> > If you saw the ANC special on Election 2010 at 8:00 o'clock PM on Monday > night, where I asked Comelec when the source code of the Election 2010 > computer programs will be released for review by interested political > parties and groups, Director Rafanan said that
Doc, I watched the show and saw you passionately ask for the source code. I believe your arguments are right. It is just unfortunate that most people do not understand the real issue. People are willing to accept what an international body says. I believe the better and more credible thing to do would be to release the code to political parties, have them sign it with their digital keys, embedded it into the system, use it, and then audit the chips after the election. What the Comelec is effectively doing is just ask us to trust an international organization for our electoral system and make the system seem trustworthy by showing the code to political parties (but not really review and understand it). As ICT practitioners, we all know that a computer system is nothing but the embedding of processes, policies, and rules into a digital system. Without a multi-lateral review, how do we know that the election machines is enforcing the correct processes, policies, and rules? Bombim Cadiz in a different mailing list opined more clearly on the matter: He said: -------------------------------------------------------------------------- The problem here is that everyone assumes that what the machine counted was actually what was marked by the voter. This is not a valid assumption. Consider the machine as a black box, completely opaque to the voter/user. Ballots are fed to it. At the end of the day, the machine spits out the results. No one knows what happened in the machine, or how it actually counted. Of course, we get descriptions of what the machine does and what it is supposed to do. However, no one actually knows how or what it did. It is opaque, remember? Now, imagine this second scenario. We will change the "trustworthy, opaque machine" into a "trustworthy group of people working inside an opaque, sealed room." A ballot is fed into the room and then the ballot comes out. At the end of the day the "trustworthy group of people" in the room announces the results of the elections. I am sure that everyone will be howling in protest when this is done! Everyone can immediately see the problem. No one knows whether the group of people counted what were actually marked on the ballots. Therefore, the results can not be trusted. I just can't figure out why people will trust the opaque, blackbox which operates exactly the same way as the opaque black room of people. The problem is the same. No one knows whether what was counted was actually what was marked on the ballots! The solution is simple. Treat the results from the machines as provisional results. Count the ballots at the end of the day, just like what we do now. Count them manually. Show the people that the ballots are counted as marked. Compare these results with what the machine spits out. When they match, then there are no problems. When they don't, then the manual counting should prevail. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Holden
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