Double-barred comments are my originals, single-barred are Jim's responses,
unbarred are my replies:
Roemer doesn't have an "exploitation-as-scarcity-rent" theory per se,
He would never say he did, since it would imply that his theory was
derivative from that of Henry George and George Bernard Shaw, among
others (if indeed he read their works), dressed up with fancy math and
jargon.
And he doesn't *need* to say he did, since, as I noted, he doesn't. [By
George.] Your statement presumes, among other things, that somebody--Marx,
say--has successfully established a logically coherent theory of
exploitation that *isn't* "derivative from that of" one of your Georges.
For what it's worth, I don't think Marx--or any subsequent Marxist before
Roemer--has, but a careful demonstration of logical coherence would need to
be made on the basis of some sort of formal, i.e. essentially mathematical,
analysis, "fancy" or otherwise. Which is why, I imagine, your own paper
introduces jargon and more-or-less "fancy" math.
Productive assets, or the wealth advanced to
finance them, must be scarce at the margin in order for surplus value (and
thus exploitation) to arise in equilibrium, but not necessarily "scarce" in
the sense that yields economic rents to capitalists.
I don't get this distinction.
See below for an example. The general idea is that exploitation, certainly
in Marx's sense, even if capitalists earn only normal profits, and thus no
economic rent.
This point especially
holds for his cooperative game-theoretic generalization of the concept of
exploitation in Part III of his 1982 book General Theory of Exploitation
and Class.
I was talking about positive theory (how does exploitation work in
practice?). The game-theoretical stuff seems to be entirely normative
(what's wrong with exploitation?).
No, Roemer's generalization is strictly positive: exploitation, according
to his definitions in Pt III, either obtains or it doesn't, however
one feels about its wrongness. His definitions are normatively motivated,
perhaps, but then, definitions generally are.
As for normative theory, I see "exploitation" as akin to "taxation
without representation" (to use Arjun Makhijani's apt definition).
Instead of being a matter of individual choice -- as in the
game-theoretic approach
As above, I'm not talking about normative theory. But in any case I
disagree with this characterization of the "game-theoretic approach". In
that framework, exploitation is not a matter of choice unless one allows
the "choice" of revolution against the existing relations of production
(and assumes it will be successful)--but to that extent, exploitation
doesn't exist in Marx's framework, either.
-- I see exploitation as involving the
negation of collective, democratic, choice:
Exploitation involves the capitalist supremacy over the working class
on societal (macro) level, the capitalist subjection of workers in
production (domination, or in academic language, subsumption), and the
workers' conscious submission to this situation (a major element
that's downplayed in my article). These also play major roles on the
the positive side of the article (which accentuates the positive, as
it were).
These are positive, not normative statements. One can agree with them
without judging the rightness or wrongness of exploitation.
The bit in the game-theoretic stuff about exploitation involving
limited choices on the part of the exploited seems obvious at best.
As it is in Marx's account as well. But as in Marx, the "game theoretic
stuff about exploitation" goes well beyond that, as anyone can confirm by
reading Roemer's argument in Pt. III of GTEC.
Why would anyone submit to being "exploited" (robbed) by a guy with a
gun if it's possible to escape easily? Maybe one would submit if one
were hypnotized or drugged, but that's not Roemer's theory.
I don't see how this is relevant to Roemer's generalization of the concept
of *capitalist* exploitation.
For example, it might be that existing capitalists are worse or
more risk-averse entrepreneurs than existing proletarians would be if they
could only get access to financial wealth (which they can't, say, due to
imperfect credit markets). Then under Roemer's definition, workers are
capitalistically exploited in this scenario because they would be better
off with an egalitarian share of alienable productive assets, even if
existing capitalists don't in fact earn scarcity *rents*.
This proves my point above by making it clear that Roemer presents a
normative definition, i.e., a comparison of (simplified) real-world
phenomena with an ideal world (with perfect credit markets, etc.)
No, it makes clear that Roemer's generalization of capitalist exploitation
is positive--exploitation either obtains according to the definition or it
doesn't, however one feels about it. The fact that I used a simplified
example to illustrate my point that Roemer's definition does not require
the existence of scarcity rents doesn't alter this point.
In any case, I wonder if Jim would disagree that Roemer's scenario of
scarce, unequally distributed capital assets is at least *sufficient* for
the existence of capitalist exploitation.
Unfortunately, arguing that something exists in a Walrasian general
equilibrium framework, as Roemer did, is tantamount to arguing that it
doesn't exist at all.
I don't see this point. It seems equivalent to saying that arguing for the
existence of surplus value in the never-obtained case of commodity exchange
at value--as Marx does-- "is tantamount to arguing that it doesn't exist at
all." The claim doesn't follow.
He thus undermined his own case by trying to
please and fit in with the economic orthodoxy (of the time -- the
orthodoxy has moved on, as has Roemer).
I don't think that's what he was doing.
(It's ironic that he rejected
"BS Marxism" by embracing neoclassical BS.)
I think this fundamentally represents what he accomplished, and is any case
beside the point at issue: Roemer's theory, contrary to your assertion,
does not require the existence of scarcity rents.
But the existence of unequally-distributed scarce non-human productive
assets does seem necessary to the existence of exploitation, as I've
said before (including in the paper I uploaded to my website). The
point, therefore, is to explain the reproduction of that social
situation over time once it has been established (by primitive
accumulation, something I don't discuss in my paper).
Explaining that would require some sort of dynamic framework. Is that what
your paper does?
Anticipatory comment: Marx's definition [and theory -- JD] of
"exploitation" is based
on an extensive measure of labor performed, i.e. labor hours, *given* a
certain
degree of labor intensity. I see that in Jim's paper the measure of labor
performed is instead intensive, i.e. based on labor effort per hour.
It's best to choose either one or the other (unless one wants an
excessively complex model). I chose labor effort per hour because it
fits with the empirical reality of today better than the alternative,
just as Marx chose the former because he saw it fitting the empirical
reality of his day better than the alternative. In reality, the world
involves a mixture of both, though we seem to returning to the case
that Marx saw as relevant -- in this brave new neoliberal world of
ours.
This
is an interesting approach, but it should be noted that variations along
the extensive and intensive margins have very different consequences in
labor-value terms. E.g., an increase in aggregate labor hours performed
always increases total commodity values produced while leaving individual
commodity values unchanged, other things (including in particular labor
intensity, constant capital, and the state of technology) constant. In
contrast, for given labor hours performed, technology, and constant
capital, a general increase in labor intensity *reduces* the values of
individual commodities, by reducing the labor hours socially necessary to
produce a given mass of commodities, while leaving *total* commodity value
unchanged.
I don't have time for fruitless discussions of the law of value today,
especially as they are likely to get into the interpretation of texts.
I don't see how it's "fruitless", and I'm not talking about "the law of
value", whatever that is. I'm talking about exploitation, which I note you
don't define directly in your paper. How can you determine if exploitation
exists if you don't, for example, determine the labor embodied in the wage
bundle?
Consequently I wonder if Jim is posing a new definition of
exploitation, one advanced by neither Marx nor Roemer.
no, I think that my model would work just as well using Marx's use of
extensive measure of labor performed. It seems a very small technical
detail.
I suspect not, based on my reading so far, but I'll forward my comments
relating to this directly to you.
If that's the case,
I don't see how his paper can possibly establish a relevant basis for
"superceding" Roemer's theory, whatever its other merits.
I think that my paper captures Marx's idea that exploitation under
capitalism is a social relationship that cannot be reduced to simple
economics or the "unequally-distributed scarce non-human productive
assets."
The real question, it seems to me, is whether the paper *disproves*, rather
than simply refines, Roemer's claim that DOSPA is necessarily and
generically sufficient for the existence of capitalist exploitation. FWIW,
it's not obvious to me that it has.
Gil
Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own
way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante.
