On Jun 12, 2007, at 3:53 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Waclaw,
Matthias, if you look carefully at BFO, you'll see that roles are
entities. This means that evidences, as roles, are entities.
Of course. I just wanted to differentiate that an experiment is not
an instance of any class called 'evidence' (in other words, an
experiment 'is not' evidence). Instead, it should be associated
with an 'evidence-role'.
The only problem with this is that roles inhere in continuants
rather than in occurrents. One way around this is not to say that
evidence is an experiment, but rather the results of an experiment.
If I may interject, the fact that you need to find a way 'around'
this illustrates what I have long found to be the case, that the
continuant/occurrent distinction, and the resulting artificial
restrictions that it places upon what one is allowed to say, is more
harm than it is worth. One can take any ontology (such as BFO) that
is based up on it and simply erase the distinction (and all its
consequent distinctions) and nothing is thereby lost, only a
simplification achieved and the need for artificial work-arounds
diminished. It is in any case based on very debatable (and indeed
debated) philosophical assumptions, arising chiefly from
ordinary-language philosophy (and Brentano's theology) than from
anything scientific. It carves nature at language's joints rather
than nature's joints.
Pat Hayes
--
---------------------------------------------------------------------
IHMC (850)434 8903 or (650)494 3973 home
40 South Alcaniz St. (850)202 4416 office
Pensacola (850)202 4440 fax
FL 32502 (850)291 0667 cell
phayesAT-SIGNihmc.us http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes
