"What interests me is that Levitt and a bunch of other economists failed to recognize the paper as satire. I am fairly certain that almost anyone from outside the economics profession would have taken it as a joke."
I've seen an example of this here... quite recently. Just replace the word 'paper' with 'thread' & add '9/11 conspiracy' Stir thoroughly , don't shake, and you have satire, until the moderator posts: "Please stop this thread." -- On 8/28/07, ravi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > http://math.bu.edu/people/nk/rr/ > > ========================= > > Debunking the Conventional Wisdom about the Science Wars, Especially > the Sokal Affair and its Aftermath > == Gabriel Stolzenberg > > In essays posted at this site, I use close readings of the science > wars literature to debunk the conventional wisdom about them, > especially about the Sokal affair and its aftermath. In doing this, I > try to adhere to standards of rigor comparable to those of my > profession, mathematics. I look forward to all criticism that is made > in the same spirit. > > --------- > > "It Makes Me Laugh" Is Not an Argument > > [The Social Text] article is structured around the silliest > quotations I could find about mathematics and physics (and the > philosophy of mathematics and physics) from some of the most > prominent French and American intellectuals. (Sokal, A House Built on > Sand: 11) > > But is it the quotations that are silly or Sokal's readings of them? > How can we tell? Many reasonable statements admit ludicrous > misreadings. We need arguments. But Sokal doesn't offer any. Indeed, > he seems oblivious to the need for them.3 He continues: > > Now, what precisely do I mean by "silliness"? …First of all, one has > meaningless or absurd statements, name-dropping, and the display of > false erudition. (11) > > This is a good definition or at least the beginning of one. But > having given it, Sokal promptly launches into his own display of name- > dropping, false erudition and absurd statements! This runs from the > top of page 12 through "OK, enough for examples of nonsense" on page > 13. I quote some fragments of it below. The name-dropping is evident. > 4 That there is also false erudition and absurd statements will be > demonstrated below.5 Sokal writes (12): > > Here, for instance, are Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari holding > forth on chaos theory….6 > > And there's much more—Jacques Lacan and Luce Irigaray on differential > topology…7 > > —but don't let me not spoil the fun.8 > > …[Latour] claims that relativity cannot deal with the transformation > laws between two frames of reference but needs at least three.9 > > I will spoil the fun. Sokal commits at least four significant mistakes. > > Deleuze and Guattari: Chaos theory? As Sokal now knows, contrary to > his jeering, "Here, for instance, are Gilles Deleuze and Felix > Guattari holding forth on chaos theory," the authors are not talking > about chaos theory. Talk about false erudition.10 So far as I know, > Sokal has not publicly acknowledged this blunder. However, in 1997, > in a lecture following one by Sokal, Arkady Plotnitsky pointed out > that, not only is the passage in question not about chaos theory, it > doesn't even look as if it is. Moreover, in 1998, in Fashionable > Nonsense (156), Sokal and Jean Bricmont themselves take pains to make > clear that it is not about chaos theory.11 But they did not tell > their readers that this contradicts Sokal's jeering remark in A House > Built on Sand. > > Lacan: Differential topology? Differential topology is sophisticated > mathematics. There is nothing in the passage that Sokal describes as > "Lacan on differential topology" that requires any knowledge of it. > Nor does Lacan pretend otherwise. But by describing the passage as > "Lacan on differential topology," he encourages his readers to > suppose falsely that, in it, Lacan pretends to know sophisticated > mathematics. Here is the passage in question. > > This diagram [the Möbius strip] can be considered the basis of a sort > of essential inscription at the origin, in the knot which constitutes > the subject. This goes much further than you may think at first, > because you can search for the sort of surface able to receive such > inscriptions. You can perhaps see that the sphere, that old symbol > for totality, is unsuitable. A torus, a Klein bottle, a cross-cut > surface, are able to receive such a cut. And this diversity is very > important as it explains many things about the structure of mental > disease. If one can symbolize the subject by this fundamental cut, in > the same way one can show that a cut on a torus corresponds to the > neurotic subject, and on a cross-cut surface to another sort of > mental disease. > > Although this can be formulated in terms of differential topology, it > requires nothing nearly so sophisticated. It is mathematics for an > eager amateur, the sort of thing one can find in a popular book. > Furthermore, on Sokal's view of Lacan, if he was pretending to use > something as fancy as differential topology, he would have been sure > to let us know. As for the quote itself, unlike Sokal, I realize that > I do not understand it nearly well enough to judge it. However, I can > say this. Besides the Möbius strip, the three surfaces that interest > Lacan arise from the three different ways of 'gluing' the opposite > edges of a rectangle, depending on whether orientations are preserved > or reversed. His evident familiarity with this and the distinction he > notes between such surfaces and a sphere (one cannot draw a knot on a > sphere) suggests a better command of the mathematics than I expected > him to possess. > > > Irigaray: Borders of fuzzy sets. Here is the remark of Irigaray to > which Sokal is referring when says, "And there's much more—Jacques > Lacan and Luce Irigaray on differential topology—but don't let me not > spoil the fun." > > The mathematical sciences, in the theory of sets, concern themselves > with closed and open spaces… They concern themselves very little with > the question of the partially open, with sets that are not clearly > delineated [ensembles flous], with any analysis of the problem of > borders [bords]… 12 (Irigaray) > > There is nothing here about differential topology. Indeed, on my > reading, Irigaray is not talking about any kind of topology except to > note correctly that little if any of it promises to be of much use in > studying the problem of borders for sets that are not clearly > delineated, i.e., for fuzzy sets or vague predicates. If Sokal finds > this a hoot, he probably missed the obvious connection between "the > problem of borders" and "sets that are not clearly delineated." The > following statement in Fashionable Nonsense (120-121) strongly > suggests that he did. > > For what it's worth, the "problem" of boundaries [bords], far from > being neglected, has been at the center of algebraic topology since > its inception a century ago, and "manifolds with boundary" [variétés > a bord] have been actively studied in differential geometry for at > least fifty years. 13 (Sokal and Bricmont) > > As a reply to Irigaray, this is risible. What do the boundaries > [bords] of algebraic topology have to do with the problem of borders > [bords] for vague predicates, e.g., for color names? In a novel I > just read, Milan Kundera says about one of the characters: > > He knew there existed a border beyond which murder is no longer > murder but heroism, and that he would never be able to recognize just > where that border lay. (Immortality, 105)14 > > Is Sokal suggesting that with the aid of algebraic topology, with its > great theorems about cycles and boundaries, Kundera's character might > after all be able to recognize just where that border lay?15 I am > sure he is not and that the reason it seems otherwise is that he has > failed to consider the relevance of Irigaray's mention of fuzzy sets > for understanding what kind of borders she is talking about.16 > Indeed, it is precisely the fuzziness of a fuzzy set—the vagueness of > a vague predicate—that makes its border problematic. > > Latour: Frames are not enough. Finally, contrary to what Sokal would > have us believe, in the quote below, Latour does not say that > relativity "cannot deal with" the transformation laws between two > frames of reference but "needs at least three." > > If there are only one, or even two, frames of reference, no solution > can be found…. Einstein's solution is to consider three actors: one > in the train, one on the embankment and a third one, the author > [enunciator] or one of its representants, who tries to superimpose > the coded observations sent back by the two others.17 > > The first sentence mentions two frames but says nothing about > transformation laws or a need for a third frame. The second sentence > has nothing about relativity theory not being able to deal with the > transformation laws between two frames or needing a third frame. How > then did Sokal 'find' these two assertions in Latour's remark? For > the one about the transformation laws, see "Reading Latour reading > Einstein" just below. As for the claim that Latour says we need a > third frame, he does say that we need a third actor. Determined to > make it be a frame, Sokal assumes that Latour doesn't understand the > difference between an actor and a frame of reference! Isn't this > convenient? For a more thorough discussion, see "Reading Latour > reading Einstein" below and "I am not a reference frame" in "Reading > and relativism" > > <...> > > -------- > > ========================= > > --ravi >
