Raghu writes:

>> Here's the basic question then: if libertarians are consumed with the
>> market-politics inter-relationship, how can you continue to assert
>> that political processes are separate from market processes? That
>> assertion is how this whole discussion started.

The following was posted by David Shemano to Pen-L in 2003:

"In reply to Ian Murray and Matthew Forstater:

Let me be more specific.  I am not disputing that the private/public 
distinction is often vague, and that markets are inseparable from the state 
that creates the rules that define the market, etc.  I am not saying that free 
trade is the natural state of affairs (btw, I am presently suffering through 
The Great Transformation -- aren't you proud of me?).

However, even if everything in the previous paragraph is true, there are types 
of behavior that are analytically distinct.  If Boeing goes to the legislature 
and says that it will move unless it receives the benefit of a state 
expenditure, that is a different behavior than if it does NOT go to the 
legislature, right?  So why would you call both behaviors the same thing?

To me, rent-seeking is the attempt to increase profitability through the 
lobbying of the state.  I am prepared to say that lobbying for a tax reduction 
or lower tariffs because it will provide an advantage compared to competitors 
may be rent seeking.  However, increasing profitabilty through making capital 
investments, for instance,  is simply a different type of behavior that is 
analytically distinguishable.  I do not see any reason why both behaviors 
should be called the same thing."

Back to the present.  I previously referenced the examples of selling your car 
and voting for mayor.  You had no problem agreeing that the two activities were 
analytically distinct, that one could reasonably be called a market process 
while the other was political.  You may think my example was simplistic and 
easy, but the point is that you acknowledge these categories are analytically 
distinct.  We can think of hard cases, but so what, they are hard cases.

Hong Kong in 1985 is a radically different society than Cuba in 2007.  You can 
agree with that, right?  What is so difficult in saying that the balance 
between the market and politics is significantly different in Hong Kong 
compared to Cuba?    Why would you feel compelled to define the differences 
away, or feel compelled to argue that a belief that Hong Kong 1985 is a 
market-based society compared to Cuba 2007 is based upon a misconception that 
markets are separate from politics?  Can't you leave it at libertarians prefer 
Hong Kong 1985 and socialists prefer Cuba 2007 because libertarians prefer 
markets and socialists prefer politics?

David Shemano

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