Again, "It's not perfect, but I don't think anyone has come up with a better 
way."

It's called session hijacking, and it is a great reason to use SSL. However, 
there's still the issue of cross-site scripting, which can really only be 
prevented by smarter coding.

Even then there are issues. For example, holes in ie's SSL capabilities 
(including a current, unpatched vulnerability- well okay it was patched but 
M$ managed to re-introduce it in more recent patches...), permit undeteted 
MITM attacks.


On Saturday 31 May 2003 05:56 am, Dustin Mitchell wrote:
> On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 11:01:26PM -0700, Evan Nemerson wrote:
> > Send a session ID to the user in a cookie, then lookup that ID in a
> > database on the server. It's extremely difficult to guess random session
> > ID's (don't just increment them!), and if you have a session timeout,
> > you're pretty much set.
>
> That's true, and it is what most people do, but if you think about it the
> session ID is then functionally equivalent to a crypt'd password for the
> duration of your session; that is, either one allows you access to the
> site. So if you were worried about folks sniffing an encrypted password and
> using it to log in, you should be equally worried about folks sniffing a
> session ID and using *it* to log in.
>
> Dustin


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