Hi all, Dan (Brickley) pointed me at these discussions on DOLCE.

Well, actually I only mentioned BFO. But you are correct in surmising that I had DOLCE partly in mind.

I tend to avoid too many emails and forums on foundational ontologies, in favor of constructive work, but this mailing list seems oriented at doing real things, then I am eager to come back to my old home in medical ontologies :)

Some comments and recap on the current status of DOLCE and its utility for medical ontologies.

(1) Continuant vs. Occurrent

Pat, we already had this discussion at least two times; the last one was very detailed and we (apparently) agreed on the fact that we might be free to adopt the distinction or not, even in DOLCE: if you want to stay neutral, just use Entity or SpatioTemporalEntity.

Yes, I know you can be 'neutral' in DOLCE. But this isn't using DOLCE correctly, as it was meant to be used. And I was intending to make a stronger point: not just that one can be continuant/occurrent neutral, but that having the distinction in a high-level ontology at all is actively harmful. The rest of your message makes my main point for me.

The distinction can be useful in some domains that share a common sense, linguistic (Western-variety) intuition, but I will not fight for it, as for any other.

If only everyone else had your laissez-faire attitude.

The point of DOLCE and related ontologies is having explicit *rationales* to justify modelling choices, not to dictate how people should think or model the world. As a matter of fact, in the context of the NeOn project (<http://www.neon-project.org>http://www.neon-project.org), we are moving to a "design pattern" approach to ontology reuse, which will probably change the way foundational or reference ontologies should be used or thought about.

That sounds interesting, indeed. Can you point to more on this topic?

(2) Roles and occurrents

Roles, as they are modelled in DOLCE-Lite-Plus (<http://www.loa-cnr.it/ontologies/DLP_397.owl>http://www.loa-cnr.it/ontologies/DLP_397.owl) and in DOLCE-Ultralite (<http://www.loa-cnr.it/ontologies/DUL.owl>http://www.loa-cnr.it/ontologies/DUL.owl), are applied to continuants, but this is just a terminological choice that adheres to the usual intuition of roles played by agents, substances, etc.

But this is disingenuous. Maybe it was just a terminological choice when you made it, but now its in the foundational ontology it has the force of case law. It is virtually impossible for a user to deny it: if he or she tries to, all kinds of tools will give error messages, etc.. It really isn't possible to ignore the distinction under these circumstances. One has to be VERY careful when writing things that will get set into stone in a 'standard'.

However, a similar intuition is provided for occurrents by the classes Course and Task in DOLCE-Lite-Plus and by the classes EventStructure and Task in DOLCE-Ultralite.

A perfect illustration of my point. Why should anyone have to understand and remember all this, all these complicated distinctions about what goes with what but not with what other? What USE is any of this stuff? What would be lost if it were all simply swept away?

There are entities that occupy space and last for a time. One can use a single, uniform, set of concepts to refer to the spatial and temporal relations between such things, and their mereology and if necessary their geometry and topology, simply *because* they occupy space and time. There is no need to pay attention to all this clutter of terminological distinctions.

Now, of course, there are distinctions to be made: not all spatiotemporal things are in the same category. But they are all *contained in space and time* in the same way, which is why (you wanted a rationale, right?) any of their properties or relations *which arise from or refer to the nature of this containment* can be described in one way, and used for all of them. Which simplifies things enormously and means that busy, practical biologists don't have to keep wondering whether the Krebs cycle or a computer program is a continuant or an occurrent. And then, once that distinction goes away, all these other distinctions go away as well.

In general, the class Concept is used to talk of notions that are used to classify any entity at some time for some reason.

Thats a nice definition. I presume it is OK to parse it as "...classify (any entity at some time) for some reason."

If you want to use Evidence as a role for (the result, execution of) an experiment, then you can use EventStructure or directly Concept. The distinction, where needed, makes sense: roles of occurrents have usually a richer structure than roles of continuants, because they are used to suggest how events and their temporal structure should be interpreted in some context

How do you get that from the usual conditions on continuants? How do contexts come into the picture? Surely events have contexts too, no?

; in order to be an evidence, the result of an experiment should be obtained in a certain way, e.g. with explicit methods and control conditions. Pat, notice that in DOLCE-Ultralite you can introduce experiment results as entities, classified by an "EvidenceConcept"

I would suggest that anything that you can refer to using a name is an "entity" of some kind.

: who cares about Brentano's theology (poor guy, however, did he make anything bad to your ancestors? :)).

No :-) I got fed up having Barry cite him at me every time we argued, so I went and checked out where his ideas really came from. In fact Brentano is one of the main sources for the 'continuant' notion: both Barry and Peter Simons explicitly acknowledge him. It does not come from robust Western linguistic common sense, as you imply above and many people assume. (It is in fact a *very* peculiar notion.) And Brentano liked the idea because he was absolutely sure that he had a soul, and that souls had to be continuants for basically theological reasons. Makes you just love philosophy, finding out things like this.

OK, enough from me on this on this topic on this email list. I promised not to debate this stuff here. So Aldo, you get the last word, if you want it.

Pat


Something else on another thread about DOLCE and solutions for readability of horrible foundational terms.
Cheers
Aldo

>On Jun 12, 2007, at 3:53 PM, <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]&In-Reply-To=%253Cp06230907c29c6cae1e1a%40%5B10.100.0.39%5D%253E&References=%253Cp06230907c29c6cae1e1a%40%5B10.100.0.39%5D%253E>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 >
 >>
 >>Hi Waclaw,
 >>
 >>>Matthias, if you look carefully at BFO, you'll see that roles are
 >>>entities.  This means that evidences, as roles, are entities.
 >>
 >>Of course. I just wanted to differentiate that an experiment is not 
 >>an instance of any class called 'evidence' (in other words, an 
 >>experiment 'is not' evidence). Instead, it should be associated 
 >>with an 'evidence-role'.
 >
 >The only problem with this is that roles inhere in continuants 
 >rather than in occurrents. One way around this is not to say that 
 >evidence is an experiment, but rather the results of an experiment.

If I may interject, the fact that you need to find a way 'around' 
this illustrates what I have long found to be the case, that the 
continuant/occurrent distinction, and the resulting artificial 
restrictions that it places upon what one is allowed to say, is more 
harm than it is worth. One can take any ontology (such as BFO) that 
is based up on it and simply erase the distinction (and all its 
consequent distinctions) and nothing is thereby lost, only a 
simplification achieved and the need for artificial work-arounds 
diminished. It is in any case based on very debatable (and indeed 
debated) philosophical assumptions, arising chiefly from 
ordinary-language philosophy (and Brentano's theology) than from 
anything scientific. It carves nature at language's joints rather 
than nature's joints.

Pat Hayes


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_____________________________________

Aldo Gangemi

Senior Researcher
Laboratory for Applied Ontology
Institute for Cognitive Sciences and Technology
National Research Council (ISTC-CNR)
Via Nomentana 56, 00161, Roma, Italy
Tel: +390644161535
Fax: +390644161513
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icq# 108370336

skype aldogangemi


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