On 2021-08-25, Chris Angelico <ros...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 5:20 PM Barry Scott <ba...@barrys-emacs.org> wrote: >> Only if this threat model matters to you or your organisation. >> Personal its low down of the threats I watch out for. >> >> The on-line world and the real-world are the same here. >> >> If a business changes hands then do you trust the new owners? >> >> Nothing we do with PKI certificates will answer that question. > > Fair enough; but a closer parallel would be walking up to a > previously-familiar street vendor and seeing a different person there. > Did the business change hands, or did some random dude hop over the > counter and pretend to be a new owner? > > But you're right, it's not usually a particularly high risk threat. > Still, it does further weaken the value of named SSL certificates and > certificate authorities; there's not actually that much difference if > the server just gave you a self-signed cert. In theory, the CA is > supposed to protect you against someone doing a DNS hack and > substituting a different server, in practice, anyone capable of doing > a large-scale DNS hack is probably capable of getting a very > legit-looking SSL cert for the name as well.
There are so many trusted CAs these days that the chances of them all being secure approaches zero - they are not all equal yet they are all equally trusted. Which is why a change of CA on a site you have visited before is potentially suspicious. -- https://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-list