Pavel Stehule wrote:
2009/10/19 Andrew Dunstan <and...@dunslane.net>:
Pavel Stehule wrote:
2009/10/19 Dave Page <dp...@pgadmin.org>:
On Mon, Oct 19, 2009 at 8:54 AM, Pavel Stehule <pavel.steh...@gmail.com>
wrote:
I dislike write access to app name guc for user too. It's not safe.
Maybe only super user can do it?
That'll render it pretty useless, as most applications wouldn't then
be able to set/reset it when it makes sense to do so.
But application can do it simply via connection string, no? Mostly
applications has connection string in configuration, so I don't see
problem there. And if I would to allow access, then I could to wrap
setting to security definer function.
I see this as security hole. It allows special SQL injection.
How is it any more a security hole than any other setting that the user can
alter with an arbitrary string value (e.g. custom options)?
Others GUC has not important role in logs. It's similar as possibility
to change client IP address.
That doesn't even remotely answer the question. How is such a thing a
vector for an SQL injection attack, that does not apply to other GUCs?
If your answer is that log parsers will try to inject the values, then
it those programs that need to be fixed, rather than restricting this
facility in a way that will make it close to pointless.
And no, it is not at all the same as changing the client's IP address.
cheers
andrew
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