http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MF02Ak02.html
Jun 2, 2011 Specter of chaos haunts Libya By Victor Kotsev TEL AVIV - The sense of chaos just keeps growing in Libya. Given the full-swing misinformation campaign on all sides, it is hard to confirm whether the latest reports of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's isolation and weakness are genuine, a product of a psychological campaign against him by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or manipulations of his own. One threat, however, is looming larger and larger, and it could dramatically affect all strategic calculations. Libya may soon become a powder keg too big and fragmented for anyone to control, including Gaddafi, the rebels, and NATO. The intensified bombing campaign in the last few weeks, coupled with a diplomatic offensive on several tracks, seems to have softened the resolve of at least some of Gaddafi's power base. Last Friday, Russia, which had previously been sharply critical to NATO's campaign, joined the countries calling for Gaddafi's ouster, and offered to mediate an end to the conflict. On Monday, eight senior officers, including five generals, and (according to rebel reports) ''scores'' of soldiers defected from the government army. The officers may have been persuaded to do so in part by a shift in NATO tactics toward bombing assets that are important to them. [1] It is far from clear, however, that these developments alone will change the status quo significantly. On Tuesday, Gaddafi told visiting South African President Jacob Zuma that he would not give up power, and Libyan government spokesman Ibrahim Moussa warned that such a scenario would lead to full-scale civil war. Gaddafi did tell Zuma that he was willing to negotiate. Some speculated that Russia sensed that Gaddafi's downfall was inevitable, but it is hard to gauge how sincere the Kremlin shift is. Persistent reports of secret talks between the rebels, Gaddafi and possibly NATO have raised the possibility of a secret deal being in the works; some pundits suggest that such a deal may involve a transfer of power within the Gaddafi family, for example to Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam. Russia's diplomacy on Libya has arguably been driven by ulterior motives since the start of the crisis, [2] and we can expect the Kremlin to have extracted a handsome price for even a slight change in its position. Some analysts speculate that such a price might manifest itself, for example, in American concessions over the missile defense system in Europe. The impact of the defections is hard to measure as well. Gaddafi has also claimed that large numbers of rebels have surrendered to him, and it is difficult to confirm the scope of such occurrences and the veracity of reports on both sides. Besides, it is useful to keep in mind just how fluid the situation on the ground can sometimes be. In the early days of the uprising, Western journalists were frequently surprised to see the same people participating in anti-Gaddafi rallies one day and in pro-Gaddafi rallies the next. It is possible that we are witnessing a similar phenomenon now, with at least some people circulating between the sides. The reports of back-channel negotiations between the seemingly irreconcilable rival governments add to these suspicions. It is hardly a surprise, therefore, that NATO's bombing campaign is growing increasingly desperate. On Tuesday, Libya accused NATO of having killed 718 and injured 4,067 civilians since the start of the operation. These figures are hard to verify, but the air raids have recently intensified and the potential targets have broadened, making collateral damage more likely. British and French attack helicopters are expected to be put to use soon, and as I argued previously, this could be seen as a precursor to a ground invasion. [3] In fact, NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen admitted on Monday that NATO might send ground forces to Libya at some point, presumably after Gaddafi's ouster. ''I would anticipate that there might be a need at some point to unfold a small force ... a small number of people there to help them in some way," he told a NATO forum in Varna, Bulgaria. [4] The Guardian meanwhile reported that small groups of former British special forces, hired privately by Arab countries, are already on the ground in the western port city of Misrata. [5] This may be the beginning of a public legitimization campaign of a ground phase of the war. Beyond that, however, Rasmussen's remarks betrayed another reality on the ground: one where not only is the war difficult to win, but peace might prove an even greater challenge. Even if Gaddafi were to leave today, a peacekeeping force would clearly be required; it is far from clear that it would do the job. There seems to be at least one reason which might theoretically persuade Gaddafi to relinquish power, or at least to confine himself to some limited part of Libya where he would be able to maintain control. That dynamic has not received sufficient reporting from the international media, even though there were signs of it from the very start. It is hard to overstate the significance of the vast weapons supplies that were looted in the first weeks of chaos following the uprising. ''What we found was shocking,'' Peter Bouckaert, a Human Rights Watch expert who was in the country at the time. wrote in Foreign Policy in April. ''Qaddafi's weapon stocks far exceeded what we saw in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein ... There is good cause for US and European officials to worry - there are rocket-propelled grenades, surface-to-air missiles, and artillery shells full of explosives that can easily be refashioned into car bombs.'' [6] This is not even to mention the many thousands of guns that are circulating freely in Libya, some reportedly released by Gaddafi himself in an effort to arm the population against a ''Western invasion". Tell-tale signs emerge in the rebels' own accounts. On Tuesday, a rebel spokesman told Reuters that ''[Gaddafi forces] filled [the rebel-held western town of Zlitan] with drug dealers, criminals and other crooks ... They gave them automatic weapons and hand grenades to oppress the residents of Zlitan. Besides arrests and intimidations, we hear accounts of rape." [7] The reports remain to be confirmed; the potential for the creation of powerful criminal structures is clearly there, however, and such structures would soon enough begin to pursue their own interests rather than Gaddafi's or the rebels'. They have a powerful arsenal at their disposal as well as a large pool of potential foot-soldiers: the countless unemployed and radicalized people on the ground - whose allegiances often shift. Many convicts escaped from the jails during the uprising, so there is no shortage of trained operatives either. There is also a looming threat that tribal identities might at some point trump loyalty to either Gaddafi or the rebels. Taken together, these threats add up to a recipe for a disaster. While until recently it was unlikely that any one except for Gaddafi would be able prevent the implosion of Libya into a full-scale brutal civil war, now it is unclear that even the colonel can do that. Notes: 1. This Week at War: The Milosevic Option, Foreign Policy, May 20, 2011. 2. The vetoes that weren't, Foreign Policy, March 21, 2011. 3. NATO goes Kosovo in Libya, , Asia Times Online, May 24, 2011. 4. NATO: Ground force may be needed in Libya after Gaddafi, Jerusalem Post, May 30, 2011. 5. Libya: SAS veterans helping Nato identify Gaddafi targets in Misrata, The Guardian May 31, 2011. 6. Qaddafi's Great Arms Bazaar, Foreign Policy, April 31, 2011. 7. Gaddafi arms "crooks" to crush Zlitan rebels: witness, Reuters, 31 May 2011. BR> Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst based in Tel Aviv. (Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing ) [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ Post message: prole...@egroups.com Subscribe : proletar-subscr...@egroups.com Unsubscribe : proletar-unsubscr...@egroups.com List owner : proletar-ow...@egroups.com Homepage : http://proletar.8m.com/Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/join (Yahoo! 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