I wrote:
> I made up the following list of "The Three Laws of Models."

1. No model can be an exact representation of the complexities of
empirical reality.

2. The predictions implied by any model vary as the assumptions change.

3. No model applies to answer all questions (to predict in all
domains) because no model can tell the whole story.<

I am sorry, but I didn't put this into context (of the book I'm
writing). In trying to do social research, there are three stages:

(a) abstraction: simplifying the blooming, buzzing complexities of the
empirical world in order to understand it (or rather, that element of
the world you want to understand);

(b) theory: a specific understanding of the world, emphasizing
(theoretical) causation links (which need not be simple or linear, and
might be structural) between events that the author of the theory
thinks are most important; and

(c) model: a statement of the theory using math, graphs, pictures,
and/or words made in order to communicate the theory to others, to
test its internal cohesion (getting the story straight), and to verify
its consistency with perceived empirical reality.

Max quotes: "Models are to be used, not believed."  -- Henri Theil

That's right. It's a big mistake to confuse the map (the model) with
the territory, to reify the model. That seems the gist of my first
"law." It's a great quote.

Dan writes: >Maybe, "No model is universal even within its
particularity (including this one)"?<

I don't understand this, Dan. I wasn't presenting an actual model. It
was more of an abstraction.

Ian writes: >The terms and inferences of models may not be
commensurable with similar models [underdetermination of theory by
evidence, intertranslatability [!!!] and all that; see
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9304 and the book itself for
more....Ian] <

I'd have to read the book. The review seems written by a jargon-lover,
who doesn't like to link abstract concepts to concrete exemplars. Too
abstract for me. But of course, that's because he's presenting
something like a model himself, i.e., an abstract picture of the book,
which itself is an abstract story. This should not be surprising,
since that's what book reviews do.

Doyle Saylor quotes me: "No model applies to answer all questions (to
predict in all domains) because no model can tell the whole story."

and says: >... I assume you for some reason think a GUT (Grand Unified
Theory) is not attainable?<

Maybe in the domain in which it is supposed to apply. (I don't know
enough physics to say either way.) But it wouldn't apply, say, to
understanding economics, sociology, psychology, or for that matter,
chemistry and biology. I don't think anyone can reduce society to
biology or biology to chemistry or chemistry to physics.

In any event, if I understand it, the GUT is a theory. The actual
specification of that theory -- the model -- may not fit the actual
world very well. The point of seeking it would be to find a model that
fits the empirical world better than previous ones.

He quotes me again: "No model can be an exact representation of the
complexities of empirical reality."

and writes: >The presumption here is that we are talking 'mathematical' model.<

No, as I made clear above, I was not referring to merely mathematical
models. There are verbal models. By their very nature, all models
involve abstraction -- simplification -- and thus leave empirical
stuff out. So they do not correspond to the complexities of empirical
reality.

>You do not make a distinction between a model and paradigm.  So this
is very vague about what you mean.<

A paradigm is 20 cents. More seriously, a paradigm is very different
from a model (at least for the way I use the word). A paradigm -- or
research program -- involves a general vision of how the empirical
world works that is applied as part of the process of understanding
it. (Neoclassical economists, for example, would like to understand
the world totally in terms of unique and stable equilibria, as in a
simple market.) It's a little bit like a street-light, which shows up
certain aspects of empirical reality, but may be totally wrong for the
purpose at hand: remember the story of the drunk looking for his car
keys under the street-light (even though he lost them in a dark alley)
because "that's where the light is better."

A research program might be thought of as a mega- or über-model.
However, entire paradigms are almost never communicated completely to
others. Nor are the internal consistency or the empirical fit ever
tested for a research program as a whole. This testing seems
impossible. Only the pieces (the models) can be contrasted/compared
with empirical reality. One paradigm might do better than another if
its pieces pass empirical tests better than the other, but that
doesn't "prove" or "disprove" it as much as suggest that it is more
productive of insights.

>Is a photograph of a space a model?<

No. It's a kind of data. Like all data, it is limited in its
representation of the real world that lies behind our perceptions of
it. But it's not a "mental picture" the way a model is.

In some ways, however, a photograph is a mixture of data and a model,
since the photographer has a major effect on the appearance of the
picture. But it's not a model as I use that word. But the example does
point up an important aspect of data: the nature of (almost?) all data
is infused with and affected by pre-existing theory.

By the way, in case anyone was wondering, I wasn't talking about Tyra
Banks either.

Doug quotes: "The SLB [Sharpe-Lintner-Black capital asset pricing]
model is just a model and so surely false." - Eugene Fama

Like a map, it is false as a picture of the details of the territory,
but like a map it might be useful as a tool for getting where people
want to go. I don't know enough about that specific model to say
anything about its validity or lack thereof.

Doug also quotes the Maestro: "It doesn't, however, induce us to then
conclude that, if the model doesn't forecast - which implies that it
has not captured the appropriate structure - we nonetheless tend to
use the structure of the model to do analysis and draw significant
conclusions about how the inner workings of relationships occur even
though the coefficients which we're employing clearly don't forecast
anything worthwhile." - Alan Greenspan

huh? AG is ambiguous, as usual. (He should have played the "Sphinx" in
the movie "Mystery Men." Maybe in the stage version?) Isn't there a
"not" missing somewhere in there?

Robert writes: >Asimov later added a fourth, which he decided he had
to call the "zeroth law."<

According to the Wikipedia, the three laws of robotics are:
> 1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human 
> being to come to harm.

>2. A robot must obey orders given to it by human beings, except where
such orders would conflict with the First Law.

>3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection
does not conflict with the First or Second Law.<

The "zeroeth law" is that:

> "A robot may not harm humanity, or, by inaction, allow humanity to come to 
> harm"; the rest of the laws are modified sequentially to acknowledge this.<

A lot of Asimov's robot stories are about how these "laws" fail to
solve all problems with robots.
-- 
Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own
way and let people talk.) --  Karl, paraphrasing Dante.

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