Dear J. Ashley: Hating government won't solve the problems. Making government be respectful of civil liberties, deferential to the People; efficient, and unobtrusive WILL solve the problems! — J. A. A. — > On Jun 5, 11:49 am, Jonathan Ashley <[email protected]> wrote: > John, > > There were folks as early as 1787 who knew that the coming government > would result in tyranny. By presenting YOUR Article III of YOUR New > Constitution you demonstrate that things would not be better under YOUR > New Constitution, but would instead fall deeper (if that's possible) > into the hands of "our monarchical, aristocratical democracy." > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > The Antifederalist Papers No. 9 > A Consolidated Government is a Tyranny > > "MONTEZUMA," regarded as a Pennsylvanian, wrote this essay which showed > up in the Independent Gazetteer on October 17, 1787. > > We the Aristocratic party of the United States, lamenting the many > inconveniences to which the late confederation subjected the well-born, > the better kind of people, bringing them down to the level of the > rabble-and holding in utter detestation that frontispiece to every bill > of rights, "that all men are born equal"-beg leave (for the purpose of > drawing a line between such as we think were ordained to govern, and > such as were made to bear the weight of government without having any > share in its administration) to submit to our Friends in the first class > for their inspection, the following defense of our monarchical, > aristocratical democracy. > > lst. As a majority of all societies consist of men who (though totally > incapable of thinking or acting in governmental matters) are more > readily led than driven, we have thought meet to indulge them in > something like a democracy in the new constitution, which part we have > designated by the popular name of the House of Representatives. But to > guard against every possible danger from this lower house, we have > subjected every bill they bring forward, to the double negative of our > upper house and president. Nor have we allowed the populace the right to > elect their representatives annually . . . lest this body should be too > much under the influence and control of their constituents, and thereby > prove the "weatherboard of our grand edifice, to show the shiftings of > every fashionable gale,"-for we have not yet to learn that little else > is wanting to aristocratize the most democratical representative than to > make him somewhat independent of his political creators. We have taken > away that rotation of appointment which has so long perplexed us-that > grand engine of popular influence. Every man is eligible into our > government from time to time for life. This will have a two-fold good > effect. First, it prevents the representatives from mixing with the > lower class, and imbibing their foolish sentiments, with which they > would have come charged on re-election. > > 2d. They will from the perpetuality of office be under our eye, and in a > short time will think and act like us, independently of popular whims > and prejudices. For the assertion "that evil communications corrupt good > manners," is not more true than its reverse. We have allowed this house > the power to impeach, but we have tenaciously reserved the right to try. > We hope gentlemen, you will see the policy of this clause-for what > matters it who accuses, if the accused is tried by his friends. In fine, > this plebian house will have little power, and that little be rightly > shaped by our house of gentlemen, who will have a very extensive > influence-from their being chosen out of the genteeler class ... It is > true, every third senatorial seat is to be vacated duennually, but > two-thirds of this influential body will remain in office, and be ready > to direct or (if necessary) bring over to the good old way, the young > members, if the old ones should not be returned. And whereas many of our > brethren, from a laudable desire to support their rank in life above the > commonalty, have not only deranged their finances, but subjected their > persons to indecent treatment (as being arrested for debt, etc.) we have > framed a privilege clause, by which they may laugh at the fools who > trusted them. But we have given out, that this clause was provided, only > that the members might be able without interruption, to deliberate on > the important business of their country. > > We have frequently endeavored to effect in our respective states, the > happy discrimination which pervades this system; but finding we could > not bring the states into it individually, we have determined ... and > have taken pains to leave the legislature of each free and independent > state, as they now call themselves, in such a situation that they will > eventually be absorbed by our grand continental vortex, or dwindle into > petty corporations, and have power over little else than yoaking hogs or > determining the width of cart wheels. But (aware that an intention to > annihilate state legislatures, would be objected to our favorite scheme) > we have made their existence (as a board of electors) necessary to ours. > This furnishes us and our advocates with a fine answer to any clamors > that may be raised on this subject. We have so interwoven continental > and state legislatures that they cannot exist separately; whereas we in > truth only leave them the power of electing us, for what can a > provincial legislature do when we possess the exclusive regulation of > external and internal commerce, excise, duties, imposts, post-offices > and roads; when we and we alone, have the power to wage war, make peace, > coin money (if we can get bullion) if not, borrow money, organize the > militia and call them forth to execute our decrees, and crush > insurrections assisted by a noble body of veterans subject to our nod, > which we have the power of raising and keeping even in the time of > peace. What have we to fear from state legislatures or even from states, > when we are armed with such powers, with a president at our head? (A > name we thought proper to adopt in conformity to the prejudices of a > silly people who are so foolishly fond of a Republican government, that > we were obliged to accommodate in names and forms to them, in order more > effectually to secure the substance of our proposed plan; but we all > know that Cromwell was a King, with the title of Protector). I repeat > it, what have we to fear armed with such powers, with a president at our > head who is captain- -general of the army, navy and militia of the > United States, who can make and unmake treaties, appoint and commission > ambassadors and other ministers, who can grant or refuse reprieves or > pardons, who can make judges of the supreme and other continental > courts-in short, who will be the source, the fountain of honor, profit > and power, whose influence like the rays of the sun, will diffuse itself > far and wide, will exhale all democratical vapors and break the clouds > of popular insurrection? But again gentlemen, our judicial power is a > strong work, a masked battery, few people see the guns we can and will > ere long play off from it. For the judicial power embraces every > question which can arise in law or equity, under this constitution and > under the laws of "the United States" (which laws will be, you know, the > supreme laws of the land). This power extends to all cases, affecting > ambassadors or other public ministers, "and consuls; to all cases of > admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the > United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more > States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens > of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands > under grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens > thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects." > > Now, can a question arise in the colonial courts, which the ingenuity or > sophistry of an able lawyer may not bring within one or other of the > above cases? Certainly not. Then our court will have original or > appellate jurisdiction in all cases-and if so, how fallen are state > judicatures-and must not every provincial law yield to our supreme flat? > Our constitution answers yes. . . . And finally we shall entrench > ourselves so as to laugh at the cabals of the commonalty. A few > regiments will do at first; it must be spread abroad that they are > absolutely necessary to defend the frontiers. Now a regiment and then a > legion must be added quietly; by and by a frigate or two must be built, > still taking care to intimate that they are essential to the support of > our revenue laws and to prevent smuggling. We have said nothing about a > bill of rights, for we viewed it as an eternal clog upon our designs, as > a lock chain to the wheels of government-though, by the way, as we have > not insisted on rotation in our offices, the simile of a wheel is ill. > We have for some time considered the freedom of the press as a great > evil-it spreads information, and begets a licentiousness in the people > which needs the rein more than the spur; besides, a daring printer may > expose the plans of government and lessen the consequence of our > president and senate-for these and many other reasons we have said > nothing with respect to the "right of the people to speak and publish > their sentiments" or about their "palladiums of liberty" and such stuff. > We do not much like that sturdy privilege of the people-the right to > demand the writ of habeas corpus. We have therefore reserved the power > of refusing it in cases of rebellion, and you know we are the judges of > what is rebellion.... Our friends we find have been assiduous in > representing our federal calamities, until at length the people at > large-frightened by the gloomy picture on one side, and allured by the > prophecies of some of our fanciful and visionary adherents on the > other-are ready to accept and confirm our proposed government without > the delay or forms of examination--which was the more to be wished, as > they are wholly unfit to investigate the principles or pronounce on the > merit of so exquisite a system. Impressed with a conviction that this > constitution is calculated to restrain the ... > > read more »
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