Dan bagusnya Islam itu sedang karam dan adalah tugas tiap orang rasional untuk berusaha mempercepat memurukkan agama taik anjing itu kedasar laut.
--- In [email protected], "sunny" <ambon@...> wrote: > > http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1049/op1.htm > > 26 May - 1 June 2001 > Issue No. 1049 > Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 > > The inevitable decline of Salafism > All fundamentalists follow the same path of internal development in thought > and action, leading either to their retreat and irrelevance, or their > destruction, writes Said Okasha* > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Undoubtedly many in Egypt and across the world are irritated by intense > Salafist media, political and popular activities. Different groups and sects > of Salafis openly express their ideas and convictions and sometimes take > action, violating the rights of other Egyptians. > > Contrary to what many observers hail as worrisome, I regard that the Salafis' > openness in expressing and forcing their views limits any potential for the > spread of their ideas, unlike the Muslim Brothers who are able to manoeuvre > by hiding their real convictions, which are no different than that of > Salafis, behind modern rhetoric and terminology. > > Salafis are fundamentalists by definition who share similar convictions > across different societies, regardless of the extent to which a society is > hailed as "civilised" and regardless of the specific religious affiliations > of fundamentalists. Fundamentalism preserves and accepts extremists' ideas > and excludes moderation or deconstructing complicated realties. Indeed, there > is a unified conceptual methodology to fundamentalism, despite the different > religious affiliations of specific fundamentalists, which asserts that there > is one possible absolute truth that explains abstract realities and also > paves the way for guiding man to avoid the horrors of the day of judgement. > This methodology leads to three main stages that Salafis and fundamentalists > all go through. > > The first of these stages is described as peaceful and the starting point of > Salafis' preaching is strengthened by a general lack of theological knowledge > in society, accordingly preaching becomes the main activity of Salafis or > fundamentalists at this stage with an objective to broaden the masses of > followers. The success of this expansionary objective paves the way for the > second stage where Salafis or fundamentalists justify the lack of > expansionary potential with convicting the population of failing to > comprehend true theology and that the devil took over their minds and souls. > Also they blame existing political regimes for protecting the status quo of > society. At this stage, they start to isolate themselves gradually from > society by either making themselves aloof from their surroundings or by > migrating to isolated landscapes such as forests and deserts, creating an > aloof community protected from exposure to society amongst which the devil is > strongly present. > > Lastly, there is a third stage where Salafis or fundamentalists are fed up > with their choice of isolation and decide to change the status quo of > society, explained earlier, by force. This is the stage at which Salafis or > fundamentalists are most active. It is a prime stage where they confront the > ruling regime or society itself. Nevertheless, such confrontations are > characterised by naivety and by the overuse of force and violence and also by > a lack of specific goals and objectives. The violence that these groups > employ is to achieve a basic objective and assumption of theirs, which is > that stratifying society according to religious beliefs and/or ethnicities in > a violent framework against each other will lead to the victory of the pure > elements in society -- ie, Salafis or fundamentalists. Usually these groups > undertake criminal acts that aim to trigger civil war, which puts these > groups under the jurisprudence of criminal law and not emergency law, given > that the latter is only in place to fight political and not criminal elements > in authoritarian states. > > Upon the realisation of criminal acts spurring civil war -- as assumed by > Salafi or fundamentalist groups -- governing authorities bring Salafi > organisations to trial. Usually trying these groups has a popular base due to > feelings of insecurity and terror that society has experienced when exposed > to strange fundamentalist ideas leading to the killing of innocent and > unarmed civilians, a peaceful religious or ethnic sect, and/or popular public > figures. > > At this point, Salafis or fundamentalists are destined to be labelled and > judged as extremists whose ideas lead armed individuals to commit crimes. > They are hence hailed as merely criminal groups and not as political > activists or freedom fighters. Nevertheless, this does not bring Salafi or > fundamentalist thought and its stages of activity to an end. Salafi or > fundamentalist thought generally is produced in societies due to a number of > factors that may never become extinct, such as: the failings of civilisation > to contain basic fears of isolation that sometimes leads to the adoption of > extreme ideologies in search of peace of mind. Also, some people's adoption > of these ideas comes as a result of dire social circumstances, such as > poverty, ignorance, marginalisation, and oppression that leads to loss of > integrity; also it can be due to an individual or a community's feeling of > incompetence in confronting worldly constraints. > > Therefore, Salafism or fundamentalism, generally, is a social-human > phenomenon that will continue to exist, renewing itself generation after > generation, in any society. Nevertheless, the dangers of these fundamentalist > trends are limited because its capacity to crystallise a coherent ideology > and a line of organised political action is limited, and moreover no > fundamentalist group has been able to reach to government or power in any > society in contemporary history except in one country, which is Afghanistan > in the 1990s. What resulted from the Taliban being in power in impoverished > Afghanistan was a harsh confrontation with the United States after the events > of 9/11. This confrontation led to the ouster of the Taliban, the occupation > of Afghanistan, and the death of Al-Qaeda's leader who cooperated with > Taliban, Osama Bin Laden. These results indicates that Salafism or > fundamentalism is degrading and limiting itself gradually, at least in its > violent capacity and potential in the foreseeable future. In Egypt, the > situation witnessed a wider space for criminal acts on the part of Salafis > since the 25 January Revolution. As a result, a wide popular force has formed > demanding that Salafis be held accountable and punished in accordance to law. > This makes possible that the fundamentalist movement in Egypt regresses to > the first and second stages of fundamentalist activity -- explained above -- > shortly. > > However, there remains a threat of Salafis resorting to making an alliance > with the Muslim Brotherhood, especially since the political scene in Egypt > remains complicated at the moment. This alliance would act to protect Salafis > from fierce popular opposition to their actions, moreover it would guarantee > that Salafis gain some benefits in case that the Muslim Brotherhood wins a > significant proportion of seats in the upcoming parliamentary elections. > Nevertheless, this danger might not be probable for two reasons. The first is > that most of the existing Salafist movements are originally made up of those > who split from the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s due to significant > ideological differences between the two groups; hence many disagreements > would surface shortly upon the creation of any alliance. Second, it is not > necessarily probable that the Muslim Brotherhood gains a majority of > parliamentary seats. Moreover, if in fact the Muslim Brotherhood won the > majority of parliamentary seats, it does not mean that it is the sole > political entity in power, especially since the political system in Egypt is > going to be more complicated from now, to integrate many political entities > distributing overlapping powers between the army, parliament and the > president. > > Generally, there are three case studies from different societies to analyse > when it comes to confirming that Salafis or fundamentalists are destined to > commit criminal atrocities that are not necessarily strategically hazardous. > > The first case study relates to the United States in 1969 when the Manson > Family, led by Charles Manson, committed murders and crimes pertaining to an > apocalyptic race war of a "Purifying Nature", as claimed by Manson. When > there was no popular support for his claims, he plotted the murder of > American actress Sharon Tate under the naive presumption that killing a > "white" person will actually make people think that "black" individuals > murdered her and hence spark a civil war between whites and blacks that will > eventually lead to the destruction of society, leaving the mission of > rebuilding a new society in accordance to God's preferences as defined by the > Manson Family. No civil war erupted and the Manson Family and Charles Manson > were tried, with Charles Manson sentenced to death, though the sentence was > commuted. > > A second case study relates to the Egyptian political scene in the 1970s when > a group entitled "Atonement and Holy Immigration" (or Al-Takfeer wal-Hijra ), > led by Shokri Mustafa, emerged. This group espoused rhetoric similar to > Charles Manson's. Mustafa called on Muslims to trace the pure Muslim > ancestors' teachings (or Al-Salaf Al-Saleh ) -- a programme similar to that > of Manson's "Purifying Nature." He also claimed to be the Awaited for > Righteous Man (or Al-Mahdi ), which is similar to Manson's claim to divinity. > At a later stage, Mustafa called on his followers to immigrate from infidel > societies. His ideas were not popular or widely accepted. Therefore, > Mustafa's rhetoric entered stage three of the development of fundamentalist > thought and action aforementioned, which pertains to committing criminal > acts. His group murdered Sheikh Al-Thahabi who was the Egyptian minister of > endowments at the time in June 1976. The presumption was that this incident > would trigger a war between the ruling regime and Islamists who cooperated > with this regime (ie, the Muslim Brotherhood). He thought that this war would > cripple society. Nevertheless, no such war took place and Mustafa was > captured and sentenced to death. > > The third case study relates to Japan in the late 1980s when the religious > cult/movement entitled "Aum shinri kyo" -- who claimed to be of "Supreme > Truth" -- committed notorious crimes in Japan. The leader of this > cult/movement was Shoko Ashara who claimed to be the only enlightened master > in Japan, calling himself the "Lamb of God" and claiming that he was the > Hindu Goddess Shiva incarnate. He promised to lead his followers to > salvation. At first, he attempted to integrate his cult/movement peacefully > in society by running for parliamentary elections in 1990. However, the > attempt was a significant failure and hence the cult resorted to the third > stage of fundamentalist development, inflicted several terrorist attacks of > which the most infamous was the Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 > which killed and injured hundreds of people. Shoko was arrested and sentenced > to death in 2004. > > These three case studies highlight the stages through which fundamentalist > groups develop a framework of action and thought. Across the three cases, the > mechanism is identical, despite religious and sociological differences, and > the cultural specify of the societies corresponding to the three examples. > Therefore, one deduction is that the probability of similar groups reaching > power, in developed or developing countries, is limited. Another deduction is > that the criminal atrocities inflicted by Salafis in Egypt lately, with the > most recent criminal act being the brutal events in Cairo's Imbaba district, > is going to result in a decline in their popularity, even amongst the poor > classes of Egyptians. This gives Salafis one of two options: first, to > regress to stages one and two and stick to peaceful preaching rather than > developing a political rhetoric; second, to continue committing more crimes > that will eventually push them towards oblivion, especially after their > leaders are convicted and punished for their criminal acts. > > * The writer is associate researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and > Strategic Studies. > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] > ------------------------------------ Post message: [email protected] Subscribe : [email protected] Unsubscribe : [email protected] List owner : [email protected] Homepage : http://proletar.8m.com/Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/join (Yahoo! 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