On Tue, Feb 22, 2011 at 8:01 AM, Heikki Linnakangas
<heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com> wrote:
> This is hashing, not encryption, there is no key. The point is that even if
> the attacker has the hash value and knows the algorithm, he can not
> construct *another* snapshot that has the same hash.
What good does that do us?
> Yes. It would be good to perform those sanity checks anyway.
I don't think it's good; I think it's absolutely necessary. Otherwise
someone can generate arbitrary garbage, hash it, and feed it to us.
No?
> But even if we don't allow it, there's no harm in sending the whole snapshot
> to the client, anyway. Ie. instead of "1" as the identifier, use the
> snapshot itself. That leaves the door open for allowing it in the future,
> should we choose to do so.
The door is open either way, AFAICS: we could eventually allow:
BEGIN TRANSACTION (SNAPSHOT '1');
and also
BEGIN TRANSACTION (SNAPSHOT '{xmin 123 xmax 456 xids 128 149 201}');
--
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
--
Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org)
To make changes to your subscription:
http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
