http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/30/opinion/30SUN1.html?th=&pagewanted=print&position= > The New York Times > > May 30, 2004 > MAKING VOTES COUNT > > Who Tests Voting Machines? > > Whenever questions are raised about the reliability of electronic voting > machines, election officials have a ready response: independent testing. > There is nothing to worry about, they insist, because the software has been > painstakingly reviewed by independent testing authorities to make sure it > is accurate and honest, and then certified by state election officials. But > this process is riddled with problems, including conflicts of interest and > a disturbing lack of transparency. Voters should demand reform, and they > should also keep demanding, as a growing number of Americans are, a > voter-verified paper record of their vote. > > Experts have been warning that electronic voting in its current form cannot > be trusted. There is a real danger that elections could be stolen by > nefarious computer code, or that accidental errors could change an > election's outcome. But state officials invariably say that the machines > are tested by federally selected laboratories. The League of Women Voters, > in a paper dismissing calls for voter-verified paper trails, puts its faith > in "the certification and standards process." > > But there is, to begin with, a stunning lack of transparency surrounding > this process. Voters have a right to know how voting machine testing is > done. Testing companies disagree, routinely denying government officials > and the public basic information. Kevin Shelley, the California secretary > of state, could not get two companies testing his state's machines to > answer even basic questions. One of them, Wyle Laboratories, refused to > tell us anything about how it tests, or about its testers' credentials. "We > don't discuss our voting machine work," said Dan Reeder, a Wyle spokesman. > > Although they are called independent, these labs are selected and paid by > the voting machine companies, not by the government. They can come under > enormous pressure to do reviews quickly, and not to find problems, which > slow things down and create additional costs. Brian Phillips, president of > SysTest Labs, one of three companies that review voting machines, conceded, > "There's going to be the risk of a conflict of interest when you are being > paid by the vendor that you are qualifying product for." > > It is difficult to determine what, precisely, the labs do. To ensure there > are no flaws in the software, every line should be scrutinized, but it is > hard to believe this is being done for voting software, which can contain > more than a million lines. Dr. David Dill, a professor of computer science > at Stanford University, calls it "basically an impossible task," and doubts > it is occurring. In any case, he says, "there is no technology that can > find all of the bugs and malicious things in software." > > The testing authorities are currently working off 2002 standards that > computer experts say are inadequate. One glaring flaw, notes Rebecca > Mercuri, a Harvard-affiliated computer scientist, is that the standards do > not require examination of any commercial, off-the-shelf software used in > voting machines, even though it can contain flaws that put the integrity of > the whole system in doubt. A study of Maryland's voting machines earlier > this year found that they used Microsoft software that lacked critical > security updates, including one to stop remote attackers from taking over > the machine. > > If so-called independent testing were as effective as its supporters claim, > the certified software should work flawlessly. But there have been > disturbing malfunctions. Software that will be used in Miami-Dade County, > Fla., this year was found to have a troubling error: when it performed an > audit of all of the votes cast, it failed to correctly match voting > machines to their corresponding vote totals. > > If independent testing were taken seriously, there would be an absolute bar > on using untested and uncertified software. But when it is expedient, > manufacturers and election officials toss aside the rules without telling > the voters. In California, a state audit found that voters in 17 counties > cast votes last fall on machines with uncertified software. When Georgia's > new voting machines were not working weeks before the 2002 election, > uncertified software that was not approved by any laboratory was added to > every machine in the state. > > The system requires a complete overhaul. The Election Assistance > Commission, a newly created federal body, has begun a review, but it has > been slow to start, and it is hamstrung by inadequate finances. The > commission should move rapidly to require a system that includes: > > Truly independent laboratories. Government, not the voting machine > companies, must pay for the testing and oversee it. > > Transparency. Voters should be told how testing is being done, and the > testers' qualifications. > > Rigorous standards. These should spell out in detail how software and > hardware are to be tested, and fix deficiencies computer experts have found. > > Tough penalties for violations. Voting machine companies and election > officials who try to pass off uncertified software and hardware as > certified should face civil and criminal penalties. > > Mandatory backups. Since it is extremely difficult to know that electronic > voting machines will be certified and functional on Election Day, election > officials should be required to have a nonelectronic system available for > use. > > None of these are substitutes for the best protection of all: a > voter-verified paper record, either a printed receipt that voters can see > (but not take with them) for touch-screen machines, or the ballot itself > for optical scan machines. These create a hard record of people's votes > that can be compared to the machine totals to make sure the counts are > honest. It is unlikely testing and certification will ever be a complete > answer to concerns about electronic voting, but they certainly are not now. >
