What's Important About Underwater Internet Cables --- the NSA can monitor them.
On Thursday, November 12, 2015 at 8:30:20 AM UTC-6, Travis wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/submarine-cables/414942/ > > > What's Important About Underwater Internet Cables > > Hint: It has nothing to do with Vladimir Putin or terrorism. > > - Ingrid Burrington > <http://www.theatlantic.com/author/ingrid-burrington/> > - Nov 9, 2015 > > “So Ingrid,” Sam asked, “how exactly will you convince your editor that > submarine cables are relevant to The Cloud?” > > We were maybe still in New Mexico or somewhere in Kansas. It was a night > drive. Time moves weirdly during night drives. All roads basically become > the closing moments of *Terminator 2*. Whenever it was and wherever it > was, it was apparently a good time for my driving partner to pose questions > about some of the stories I had lined up for this series, including one > exceptionally long piece about a submarine cable (which, dear reader, will > run later this week). > > “Well,” I replied, “clouds are just evaporated molecules of water that > emerge from larger bodies of water. Oceans are bodies of water. It’s...it’s > relevant.” > > Look, I was pretty tired. But if there is a case to be made for placing > submarine cables within the landscape of The Cloud, it's more a case for > historical continuity and resonance. Cloud infrastructure is a landscape of > interdependent systems, submarine cables among them. > > Submarine cables don't come up in the news that often, but if they do it > seems to be in two forms: short articles reminding everyone that the > Telegeography Submarine Cable Map <http://submarinecablemap.com/> exists, > and short articles of hand-wavey reminders that submarine cables are > vulnerable to harm (from tectonic plates, ship anchors, sharks, and > terrorists, among others). > > While these are totally valid topics to explore, I often find these > stories lacking in context about the various systems, geographies, and > politics that shape submarine networks. While there are lots of other super > compelling aspects of submarine-cable law and policy (says the person who > owns a copy of *Submarine Cables: The Handbook of Law and Policy*), here > are two questions that might help readers take in Telegeography takes with > a little less gee-whiz and a little more clarity. > Who Owns Submarine Cables? > > For the most part, Internet submarine cables are built by consortia of > international companies. The consortium method has the advantage of > distributing risk on submarine-cable projects, which can range in cost from > the hundreds of millions to the low billions. When they first emerged, > during the postcolonial Cold War era, these consortia were made up of > telecoms from different countries forming agreements with each other. > Ownership and maintenance of the cables was aligned along these landing > sites—the parts of the cable that ran through the U.S. might belong to > AT&T; the parts running through the U.K., maybe to BT. > > In the late 1990s as the Internet became increasingly privately held, > venture capital began participating in these consortia as well. Perhaps the > most famous early example of this shift was the FLAG network, the subject > of Neal Stephenson's essay <http://www.wired.com/1996/12/ffglass/>“Mother > Earth Mother Board <http://www.wired.com/1996/12/ffglass/>” (arguably the > Book of Genesis in the Internet-infrastructure nerd bible). Today, many > kinds of non-telecoms invest in submarine cables, including companies like > Google and Facebook, who both own stakes in Pacific submarine cables. > > Military agencies also build submarine cables, which do not appear on > public maps. While these cables have recently been the subject of much > kerfuffle over whether they are vulnerable to Russian sabotage (which, > while probably a possibility, featured such so much over-the-top panic in > its speculations that it basically was only missing trained Russian spy > sharks), military telecommunications networks have played a crucial but not > extensively reported role in legal challenges to U.S. and U.K. drone-strike > operations in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. > > In 2014, the U.K.-based organization Reprieve filed a complaint with the > British government against BT for its role in facilitating drone strikes > based on a submarine cable. In 2012, BT accepted a contract > <http://www.theguardian.com/business/interactive/2014/aug/27/bt-drone-cable-contract-camp-lemonnier-djibouti> > > from the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to connect a military > base in the U.K. to a military base in Djibouti. The court threw out > <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ncp-initial-assessment-complaint-by-reprieve-against-bt-equipment-provided-to-us-defence-agency> > > the complaint, ruling that Repreive presented insufficient evidence that > the cable was explicitly used in drone strikes. > > More recently, a Somali man brought a legal complaint to the German > government > <https://theintercept.com/2015/09/22/somali-tries-hold-germany-accountable-fathers-death-u-s-drone-strike/> > > over the role that the Ramstein Air Force base played in a drone strike > that killed his father. Ramstein isn't a landing point for a submarine > cable, but for a satellite uplink that connects directly to drones in > Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. A combination of submarine and terrestrial > cables connects the uplink to Creech Air Force Base in Nevada. While the > Ramstein complaint is more about the uplink than the fiber, it and the > Reprieve complaint are reminders of the scale of military network > infrastructure, and the significance of that infrastructure in contemporary > warfare. > Who Builds Submarine Cables? > > For much of the history of submarine cables, many telecommunications > companies were responsible for their own cable design and manufacturing, as > well as fleets of cable ships (as seen in this AT&T video about their > submarine-cable operations <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QVRL4UcT1sQ>). > After the first tech bubble collapsed in the late 1990s, many of the large > telecoms divested themselves of their submarine-cable operations, spinning > them off into separate companies. A number of these formerly telecom-owned > companies act as “turn-key” suppliers—they manufacture the cable, survey > routes and obtain relevant permits, maintain fleets of cable ships, and > perform maintenance and repairs. TE SubCom, the current incarnation of what > used to be AT&T Submarine Systems, explains what they do in this thrilling > corporate video <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ovi5dEdkaoA> (from that > video, I strongly encourage you to go down the rabbit hole that is > corporate submarine-cable videos, it will probably transform your life > forever). > How Do Submarine Cables End Up Where They End Up? > > The design of submarine-cable routes and the decision of where to place > them is a lengthy, complex calculation of bathymetry, geography, local > land-use laws, international law, and the law of the sea. For a long time > it was also a calculation heavily shaped by legacy—a lot of Internet cables > run along similar routes and to similar sites as their telegraph > predecessors, to major coastal cities throughout the world. There is an > assumption that these routes are reliable and secure, as they've been tried > and maintained in the past. > > The history of modern telecommunications development traces the expansion > of empire. The British telegraph submarine-cable system the All-Red Line, > for example, is kind of just a cool map of Places Britain Used To Own. > Today, a number of the landing sites on the All-Red Line remain landing > sites for submarine cables. > > As Nicole Starosielski documents in her book *The Undersea Network* (if > we're being cute, the Book of Jonah in the Internet-infrastructure nerd > bible), this pattern of submarine cables following empire came to reflect > the new mode of empire: globalization. During the Cold War, landing sites > began to shift away from central port cities to more rural areas, > recognizing that decentralizing communication networks was a far more > viable security strategy in the face of nuclear war. These more remote > sites were sometimes chosen purely for logistical reasons—such as the > Manchester cable station, which was chosen as the site for the first > continental U.S.-Hawaii cable because it's literally the shortest distance > away from Hawaii. > > As ownership models moved away from strictly telecom consortia, new > landing sites were built and selected because the incumbent telecom > companies didn't want the new consortia to build in their territory, as it > were. Today's submarine-cable networks are increasingly governed by > logistics, bottom lines, and latency, rather than colonial control or Cold > War paranoia. But they remain useful objects for understanding some of the > public and private power dynamics that play across the network at the > infrastructural level, literally across oceans. > > > > > > > __._,_.___ > ------------------------------ > Posted by: "Beowulf" <[email protected] <javascript:>> > ------------------------------ > > > Visit Your Group > <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/grendelreport/info;_ylc=X3oDMTJmN2x0Z2Q1BF9TAzk3MzU5NzE0BGdycElkAzIwMTk0ODA2BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTMyMzY2NwRzZWMDdnRsBHNsawN2Z2hwBHN0aW1lAzE0NDcyODY0ODk-> > > > > [image: Yahoo! Groups] > <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo;_ylc=X3oDMTJlYXM0aTdiBF9TAzk3NDc2NTkwBGdycElkAzIwMTk0ODA2BGdycHNwSWQDMTcwNTMyMzY2NwRzZWMDZnRyBHNsawNnZnAEc3RpbWUDMTQ0NzI4NjQ4OQ--> > > • Privacy <https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/groups/details.html> • > Unsubscribe <javascript:> • Terms of Use > <https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/> > > __,_._,___ > > > -- -- Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. 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