Re-neg. As expected. False statments yet again. How predictable. RE: Your blatant Islamophobia FYI: Pure Islamic religion is good as are all other religions, however the corrupted extremist forms of it are not good.
On 10/19/10, Keith In Tampa <[email protected]> wrote: > There is no help for Tom. He refuses to read, look at the facts, and just > continues to spew out hatred. > > No need to worry about me paying off Tom's mortgage, he hasn't taken the > time to even read the article(s)!! > > > > > On Tue, Oct 19, 2010 at 1:49 PM, dick <[email protected]> wrote: > >> You keep saying those things and they are all lies. Saying something >> without providing proof and when someone calls you on it you just wash, >> rinse, repeat does not make what you say true - and it is not. Almost to >> the point where I just delete your messages as being nothing but BS. >> >> >> On 10/19/2010 01:43 PM, Tommy News wrote: >> >>> The GOP created the meltdown, ignored the American people, started >>> unwarranted wars, took us from a $236 billion dollar surplus to $1.3 >>> trillion dollar deficit, and now tells us they are the ones to fix it! >>> Even though they have no plan! >>> >>> A return to the failed GOP Bush policies is no plan, which will only >>> fail yet again. >>> >>> On 10/19/10, Keith In Tampa<[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Yes, Tommy, the articles totally debunk the horse hockey that you wrote. >>>> >>>> On Tue, Oct 19, 2010 at 12:27 PM, Tommy News<[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Thanks for all this. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 10/19/10, MJ<[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> > The Myth of Energy Deregulation >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Monday, November 07, 2005 >>>>>> by Adam Summers >>>>>> >>>>>> While the initiatives on the upcoming November 8 California special >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> election >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> ballot backed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger have been receiving >>>>>> all >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> of >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> the media attention, another initiative that addresses an important >>>>>> issue >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> is >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> being overlooked. Proposition 80, the so-called "Repeal of Electricity >>>>>> Deregulation and Blackout Prevention" initiative, would make some >>>>>> significant and detrimental changes in the state's energy policy. >>>>>> >>>>>> The fact that even a government regulatory body such as the California >>>>>> Public Utilities Commission (PUC) is actually against a measure that >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> would >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> increase its regulatory powers should tell you something right off the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> bat >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> about the merits of Prop. 80. >>>>>> >>>>>> California energy consumers are currently served by one of three types >>>>>> of >>>>>> providers: investor-owned utilities (IOUs), local publicly-owned >>>>>> electric >>>>>> utilities, and independent electric service providers (ESPs). Before >>>>>> the >>>>>> state's "deregulation" experiment of the 1990s was suspended in 2001 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> during >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> California's energy crisis, customers could choose to purchase their >>>>>> electricity services directly from ESPs through "direct access" >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> contracts, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> rather than through an intermediary such as the local IOU or public >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> utility. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Proposition 80 Would Reduce Consumer Choice and Increase Costs >>>>>> >>>>>> Proposition 80 would permanently prevent all customers receiving >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> electricity >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> services from an IOU from switching to an ESP, effectively eliminating >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> any >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> new direct access (existing direct access contracts would be >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> grandfathered >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> in).[1] Thus, under Prop. 80, instead of having the option to buy >>>>>> electricity directly from independent producers, consumers would have >>>>>> no >>>>>> choice but to buy their electricity from utilities. By effectively >>>>>> eliminating an entire class of providers, the state has stifled >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> competition >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> (and would continue to do so), thereby leading to higher prices and, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> likely, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> lower-quality service. >>>>>> >>>>>> The effect of this provision on prices would be significant. ESP >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> customers >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> include hospitals, local governments, the California State University >>>>>> system, several University of California campuses, community college >>>>>> districts, and local school districts. The nonpartisan Legislative >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Analyst's >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Office (LAO) estimates that the UC system alone saves about $12 >>>>>> million >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> per >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> year by purchasing its electricity from a lower-cost independent >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> provider. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> According to Mike Florio, an attorney for The Utility Reform Network >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> (TURN, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> one of the chief proponents of Prop. 80 that helped craft the >>>>>> measure), >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> ability of consumers to purchase electricity directly from independent >>>>>> service providers "destabilizes the whole business … and we'll truly >>>>>> be >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> at >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> the mercy of the gods of the free market."[2] How dare people be able >>>>>> to >>>>>> choose whom they want to do business with! I suppose TURN hired Mr. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Florio >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> not for his legal expertise, but rather by the sheer providence of the >>>>>> "free-market gods." >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Proposition 80 Would Impede Innovation and Efficiency >>>>>> >>>>>> Another provision of Prop. 80 would prohibit the broader >>>>>> implementation >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> of >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> "dynamic pricing" of electricity without the consent of the consumer. >>>>>> Currently, all but the largest energy consumers pay a flat rate for >>>>>> electricity that does not vary by the time of day. Clearly, energy use >>>>>> is >>>>>> not constant throughout the day, however. There are certain "peak" >>>>>> hours >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> of >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> the day when consumers use lots of electricity, and "non-peak" hours >>>>>> when >>>>>> they use very little. The costs of providing electricity vary >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> accordingly. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> As such, the IOUs have submitted proposals to the PUC to charge all >>>>>> consumers higher rates during peak hours and lower rates during >>>>>> non-peak >>>>>> hours. This price discrimination would be accomplished through the use >>>>>> of >>>>>> high-tech "smart" meters. >>>>>> >>>>>> In addition to making good sense one should pay more for something >>>>>> when >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> it >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> is in higher demand dynamic pricing would encourage conservation via >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> pricing mechanism. Dynamic pricing would be a more efficient system >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> because >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> higher prices would discourage some from consuming such a scarce >>>>>> resource >>>>>> while ensuring that those who place the highest value on energy use >>>>>> are >>>>>> still able to consume it. Similarly, those who have some flexibility >>>>>> over >>>>>> when they consume their energy would be encouraged to utilize it >>>>>> during >>>>>> non-peak hours, thus placing less strain on the system. >>>>>> >>>>>> Allowing the consumer to opt out of a dynamic pricing model would be >>>>>> like >>>>>> forcing a hotel owner to offer customers the choice of the nightly >>>>>> room >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> rate >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> or an average of the nightly room rates throughout the week. Since >>>>>> significantly more people stay at hotels during the weekend, rates are >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> much >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> higher on Friday and Saturday nights. The average weekly rate, >>>>>> however, >>>>>> would be higher than normal weekday rates but lower than normal >>>>>> weekend >>>>>> rates. The cheaper "opt-out" weekend rates and higher weekday rates >>>>>> would >>>>>> encourage even more people to stay during the weekend and fewer to >>>>>> stay >>>>>> during the week. The result would be a shortage of hotel rooms during >>>>>> the >>>>>> weekend and a loss of revenue for the hotel owner. No wonder demand >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> strains >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> the electrical grids during hot summer days. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Environmental Issues >>>>>> >>>>>> Under current regulations, energy producers must increase the portion >>>>>> of >>>>>> energy derived from renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, >>>>>> and >>>>>> hydroelectric by one percent per year until 2017, when 20 percent of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> energy produced must come from these sources. Proposition 80 would >>>>>> accelerate this deadline to 2010. Interestingly, some >>>>>> environmentalists >>>>>> oppose Prop. 80 because a provision requiring a two-thirds vote of the >>>>>> Legislature to amend the measure could make it more difficult to >>>>>> increase >>>>>> the renewable energy standard in the future. >>>>>> >>>>>> According to the LAO's analysis, Prop. 80 would also require that "the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> first >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> priority for IOUs in procuring new electricity is to be from >>>>>> 'cost-effective' energy efficiency and conservation programs, followed >>>>>> by >>>>>> 'cost-effective' renewable resources, and then from traditional >>>>>> sources >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> such >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> as fossil fuel burning power plants."[3] Of course, if renewable >>>>>> energy >>>>>> sources and energy efficiency and conservation programs were truly >>>>>> "cost >>>>>> effective," producers would already be utilizing them in higher >>>>>> numbers >>>>>> because it would make them more profitable. This clearly is not the >>>>>> case. >>>>>> Forcing companies to invest significant amounts of their scarce >>>>>> resources >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> on >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> more costly energy-production methods, which make up a relatively >>>>>> small >>>>>> share of total energy production (for good reason), will only ensure >>>>>> that >>>>>> costs and, ultimately, consumers' electricity bills remain higher >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> than >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> necessary. >>>>>> >>>>>> As new technologies and energy-production methods are developed, this >>>>>> may >>>>>> change, but for now, it is best for both producers and consumers to >>>>>> focus >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> on >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> the most efficient means of producing energy. Of course, if consumers >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> demand >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> "cleaner" energy, in a truly free market, producers will have an >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> incentive >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> to provide it. Indeed, after Pennsylvania successfully implemented its >>>>>> electricity deregulation effort in 1999 (without the pitfalls >>>>>> experienced >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> by >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> California), 20 percent of consumers chose to switch to suppliers of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> "green >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> power," despite the fact that they had to pay a small premium to do >>>>>> so. >>>>>> Proposition 80 eliminates this choice, instead demanding that all >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> consumers >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> support the higher cost of investing more in renewable energy >>>>>> whether >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> they >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> want to >>>>>> or not. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Misconceptions Over Electricity "Deregulation" in California >>>>>> >>>>>> Some blame deregulation for the rolling blackouts, soaring spot market >>>>>> prices, and utility bankruptcies that sprang from the energy crisis of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> 2000 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> and 2001. But this anger is misplaced. California has never >>>>>> experienced >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> true >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> deregulation. The "deregulation" implemented in 1996 left price >>>>>> controls >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> place and created "artificial" markets ripe for manipulation and >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> disparities >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> between supply and demand. >>>>>> >>>>>> By setting price caps below market prices, California limited the >>>>>> profitability of the industry. When wholesale energy costs increased, >>>>>> the >>>>>> price caps prevented energy producers from passing them on to >>>>>> consumers. >>>>>> Wholesale prices rose dramatically for a number of reasons: natural >>>>>> gas >>>>>> prices rose, hot weather in the Southwest increased demand, a relative >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> lack >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> of water in the Northwest minimized the production of hydroelectric >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> energy, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> and pollution-control permits, which allow industrial companies that >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> produce >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> less pollution than allowed by regulations to sell the difference as >>>>>> "credits" to higher-pollution-producing companies, rose ten-fold, from >>>>>> $4 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> $40. >>>>>> >>>>>> The price caps additionally discouraged potential producers from >>>>>> entering >>>>>> the market and increasing competition, and they discouraged existing >>>>>> producers from investing profits in adding capacity, of which >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Californians >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> were (and continue to be) in dire need. As a result of the price caps >>>>>> and >>>>>> pressure from politicians and environmentalists, the building of >>>>>> plants >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> transmission lines slowed dramatically and energy producers were not >>>>>> able >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> keep up with demand, particularly in the Silicon Valley, where the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> booming >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> computer and "dot-com" industries led to even sharper increases in >>>>>> electricity demand. >>>>>> >>>>>> After the big three investor-owned utilities Pacific Gas& Electric, >>>>>> Southern California Edison, and SEMPRA (San Diego Gas& Electric) >>>>>> were >>>>>> forced to sell many of their fossil-fuel-burning generators to private >>>>>> firms, regulators prohibited them from entering into long-term >>>>>> contracts >>>>>> with these firms, forcing them to rely upon the much more volatile >>>>>> short-term and spot markets. In addition, California forced generators >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> utilities to trade power through the Power Exchange, a state-run pool. >>>>>> >>>>>> While that requirement was designed to give every company the same >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> wholesale >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> price for power, it also guaranteed that they would be unable to >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> negotiate >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> lower-priced power on their own. The California rules essentially >>>>>> barred >>>>>> utilities from buying power on the futures market, meaning they were >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> unable >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> to lock in supplies and prices.[4] >>>>>> >>>>>> This is as if Wal-Mart and Marshall Field's were forced to acquire >>>>>> their >>>>>> goods from a non-profit, state-run pool that would guarantee that they >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> would >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> acquire the goods for the same price. Wal-Mart never would have been >>>>>> able >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> develop its efficient and innovative purchasing and distribution >>>>>> system, >>>>>> meaning it could not generate savings to pass on to customers in the >>>>>> form >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> of >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> lower prices. >>>>>> >>>>>> At the time of the increase in wholesale prices, PG&E and Edison were >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> still >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> in the deregulation "transition" period, and thus still subject to PUC >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> rate >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> regulations. As a result, PG&E went bankrupt and Edison teetered on >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> edge >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> of insolvency. To add insult to injury, when the government stepped in >>>>>> to >>>>>> purchase electricity on behalf of the struggling IOUs to try to quell >>>>>> the >>>>>> crisis, not only did it do so at the height of the emergency, when >>>>>> energy >>>>>> prices were highest, it locked in these prices with long-term >>>>>> contracts >>>>>> costing billions of dollars. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The Natural Monopoly Justification for Regulation >>>>>> >>>>>> The main argument against the full privatization of public utilities >>>>>> such >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> as >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> electricity and water service is that such industries are "natural >>>>>> monopolies." That is, they require such high fixed costs (it is easier >>>>>> to >>>>>> start a new restaurant than to invest in the infrastructure for a new >>>>>> electric grid) that it is inefficient for there to exist more than one >>>>>> producer in a particular location. This, it is feared, will lead the >>>>>> producer to engage in price gouging. >>>>>> >>>>>> There are several problems with this rationale, not the least of which >>>>>> is >>>>>> the notion that "public utilities" somehow constitute a unique set of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> goods >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> that must be "protected" by government intervention. As economist >>>>>> Murray >>>>>> Rothbard noted in Power and Market: >>>>>> >>>>>> The very term "public utility" … is an absurd one. Every good is >>>>>> useful >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> "to >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> the public," and almost every good … may be considered "necessary." >>>>>> Any >>>>>> designation of a few industries as "public utilities" is completely >>>>>> arbitrary and unjustified.[5] >>>>>> >>>>>> High capital costs certainly will limit the number of actual and >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> potential >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> providers, but there is still a profit motive in a free market that >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> creates >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> opportunities for lower-cost producers. In addition, it is important >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> note >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> that markets are not static; technological innovations may allow for >>>>>> additional competition in the future. >>>>>> >>>>>> Another misconception opponents of free markets have concerns the very >>>>>> understanding of the nature of competition. Even if there is only one >>>>>> producer of a certain good or service in town, this does not mean that >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> producer is "gouging" customers through monopolistic practices. >>>>>> Indeed, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> just >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> because he is the sole supplier today does not mean he will be the >>>>>> sole >>>>>> supplier tomorrow. As economist Thomas J. DiLorenzo explains: >>>>>> >>>>>> If competition is viewed as a dynamic, rivalrous process of >>>>>> entrepreneurship, then the fact that a single producer happens to have >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> lowest costs at any one point in time is of little or no consequence. >>>>>> The >>>>>> enduring forces of competition including potential competition >>>>>> will >>>>>> render free-market monopoly an impossibility.[6] >>>>>> >>>>>> In other words, even if there happens to be only one current provider >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> a >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> particular good or service, in a free market that provider is held in >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> check >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> by the mere threat of competition if he charges prices that are too >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> high >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> or provides poor service, there will be an incentive for a competitor >>>>>> to >>>>>> come in and take market share from him by offering lower prices or >>>>>> better >>>>>> service. >>>>>> >>>>>> The rules change, however, when government regulation erects barriers >>>>>> to >>>>>> entry or otherwise suppresses competition. In addition to the many >>>>>> government regulations purportedly enacted in the "public interest," >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> there >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> are numerous instances where private-sector businesses have been able >>>>>> to >>>>>> successfully lobby policymakers to use the power of government to >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> establish >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> barriers to competition and protect them from existing or potential >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> rivals. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Unlike the free-market case, there is no possibility of these >>>>>> monopolists >>>>>> losing out to lower-cost providers (barring the elimination of the >>>>>> regulations), and they are able to "exploit" consumers. These are the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> truly >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> harmful monopolies. Thus, the only "bad" monopoly is a >>>>>> government-created >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> or >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> government-preserved >>>>>> monopoly. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Conclusions >>>>>> >>>>>> Proposition 80 would be a step backward for California. It would >>>>>> restrict >>>>>> consumer choice, discourage competition, and impose more of the kinds >>>>>> of >>>>>> regulations that got the California power industry into trouble in the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> first >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> place. >>>>>> >>>>>> As awful as Proposition 80 is, however, there is good news. It is >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> trailing >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> in recent public opinion polls, and even if it should end up passing >>>>>> it >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> is >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> likely to be discarded by the courts. It was removed from the ballot >>>>>> on >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> July >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> 22 by the Court of Appeals in Sacramento because the court found that, >>>>>> according to the state constitution, the PUC's authority can only be >>>>>> increased by the Legislature, not by initiative. The initiative was >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> restored >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> a few days later by the California Supreme Court, which did not offer >>>>>> an >>>>>> opinion on the merits of the case but felt that the public should have >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> chance to vote on the initiative before the legal challenge is heard. >>>>>> (Of >>>>>> course, if voters reject the measure, this will be a moot point and >>>>>> the >>>>>> courts will not have to waste their time on it a fact that surely >>>>>> was >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> not >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> lost on the Supreme Court.) >>>>>> >>>>>> Politicians and regulators forced a sham of a "deregulation" scheme >>>>>> upon >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> energy industry in California, and then blamed the free market when it >>>>>> inevitably failed! The problem was not too much free-market >>>>>> competition; >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> it >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> was too much regulation (despite the "deregulation" doublespeak). The >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> real >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> solution to California's energy problem is to eliminate price caps and >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> all >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> government regulation, thereby removing barriers to entry, fostering >>>>>> competition, offering consumers maximum choice, and affording >>>>>> providers >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> greatest incentives to increase capacity and best serve their >>>>>> customers. >>>>>> >>>>>> Adam Summers is a policy analyst for the Reason Foundation >>>>>> ([email protected]). Comment on the blog. >>>>>> >>>>>> [1] This option was suspended during the electricity crisis of 2000 >>>>>> and >>>>>> 2001, but is scheduled to be reinstated when the last of the power >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> contracts >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> signed on behalf of the IOUs by the Department of Water Resources >>>>>> expires >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> 2015. >>>>>> >>>>>> [2] Carrie Peyton Dahlberg, "Electricity proposition crackles: Will >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> prices >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> go up? Will it avert an energy crisis? It all depends on who's >>>>>> talking," >>>>>> Sacramento Bee, October 15, 2005, >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.sacbee.com/content/politics/story/13717834p-14560232c.html(free >>>>>> registration required). >>>>>> >>>>>> [3] California Secretary of State, Official Voter Information Guide, >>>>>> Statewide Special Election, November 8, 2005, p. 52, >>>>>> http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov05/voter_info_pdf/entire80.pdf . >>>>>> >>>>>> [4] Terry Maxon, "Power Woes Unlikely in Texas, Officials Say," Dallas >>>>>> Morning News, January 19, 2001, cited in Lynne Kiesling, "Getting >>>>>> Electricity Deregulation Right: How Other States and Nations Have >>>>>> Avoided >>>>>> California's Mistakes," Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 281, April >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> 2001, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> p. 18, http://www.reason.org/ps281.pdf. >>>>>> >>>>>> [5] Murray N. Rothbard, Power and Market: Government and the Economy, >>>>>> (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977), p. 76, >>>>>> http://mises.org/rothbard/power&market.pdf. Now integrated into Man, >>>>>> Economy, and State. >>>>>> >>>>>> [6] Thomas J. DiLorenzo, "The Myth of Natural Monopoly," The Review of >>>>>> Austrian Economics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1996), p. 44, >>>>>> http://mises.org/journals/rae/pdf/rae9_2_3.pdf. >>>>>> >>>>>> http://mises.org/daily/1954 >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. >>>>>> For options& help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum >>>>>> >>>>>> * Visit our other community at >>>>>> http://www.PoliticalForum.com/ <http://www.politicalforum.com/>< >>>>>> http://www.politicalforum.com/> >>>>>> * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls. >>>>>> * Read the latest breaking news, and more. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Together, we can change the world, one mind at a time. >>>>> Have a great day, >>>>> Tommy >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. >>>>> For options& help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum >>>>> >>>>> * Visit our other community at >>>>> http://www.PoliticalForum.com/ <http://www.politicalforum.com/>< >>>>> http://www.politicalforum.com/> >>>>> * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls. >>>>> * Read the latest breaking news, and more. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. >>>> For options& help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum >>>> >>>> * Visit our other community at >>>> http://www.PoliticalForum.com/<http://www.politicalforum.com/> >>>> * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls. >>>> * Read the latest breaking news, and more. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. >> For options & help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum >> >> * Visit our other community at >> http://www.PoliticalForum.com/<http://www.politicalforum.com/> * It's >> active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls. * Read the >> latest breaking news, and more. >> > > -- > Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. > For options & help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum > > * Visit our other community at http://www.PoliticalForum.com/ > * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls. > * Read the latest breaking news, and more. -- Together, we can change the world, one mind at a time. Have a great day, Tommy -- Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups. For options & help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum * Visit our other community at http://www.PoliticalForum.com/ * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls. * Read the latest breaking news, and more.
