I have posted a brief piece on Carbon  Trading at Maxspeak.
http://maxspeak.org/mt/archives/002593.html

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October 09, 2006
PROBLEMS WITH CARBON TRADING - By Gar W. Lipow

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has published an impressive and
beautifully written analysis of Carbon Trading.
The full text is available in PDF form at no charge
http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/DD2006_48_carbon_trading/carbon_trading_web.pdf

At 381 pages, I'm not going to attempt to summarize here. But the
following does touch on some of the major problems with carbon
trading:

The Kyoto protocol includes project based emission reductions. Instead
of reducing your own (or somebody else's) greenhouse gases, you can
finance a project in a poor nation (one without any Kyoto obligations)
which supposedly lowers emissions.

The problem is that credits are based not on proven reductions, but on
claims that without carbon credits the situation would be worse. A
highly toxic landfill in Durban, South Africa gained credits for
keeping the dump open, and burning methane from the landfill to
generate electricity onsite. Consultants determined that only
plausible alternative was to generate electricity from coal. Shutting
down the site, and saving same amount of electricity through
efficiency measures was ruled out as implausible. So was purifying
site methane and selling it to the local gas company.

This sort of thing is the rule, not the exception in carbon credits.
As one example, most experts agree renewable energy could supply
significant amounts of carbon neutral energy, but less than 2% of
project carbon is generated by renewable sources.

Attempts have been made to compensate by calculating fudge factors.
The idea is that you figure out that ,say, 20% of carbon reductions
are valid and credit that percent. The problem here is confusion
between risk and uncertainty. Flip a coin, and you have a 50% chance
of coming up heads. This applies to all sorts of things - with a very
small percent error factors, insurance companies can calculate risks
and life expectancies for all sorts of things. But project based
carbon credits depend on guessing which of an a number of alternatives
would have been chosen - narrowing the possibilities down to two. That
is uncertainty. You don't know, and you will never know, not even in
retrospect, which alternative would have been chosen. Not only don't
you know which alternative path would have been taken, you don't know
whether all possible alternatives were considered. Insurance
companies, which deal mainly with risk, get very practical feedback.
If their actuarial calculations are too far off (i.e. further off than
their competition) they either pay unexpectedly high claims, or refuse
classes of policies they could have profitably carried. In the absence
of feedback, it would be tough to put a number on risk, and certainly
makes no sense to put one uncertainty or ignorance. So carbon
consultants have no means of telling whether fudge factors are
correct. They have every incentive to provide the highest estimates
they can get away with; essentially printing money - until carbon
markets collapse (as they recently did).

To make it worse, we have another type of project - sequestration.
Instead of reducing sources we create new sinks - absorbing carbon.
For example, local grasslands are converted into giant Eucalyptus
plantations to absorb carbon.

No one really know how much carbon is sequestered by growing plants.
We do know that a great deal of it is absorbed by soil, which many
release greenhouse gases as temperatures rise. We know that tilling
such plantations releases old carbon that was imbedded in soil
structure. We know machinery, and fertilizers, and pesticides for such
plantations consume fossil fuel energy. We know that carbon fixation
rates vary tremendously within the same species of plants, depending
on micro-climate, soil, pests and other variables, so we don't know
the difference between these plantations and whatever they displace.
And in addition carbon plantations are often victim of forest fires,
or other ways of ending plant lifespan - including harvesting once
credit for the sequestration has been sufficiently laundered. So not
only is forestry based carbon sequestration highly uncertain, there is
good reason to believe in many cases it is a net emitter. (Carbon
sequestration from fossil fuels provides more measurable short term
reductions. But long term stability is questionable, and there are
severe side affects, such as acidification.)

A second type of carbon trading is emissions trading. Two companies
both need to reduce carbon output by 5%. Company A can has cheap cuts
it can make, where company B only has expensive reductions available.
So Company A shrinks carbon pollution by 10%, and company B buys half
those reductions. We will see in a bit that with carbon there are
reasons this will not work well. But leaving those aside, given that
there are project credits as part of the same system, this is a
disaster. Because both A and B have incentives to buy cheaper (mostly
or totally invalid) project credits rather than reduce their own
emissions.

But of course emissions trading as actually practiced has flaws of its
own. The point of emissions trading is to grandfather in big polluters
by granting them Carbon Credits at no charge. and letting them sell
them; otherwise (as we will) see a carbon tax, or minor variation
thereof, would do the same thing.

Obviously this is a simple giveaway of a new form of property (carbon
permits) to the rich and powerful. The logic, of course, is that you
are giving into political reality, and bribing them to "buy into" the
system.

Of course this spawns massive abuses - even beyond the giveaway. For
instance a great many energy companies that have both coal and natural
gas generators were given credits as though they generated electricity
only from coal. (Natural gas is a lower intensity carbon emitter than
coal, even if burned with equal intensity.) That meant that those
particular utilities had surplus carbon credits without needing to
reduce carbon intensity by one gram, and had a windfall from selling
carbon. In other cases, carbon credits were issued for whole
industries based on inflated economic projections - resulting in huge
surpluses that contributed to car bon market collapse.

This is worse than an inefficient means of reducing carbon. In the
long run there is every reason it will block or delay decarbonization.

There is the obvious problem of false or inflated credits of course.
But it goes beyond this. In poor nations, phony carbon credits absorb
money that people are spending (often with sincere intentions) to help
solve global warming. At least some of that money, probably a fairly
high percent, might be invested in real renewable energy projects
rather than paper credits if the counterfeit was not so widely
available. It is old economic principle that bad money drives out
good. There is a firm called the Gold Standard that tries to tries to
do severe filtering - financing only valid projects. It remains a
marginal firm, struggling to compete with other carbon credit firms.
Customers complain that it does not provide enough low cost carbon
credits, that it is far more expensive than other funds. And of course
that is true. Actual reductions in carbon emissions are much more
expensive than creative accounting.

In rich nations you run into another problem. Firms concentrate on
various ways of gaming the carbon market rather than reducing
emissions. Huge amounts of money in Europe are spent lobbying for
grants of free carbon credits. Lobbyists fight to loosen standards on
credits, to extent the life to grant all sorts of rights. So emission
trading actually reduces innovation that could help solve the climate
crisis. It is the old problem with systems that are too easy to game -
money flows to lawyers and lobbyists, not engineers.

We have looked at some of the problems with the current system. The
question arises - is the problem with emissions trading or just this
particular implementation?

Each year we burn fossil fuels produced from plant matter that took
400 years to grow. From a greenhouse viewpoint, we need to reduce
emissions by about 80% to 90%. Almost every nation has to reduce
fossil fuel use, as do most fossil fuel users - ultimately to zero or
close to it. Carbon equivalent concentrations in the atmosphere are
already higher than is safe. Except in an extremely temporary or
marginal sense, it simply is not possible to produce significant
"excess" reductions worth trading. The best way to reduce carbon
emission is to produce less coal, oil and natural gas every year,
until we reduce fossil fuel to zero, or close to it. If we are serious
about greenhouse gas reduction, there simply will not be enough
"emission credits" for sale to let us drive 9 MPG hummers.

Similarly, true emissions trading is by nature complicated and lacks
transparency. Grandfathering is not a bug in the system, but a
feature. Let's look at what an "emissions trading" system would look
like without grandfathering. Imagine a system where you had permits
for each unit of carbon equivalent, auctioned world-wide to the
highest bidders. Each permit would expire after a year or so, and the
number of permits available would shrink each year.

Would you attach a carbon measurement device to every smokestack,
automobile and carbon emitter? It might be possible, but that is
expensive and a lot of trouble. A better way would be to simply
require reporting of fossil fuel consumed - coal, oil, gas. Since
average carbon equivalents are known (approximately) for each, you
could come up with a number that is close enough for the incentive
system you are trying to set up. In industry fossil fuel consumption
is something you have to keep track of as part of basic cost
accounting anyway. Fossil fuels used to produce electricity would be
included in the cost. Utilities could report fossil fuels sold
directly to businesses and households. For automobiles and other
non-utility home appliances (propane appliances, powered mowers and
such) you could estimate usage by model and usage. Although possible,
the transaction costs of this are not trivial.

There is a simpler way. Rather than requiring permits at the
individual user level, require resource extractors to buy permits for
each barrel, or ton, or thousand cubic feet mined or drilled. Let them
pass through the cost of this to their customers as fuels were sold.
Emissions permits would mostly be traded along with the fossil fuels
they permitted , in the same markets fossil fuels currently trade in.
(You would have true permit trading in the margins between companies
who extract less than expected, and companies who make discoveries
that allow them to produce more.) Essentially this would be a carbon
tax combined with rationing. It is not (with the extremely minor
exception noted) an emissions trading system at all.

As soon as you depart from this - allow grandfathering, move the
permitting further along the supply chain to distributors or consumers
of fossil fuel you end up with all or most of the problems the current
system shows. Any real emissions trading systems (where emissions
permits are significantly separated from extraction or initial sale of
fossil fuels) increases transaction costs. And such a system, by
reducing transparency, increases the space for gaming the system -
increasing incentives to put money into lawyers and lobbyists rather
than engineers, reducing innovation.

A true tradable permits system reduces incentives for innovation in
other way. The idea behind such a system is to make sure that low
hanging fruit is picked first. But the problem is it not only makes
sure that low hanging fruit is picked first, it encourages going to
extreme lengths to find that low hanging fruit - to search your
nation, continent, or the world. When you take the search for low
hanging fruit to this extreme in a context where everyone eventually
has to cut, you delay innovation which needs to eventually be made.
Worse, you squeeze the profitability out of innovating firms long
enough that they may be gone by the time the low hanging fruit has
been used up. We are not going to get major greenhouse gas reductions
if everybody is busy looking for low hanging fruit thousands of miles
away, and no one is implementing well known processes to reduce their
own emissions.

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