On Tuesday, January 30, 2024, Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: > > > My larger point here is that trying to enforce restrictions on > superusers *within* Postgres is simply not a good plan, for > largely the same reasons that Robert questioned making the > GUC mechanism police itself. It needs to be done outside, > either at the filesystem level or via some other kernel-level > security system. > > The idea of adding a file to the data directory appeals to me.
optional_runtime_features.conf alter_system=enabled copy_from_program=enabled copy_to_program=disabled If anyone tries to use disabled features the system emits an error: ERROR: Cannot send copy output to program, action disabled by host. My main usability question is whether restart required is an acceptable restriction. Making said file owned by root (or equivalent) and only readable by the postgres process user suffices to lock it down. Refusing to start if the file is writable, and at least one feature is disabled can be considered, with a startup option to bypass that check if desired. David J.
