--- ravi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Devine, James wrote:
> > according to many philosophers of math (according
> to JKS), math
> > exists outside of us whether we use it or not.
> >
>
> well, what does 'exist' mean? physical existence?


Are you getting all Clinton on us, "depends on what
the meaning of 'is' is"? -- Why the prejudice that
something must be a "physical" object to exist? Does
the working class have a physical existence? The
English language? Would it destroy you if it turned
out that the mind wasn't the same as the brain, that
it consisted (say) of nonphysical functional states?
And anyway, what makes you so sure you know what
"physical" existence is?

Platonists think there are numbers that have certain
relations, that we don't make them up, their not
dependent on human choices or conventions, that the
relationships are discovered or found and not
stipulated, and that the relationships are there
whether or not we can prove them. (This last is the
main think that intuitionists deny.) You wouldn't ask
"where" the numbers are, because they don't have a
physical location, it's sort of like asking "where"
the English language is. Or the meaning of Hamlet. (I
have it right here!) Or how much they weigh or how
fast they are or what color they are. Those questions
are just category mistakes, as an older generation of
philosophers would say.

I don't see what is so problematic about the idea of
abstract entities. The world is full of weird entities
that it is useful to posit -- that is, to say that
they exist. Classes. Quarks (those are physical, but
strange). Meanings. Minds. Why not numbers? But if we
say that they exist, at least in my book, we mean it,
it's not "as if," it's not pretend. I know some people
have an urge -- Ive had it myself -- to make
everything explicable in physical terms. But that's a
metaphysical prejudice. Why does everything have to be
physical?

jks



_______________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Declare Yourself - Register online to vote today!
http://vote.yahoo.com

Reply via email to