British and Israeli spooks--the latest version of this articulated by > arch-buffoon Tariq Ali at the pro-war rally in London. In fact, ISIS was > the result of the American invasion of Iraq that installed a pro-Iranian > Shi'ite sectarian gang in Baghdad at the urging of Chalabi in > partnership with neocons. When Anbar Province erupted in 2004, the left > was ecstatic over the resistance in Fallujah that was led in part by the > same exact people who are in the driver's seat of ISIS today: Saddam's > officer corps and jihadists. A new book lays this out in detail. > > NY Times, Dec. 1 2015 > Review: ‘Black Flags,’ Tracing the Birth of ISIS > By MICHIKO KAKUTANI > > In the last month, terror attacks that left 130 dead in Paris and 43 > dead in Beirut and took down a Russian airliner with 224 people aboard > have made the entire world horribly aware that the Islamic State not > only seeks to establish a caliphate in Syria and Iraq, but also is > beginning to export its monstrous savagery abroad. Although the Islamic > State has been in the headlines for only two years, and its metastasis > has been alarmingly swift, the seeds of the group — in its many > incarnations — were planted many years ago, as Joby Warrick’s gripping > new book, “Black Flags,” makes clear. > > Mr. Warrick, a reporter for The Washington Post and the author of the > 2011 best seller “The Triple Agent,” has a gift for constructing > narratives with a novelistic energy and detail, and in this volume, he > creates the most revealing portrait yet laid out in a book of Abu Musab > Al-Zarqawi, the founding father of the organization that would become > the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL). > > Although this book owes some debts to Jean-Charles Brisard’s 2005 book, > “Zarqawi: The New Face of Al Qaeda,” Mr. Warrick places that material in > context with recent developments and uses his own copious sources within > the United States and Jordanian intelligence to flesh out Mr. Zarqawi’s > story and the crucial role that American missteps and misjudgments would > play in fueling his rise and the advance of the Islamic State. > > Perhaps emulating the approach Lawrence Wright took in “The Looming > Tower,” his masterly 2006 account of the road to Sept. 11, Mr. Warrick > focuses parts of this book on the lives of several individuals with > singular, inside takes on the overarching story. They include a doctor > named Basel al-Sabha, who treated Mr. Zarqawi in prison; Abu Haytham, > who ran the counterterrorism unit of Jordan’s intelligence service and > fought the Islamic State in its various guises for years; and Nada > Bakos, a young C.I.A. officer who became the agency’s top expert on Mr. > Zarqawi. This narrative approach lends the larger story of the Islamic > State an up-close-and-personal immediacy and underscores the many > what-ifs that occurred along the way. > > In “Black Flags,” Mr. Zarqawi comes across as a kind of Bond villain, > who repeatedly foils attempts to neutralize him. He was a hard-drinking, > heavily tattooed Jordanian street thug (well versed in pimping, drug > dealing and assault), and when he found religion, he fell for it hard, > having a relative slice off his offending tattoos with a razor blade. > > He traveled to Afghanistan in 1989 to wage jihad; during a stint in a > Jordanian prison, he emerged as a leader known and feared for his > ruthlessness as an enforcer among Islamist inmates. He began thinking of > himself as a man with a destiny, and in the aftermath of the American > invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, he set up a small training camp in > Iraq’s northeastern mountains, near the Iranian border. > > At this point, Mr. Zarqawi was just a small-time jihadist. But then, Mr. > Warrick writes, “in the most improbable of events, America intervened,” > declaring — in an effort to make the case for ousting Saddam Hussein — > that “this obscure Jordanian was the link between Iraq’s dictatorship > and the plotters behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.” As > C.I.A. analysts well knew, this assertion was false; in retrospect, it > would also have the perverse effect of turning Mr. Zarqawi into “an > international celebrity and the toast of the Islamist movement.” Weeks > later, when United States troops invaded Iraq, this newly famous > terrorist “gained a battleground and a cause and soon thousands of > followers.” > > Accused by the Bush administration of being in league with Saddam > Hussein, Mr. Zarqawi would use the Americans’ toppling of the dictator > to empower himself. He was a diabolical strategist, and he quickly > capitalized on two disastrous decisions made by the Americans > (dissolving the Iraqi Army and banning Baath Party members from > positions of authority), which intensified the country’s security woes > and left tens of thousands of Iraqis out of work and on the street. > Soon, former members of Mr. Hussein’s military were enlisting in Mr. > Zarqawi’s army; others offered safe houses, intelligence, cash and weapons. > > While the Bush White House was debating whether there even was an > insurgency in Iraq, Mr. Zarqawi was helping to direct the worsening > violence there, orchestrating car and suicide bombings and shocking > beheadings. He also used terrorism to change the battlefield, fomenting > sectarian hatred between the Shiites and the disenfranchised and > increasingly bitter Sunnis, guaranteeing more chaos and discrediting the > electoral process. > > Mr. Zarqawi’s penchant for ultraviolence had won him his favorite > moniker, “the sheikh of the slaughterers,” but by mid-2005, his > bloodthirstiness and killing of Shiite innocents worried Al Qaeda’s > leadership, which warned him that “the mujahed movement must avoid any > action that the masses do not understand or approve.” > > After many narrow escapes, Mr. Zarqawi was finally killed by a United > States airstrike in June 2006, and over the next few years, the United > States managed to decimate much of his organization. Still, dangerous > embers remained, and they would burst into flames under the group’s new > leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who shared Mr. Zarqawi’s taste for > gruesome violence, and who had built up a valuable network of supporters > while serving time in Camp Bucca, a United States-controlled prison > known as a “jihadi university” for its role in radicalizing inmates. The > sectarianism of the Iraqi prime minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki drove > increasingly marginalized Sunnis into the embrace of the Islamic State — > a dynamic hastened by the withdrawal of American troops in 2011. > Meanwhile, in Syria, the chaos of civil war created perfect conditions > for the Islamic State’s explosive growth and a home base for its > self-proclaimed caliphate. > > The final chapters of this volume have a somewhat hurried feel. In fact, > more detailed examinations of the rise of Mr. Baghdadi, the Islamic > State’s sophisticated use of social media, and its efforts to displace > Al Qaeda as the leader of global jihad can be found in two illuminating > recent books: “ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror,” by Michael Weiss and > Hassan Hassan, and “ISIS: The State of Terror,” by Jessica Stern and J. > M. Berger. But for readers interested in the roots of the Islamic State > and the evil genius of its godfather, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, there is no > better book to begin with than “Black Flags.” > > _______________________________________________ > pen-l mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l > -- Cheers, Tom Walker (Sandwichman)
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