Heikki Linnakangas wrote: > On 11/30/2016 09:01 AM, Michael Paquier wrote:
> > It is important that this value [nonce] be different for each > > authentication (see [RFC4086] for more details on how to achieve > > this) > > So the nonces need to be different for each session, to avoid replay > attacks. But they don't necessarily need to be unpredictable, they are > transmitted in plaintext during the authentication, anyway. If an attacker > can calculate them in advance, it only buys him more time, but doesn't give > any new information. > > If we were 100% confident on that point, we could just always use current > timestamp and a counter for the nonces. But I'm not that confident, > certainly feels better to use a stronger random number when available. Hmm, if enough internal server state leaks through the nonce (PID generation rate), since the generating algorithm is known, isn't it feasible for an attacker to predict future nonces? That would make brute-force attacks practical. Perhaps it's enough to have a #define to enable a weak RNG to be used for nonces when --disable-strong-random. That way you're protected by default because the auth mechanism doesn't even work if you don't have a strong RNG, but you can enable it knowingly if you so desire. -- Álvaro Herrera https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/ PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
