Venezuela: the class issues in Chavez’s constitutional referendum
By Bill Van Auken
28 November 2007

The approach of the December 2 referendum on the proposed reworking of
Venezuela’s constitution has produced a sharp intensification of the
country’s political crisis.

On Monday, the political violence orchestrated by right-wing opponents
of the left-nationalist government of President Hugo Chavez claimed
the life of Jose Oliveros, a 19-year-old oil worker, who was shot in
the back by opponents of the constitutional reform while heading for
work at a state-owned firm in the central state of Aragua. When he
attempted to drive down a street blocked by protesters, he was shot
and killed.

The young worker’s death comes after nearly a month of demonstrations—
both for and against the reform, which includes 69 additions or
amendments to the country’s current constitution.

Leading the campaign against the reform are the political forces tied
to Venezuela’s wealthy oligarchy, backed by Washington, the same
forces that sought to overthrow Chavez in the abortive US-supported
coup April 2002 and which have since staged a series of political
provocations.

Egged on by Venezuela’s privately owned right-wing media, the “no”
campaign has generated an atmosphere of hysteria over the referendum,
managing to mobilize demonstrations drawn largely from the most
privileged sections of middle and upper class students.

These right-wing and often violent student protests have drawn the
great bulk of the attention of the international mass media, which has
cast them as a struggle against authoritarianism and in defense of
democracy. No section of the mass media has taken note of the
political irony that these supposed champions of democracy were
precisely the same elements that backed a military coup aimed at
overthrowing an elected president.

For the most part, demonstrations supporting the reform, consisting of
more predominantly working class crowds, have been larger, but have
drawn no comparable media attention.

Conflicting opinion polls have either indicated that the reform will
pass with a clear majority or placed the “yes” and “no” votes in a
dead heat.

By every indication, political tensions in Venezuela are sharper than
at any time since the attempted coup of 2002. The traditional bastions
of the ruling elite have sought to foment a confrontation. The
Catholic bishops, for example, issued a statement Monday describing
the reforms as “morally unacceptable.” Similarly, Fedecamaras, the
main business association, which was one of the principal supporters
of the failed coup, called Monday for a no vote, while insisting that
their position had nothing to do with its members’ “lifestyle.”

“In Fedecamaras we are democrats,” the statement read. “We are not nor
do we want to be communists.”

More telling in terms of the depth of the political crisis is the
defection of some political parties—the social democratic Podemos
being the most significant—and leading figures previously identified
with “Chavismo.”

Most important among the latter is retired general Raul Baduel, who
had been Venezuela’s defense minister until July of this year. On
November 5, Baduel called a press conference for Venezuela’s right-
wing media condemning the proposed reform as a “constitutional coup.”
While urging a “no” vote, he also called upon the military to
“profoundly analyze” proposals for changes to the structure of the
armed forces and declared that “the capacity of Venezuelan military
men to analyze and think” should not be underestimated.

The content of such words is unmistakable. Denouncing the referendum
vote as a “coup” essentially legitimizes the real thing, while the
appeal to “military men” to “analyze” the political proposals
presumably implies that once they have done so, action is warranted.

The significance of this veiled appeal to the officer corps is all the
greater in that its author was one of Chavez’s oldest political allies
and long considered his most important supporter within the Venezuelan
military.

Baduel was one of the initial members of the Revolutionary Bolivarian
Movement (MBR-200), the conspiratorial cell formed within the
Venezuelan military in the 1980s that ultimately gave rise to the
abortive 1992 coup led by Chavez, then a paratrooper colonel. While
Baduel did not participate in the coup and apparently questioned its
feasibility, he subsequently defended Chavez and backed his
presidential bid in 1998.

More importantly, in 2002, it was Baduel who led the forces within the
Venezuelan military that ultimately defeated the US-backed April coup.
In 2004 he was named the army’s commander and in 2006 the country’s
defense minister.

This turn by Baduel—who had proclaimed himself a firm adherent of
Chavez’s “21st century socialism”—undoubtedly reflects broader
divisions within the army as a whole, and the threat of another coup
can by no means be discounted.

There is also no doubt that the US State Department and the CIA are
actively fomenting the opposition to the constitutional reform as a
vehicle for uniting forces that could potentially overthrow the Chavez
government. Just as in the Middle East, Washington is determined to
reassert its hegemonic control over a region that contains some of the
most important energy reserves on the face of the planet by installing
a more pliant regime.

The mass sentiment in favor of the referendum is founded both on the
hatred among masses of Venezuelan workers and oppressed for their most
rabid class enemies, who make up the “no” camp, as well as the
constitutional reform’s promise of various social benefits, which are
promoted by the Chavez government and its supporters as the
implementation of “socialism.”

These reforms include promises to implement a six-hour workday and the
establishment of a supplementary health insurance program for the
millions of Venezuelans—up to half the population—who are classified
as part of the “informal” sector of the economy, without any regular
employment. Making these programs into articles in the constitution,
however, does not create them beyond the level of a legal principle.

The reality is that the changes advanced for Venezuela’s constitution
have nothing to do with putting an end to capitalism or establishing a
socialist society, and the dangers that the various amendments
proposed by the government pose to the working class are far greater
than any promised benefits.

The essential thrust of the reforms is the amassing of greater
presidential power in the hands of Chavez, furthering the
consolidation of a personalist bourgeois regime resting on both the
military and populist appeals to the poorest sections of the
population, made possible by oil export-funded social programs.

The amendments include an extension of presidential terms from six
years to seven and allow the unlimited reelection of incumbent
presidents, both of which are designed specifically to keep Chavez in
Miraflores, the presidential palace.

While much has been made about the left and even “socialist” rhetoric
that suffuses the proposed amendments, the reality is that the
rewritten constitution includes explicit guarantees for the private
capitalist ownership of the means of production. It also enshrines the
status of “mixed” private-state enterprises, which exist most
prominently in the deals signed between the Venezuelan government and
the foreign energy conglomerates for the exploitation of Venezuelan
oil. Other clauses in the existing constitution guaranteeing equal
treatment for foreign and national capitalist enterprises, patents and
intellectual property rights remain untouched.

To the extent that the document envisions state expropriation of
capitalist industries, it is within the general framework of its
defense of private property, to be carried out along the lines of the
recent nationalization of CANTV, the Verizon-owned Venezuelan
telephone company, which was accompanied by compensation exceeding its
value on the stock market.

There are also amendments redefining the Venezuelan military as an
“anti-imperialist popular entity” and renaming the National Guard the
“Bolivarian Popular Militia,” but, these semantic changes
notwithstanding, these bodies remain under the same structure and
discipline of the bourgeois armed forces.

The most significant change in this regard is, once again, a
strengthening of presidential power, with the president given the
authority to determine all promotions within the officer corps.

In the political sphere, the reform would give Chavez power to create
by decree federal provinces, territories and even cities, while naming
un-elected “vice-presidents” to govern over them, essentially usurping
the power of elected provincial and municipal governments.

Similarly, the entire public treasury—including the central bank and
the country’s currency reserves—will be placed under the direct
control of the president. Meanwhile, however, Venezuela’s financial
system remains firmly in the control of the international banks and
their Venezuelan subsidiaries—which are recording the highest rates of
profit in all of Latin America—while the government remains committed
to the repayment of the country’s foreign debt.

As window dressing, communal councils are enshrined in the
constitution, with Chavez and his supporters touting these bodies as a
form of “people’s power” and “parliamentarism of the street.” The
reality, however, is that these are not councils of workers and
peasants arising from below in the struggle to overthrow capitalism
and establish a new state based upon the working class, but rather
structures imposed from above that are totally dependent, politically
and economically, on presidential patronage and Chavez’s disbursement
of oil revenues. Their function is not to organize the class struggle,
but rather to suppress it and subordinate the masses to the
government.

The most menacing amendments, however, empower the president to impose
a state of emergency in which the government could suspend rights of
due process, essentially allowing detention without charges, trial or
legal representation. Also, the reform would remove any limits on the
length of such states of emergency.

Supporters of and apologists for the Chavez government have insisted
that such dictatorial measures are needed to combat a reprise of the
2002 attempt to overthrow it. The reality, however, is that Chavez did
not utilize even the legal means available under the old constitution
to punish those who led the coup against him in 2002, none of whom
have been tried, much less jailed.

There is a far greater likelihood that the bourgeois state—under
Chavez’s leadership or anyone else’s—would employ such repressive
measures against a revolutionary movement of the working class against
the rights of capitalist private property enshrined in the same
constitution than to suppress a military coup.

No such military uprising backed by domestic and international capital
has ever been stopped through the abrogation of democratic rights.
Rather, the only force capable of defeating such a coup is the
independent mobilization of the working class and oppressed masses in
struggle.

Chavez’s choice of the slogan “21st century socialism” to describe his
oil-export-funded nationalism and social populism has a dual
significance. On the one hand, it is designed—as he himself has made
clear—to distinguish his policy from genuine socialism and Marxism,
particularly in denying that it is based upon the independent
revolutionary struggle of the working class. Secondly, it serves to
obscure history and deny the bitter lessons of the twentieth century.

Over and over again, in the struggles of that period the lesson was
written in blood that the working class cannot defeat the threat of US-
backed fascist-military coups by subordinating itself to a bourgeois
government—no matter how populist or “socialist” its political
rhetoric. Such was the case, most catastrophically, with the Popular
Unity government of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, as it was with
the “left” military regimes of generals J.J. Torres of Bolivia and
Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru—in 1971 and 1975 respectively—or, for
that matter, Peronism in Argentina in 1976.

Defeating the right-wing forces behind the “no” campaign over the
present referendum and as well as the very real threat of a US-backed
coup that would unleash a wave of savage repression can be achieved
only through the independent struggle of the Venezuelan workers and
oppressed.

This requires the building of a new, independent revolutionary party
fighting for the political mobilization of working people in Venezuela
as part of an international struggle to put an end to capitalism.
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