On Thu, Sep 26, 2024 at 10:58:57AM +0300, Michael Tokarev wrote:
> 25.09.2024 13:23, Mattias Nissler wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 25, 2024 at 12:03 PM Michael Tokarev <m...@tls.msk.ru> wrote:
> ..
> > > So, the issue has now become CVE-2024-8612 (information leak), with this
> > > commit (v9.1.0-134-g637b0aa139) being the fix.
> > 
> > Interesting. IIUC, this is triggered by device implementations calling
> > dma_memory_unmap with an incorrect size parameter as provided by a
> > hostile guest. Shouldn't the device implementations be fixed to
> > validate the parameter as well? Maybe this has already happened? It
> > would seem the more targeted fix to me.
> 
> Yes, a similar question occurred to me too, - this change does not look
> like a proper fix for CVE-2024-8612.  And nope, no other changes has been
> made to fix it properly, in the device implementations.
> 
> Maybe now with CVE-2024-8612 in place, we can fix the actual problem in
> the right place, instead of relying on this change..
> 
> > > Should we back-port it to previous stable releases of qemu?
> > > (it applies to 9.1 but not to 9.0, and I haven't tested it even in 9.1.
> > > If anything it needs some work for 9.0 and before)
> > 
> > FWIW, I've been running with earlier variants of this since at least
> > 8.0.50, so a backport shouldn't be hard. Note that if we decide to
> > backport, we should also include "mac_dbdma: Remove leftover
> > `dma_memory_unmap` calls", which fixes a bug uncovered in mac_dbdma
> > uncovered by the concurrent bounce buffers change.
> 
> So far I picked this and mac_dbdma change for 9.1, and will try to
> back-port things up to 8.2.  But it is better - IMHO - to have a real,
> more targetting, fix for CVE-2024-8612.

Agree 100% here.

Cc a bunch more people involved.


> Thanks,
> 
> /mjt


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