Gassler Robert wrote:
This is riminescent of the nonsense over altruism from a couple of decades
back: whatever nice thing you do, it is really selfish underneath. Two
references come to mind that counter this nonsense. David Collard's Altruism
and economy showed the neoclassicals that altruism is rational after all. Mark
Lutz and Kenneth Lux in their book The Challenge of Humanistic Economics turned
the usual argument on its head in a section that showed selfishness is really
altruism in disguise.
The Levitt and List argument? I agree, that is nonsense. But the
behaviorists are saying something different. One reason that they are
interesting is that they open the door to the role of historically
evolved institutions.
"a player does not care about the other's welfare per se, but desires
some kind of equity in the context of this particular interaction. We
conclude that the outcomes of ultimatum, dictatorship and many other
bargaining games have more to do with manners than altruism."
Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler, "Ultimatums, Dictators and
Manners," The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Spring,
1995).
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/richard.thaler/research/articles/2-Anomalies_Ultimatums_Dictators_Manners.pdf
The experimental data may have other interesting things to say: Consider
page 10, the Schotter results could be interpreted as suggesting that
capitalist relations are the cause of selfishness.
And consider the ultimatum study with children. Isn't it interesting
that kindergartners (5 year-olds in the USA) are the group closest to
the neoclassical expectation. As Marx once observed, "vulgar economy
feels particularly at home in the estranged outward appearances of
economic relations." Capitalism fosters infantile attributes, it turns
the population into thumb suckers, and the neoclassicals capture
perfectly that gain of truth about capitalism.
Jim Devine wrote:
For e.g., in a lecture at Princeton he referred to research
by John List on the "Dictator Game", and went on to argue how it is
entirely consistent with the self-interested individuals hypothesis.
In this game, one subject (the dictator) is given $10.00, and is then
given a choice - to either give part of the $10.00 to another subject,
or to give nothing, or even to steal some or all of $10.00 from the
other. Levitt says that apparently altruistic behavior found in this
experiment is merely an artifact of the subjects trying to win the
approval of the experimenter.
I didn't know that he's the one who made that argument. Behaviorists
have responded to that. It'd be nice if there were an expert in the
house...
I am not such an expert, but I have read a bit of this literature.
1) The dictator game is a variation of the "ultimatum game." In these
games, the player who makes the offer is the "Allocator" and the other
player is the "Recipient." In the Dictator version the Recipient must
accept whatever unilateral offer the Allocator makes. In the ultimatum
game the Recipient has the option to reject or accept the offer.
2) My guess about the behaviorist response to Levitt and List is
something like this: Although one might interpret the "Allocator's"
action as trying to win the approval of the experimenter, it is less
reasonable, in the ultimatum version, to interpret the "Recipient's"
action in the same way. The Recipient in the experiment is given the
ability to accept or reject the Allocator's offer. If the offer is
rejected neither player gets any payoff. It is common for recipients to
reject offers that are positive but unfair allocations. For a $10 stake,
$1 and $3 offers have been rejected. In general, offers less than 20% of
the stake are frequently rejected. The Recipient sacrifices a positive
payoff and punishes the other player for acting unfairly.
3) The behaviorists interpret the experiment as the players exercising a
sense of fairness, not altruistic behavior. Here is what Richard
Thaler wrote some time ago:
"One conclusion which emerges clearly from this research is that notions
of fairness can play a significant role in determining the outcomes of
negotiations. However, a concern for fairness does not preclude other
factors, even greed, from affecting behavior."
I'm reminded of a comment by RH Tawney:
"It is obvious, indeed, that no change of system or machinery can avert
those causes of social malaise which consist in the egotism, greed, or
quarrelsomeness of human nature. What it can do is to create an
environment in which those are not the qualities which are encouraged.
It cannot secure that men live up to their principles. What it can do is
establish their social order upon principles to which, if they please,
they can live up and not live down."
4) The relevant Chicago boys articles appear to be:
Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List, “What do Laboratory Experiments
Measuring Social Preferences tell us about the Real World,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, (Spring 2007).
List, John A. “On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games,”
Journal of Political Economy, (June 2007).
