http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1009/op31.htm

 29 July - 4 August 2010
Issue No. 1009

Revolution in dreams and reality
While it can be faulted, as with all social upheavals, the 1952 Revolution in 
Egypt advanced values the Egyptian people continue to revere and uphold, writes 
Salah Eissa* 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

There must be a reason for the rather extravagant commemoration of the 1952 
Revolution this year. In fact, there are probably several reasons, all 
political. With parliamentary elections approaching, the ruling party is keen 
to reaffirm its genealogical descent from this revolution. Some of its rivals 
have seized upon the occasion to refute this and charge that the ruling party 
has turned its back on the revolution and its goals and, therefore, does not 
merit the people's vote. Other opposition forces have gone so far as to claim 
that Egypt is in the grips of social and economic circumstances similar to 
those that prevailed just prior to the revolution and that another revolution 
is immanent. A third camp among the opposition has taken a stance somewhere 
in-between. It agrees that the NDP is a direct descendent of the revolution and 
holds that this pedigree is sufficient cause for another revolution that would 
eliminate all vestiges of the assault the 1952 Revolution waged on the people's 
rights and freedoms.

Politics has a habit of spoiling things, including history. As the debate raged 
between the champions of the July Revolution and its detractors, the various 
participants gave themselves the right to remove this revolution -- as a 
historical event -- from its chronological and spatial context, to strip it of 
its surrounding international and regional balances and circumstances, and even 
to discard the domestic social conditions that prevailed at the time. Then they 
accorded themselves the further right to suppress some facts and magnify other 
details, and in general to turn history into a propaganda tool in the hope of 
winning cheap victories that would translate themselves into People's Assembly 
seats.

Anyone who believes that Egypt should have remained in a state of revolution 
for 58 years, from 23 July 1952 to 23 July 2010 is blind to a fact of history. 
Revolutions are sudden upheavals in a society's normal life; they overturn an 
existing order and soon become the status quo. The 1952 Revolution was no 
exception. It overturned the monarchy and then became the ruling order with the 
promulgation of the 1956 Constitution whose fundamental underpinnings governed 
all successive constitutions, including the present one, and assured that the 
executive occupied a unique and totally dominant position over all other 
authorities. 

No less deluded are those who imagine that the 1952 Revolution can be cloned, 
in Egypt or elsewhere. With history, as in rivers, the same water cannot flow 
beneath a bridge twice. Evolution and change are the rule. In order to 
reproduce the 1952 Revolution, we would have to reproduce the world as it stood 
in 1952, the ideas and movements that were current at the time, the military 
bases that were still there, and the social forces and political parties and 
organisations that were contending with one another. Not only would we have to 
make sure that they all were aligned the same way, we would also have to clone 
the revolutionary leaders exactly as they were on the eve of 23 July some 58 
years ago. Furthermore, we would have to recreate the same concerns, problems 
and circumstances, which means that to restage the 1952 Revolution today would 
not be a step forward, but rather a huge step backward.

The real value of the July Revolution lies in the fact that it succeeded in 
formulating a theory for national liberation that added to the 1882 and 1919 
revolutions that preceded it. It was a revolution tailored to its times in a 
bipolar world order, and to the needs of the people it championed. It honed the 
skill of capitalising on the contradictions between the superpowers instead of 
its predecessors' tactic of exploiting rifts in the colonialist front. It also 
seized upon the divide between the capitalist and socialist camps to assert 
itself as part of a third bloc consisting of national liberation movements 
around the world. Its vision of national liberation was not limited to the 
evacuation of foreign armies from Egypt. It embraced the rejection of outside 
intervention in domestic affairs and foreign pacts at the expense of the 
national will, the expulsion of foreign monopolies and the Egyptianisation of 
the economy, and the fortification of independence through development plans 
aimed at enhancing the capacities of the people, expanding public services, 
elevating the disadvantaged classes and promoting a higher level of social 
justice.

As it moved to attain these aims, the July Revolution had to deal with some 
very powerful enemies at home and abroad. These grew more and more ferocious 
and determined as the revolution began to extend its intellectual, political 
and moral influence beyond its borders, establishing itself as a pillar of the 
global independence movement and one of the most instrumental forces in ending 
direct colonial occupation in the rest of the Arab world, Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. It evolved into one of the foremost revolutionary phenomena of 
the 20th century. 

While it won many of its battles and thwarted many conspiracies, it could not 
be expected to win them all or to beat all conspirators. It would also have to 
pay an exorbitant price for some its positions. But in the final analysis it 
contributed to creating and building a nation, an Arab world and an 
international environment that were different and better than before. Along the 
way, it committed mistakes that led to crisis, losses that could have been 
avoided, and needless conflicts with allies that sapped our strength and theirs 
to the benefit of our mutual enemy. It was also only natural that the many 
foreign and domestic conspiracies would engender a form of paranoia and an 
obsession with security that could be exploited by the security agencies to 
strengthen their power and control. The consequent dissemination of a 
police-state climate deprived the revolution of the ability to benefit from 
well- intentioned criticism, and it prevented the large corps of political 
elites who supported the aims of the revolution from safeguarding these aims.

Such problems are the fate of all revolutions. In fact, the July Revolution may 
have had less than the average share of the negative phenomena associated with 
the regimes that emerged in Third World countries that had newly won their 
independence. But nor should this be our only criteria. We would not pass 
judgement on the French Revolution solely on the basis of the guillotine and 
"the terror" and ignore the storming of the Bastille, the National Assembly, 
and the beacon of "liberty, fraternity and equality" that that revolution gave 
the world. Nor would we judge the Mohammed Ali era on the basis of the massacre 
of the Mamelukes in the Citadel while ignoring his role in laying the 
foundations for modern Egypt. If we insisted upon such narrow criteria we might 
as well strike "revolution" from the historical lexicon. 

Times have changed. The July Revolution is nearing its 60th anniversary and it 
has become a historical phenomenon than can be neither called to life again nor 
cloned. But surely that should not be the point, because the lasting value of 
revolutions resides not in their concrete accomplishments, which are ephemeral, 
but in the values they establish. The July Revolution set four essential values 
that still remain alive:

- National independence and the autonomy of the national will, and the refusal 
to concede any territory, to enter into any alliance that could undermine the 
national will, and to bow to pressures that are against the interests of the 
Egyptian people.

- The right of the citizen to climb from the lowest to the highest rung of the 
social scale on the basis of his or her own efforts, talents and intelligence, 
rather than on the basis of gender or social or regional origins.

- The commitment on the part of the state to guarantee a minimal standard of 
living for the poor and limited income classes.

- The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation.

The governments that have succeeded one another for nearly six decades have all 
abided by these four essential values, even if they did so in different ways, 
as determined by the circumstances of their times or the exigencies and 
pressures they faced. These are the values the Egyptian people continue to 
cling to, and are the basis on which they judge their government and will 
continue to judge their governments for a long time to come.

* The writer is editor-in-chief of the weekly newspaper Al-Qahera . 


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Reply via email to