Document a policy that NBD connections should strongly consider using TLS and x509 certificates to filter out unwanted clients. If a malicious server or client can trigger a QEMU assertion failure on a plaintext connection, but can trivially have risk mitigated by enabling TLS to weed out unknown partners (so that a full-on attack of QEMU would first require chaining some other attack to convince a "trusted" client to break protocol in the first place), then that reduces the CVSS-BE score of the QEMU bug. In turn, our policy already states that low severity scores can be fixed without an embargo.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> --- docs/system/security.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/docs/system/security.rst b/docs/system/security.rst index e211fdd2344..e30f771731a 100644 --- a/docs/system/security.rst +++ b/docs/system/security.rst @@ -320,3 +320,26 @@ encryption and authorization control policy on client connections. In summary, the monitor console is considered a privileged control interface to QEMU and as such should only be made accessible to a trusted management application or user. + +Block device network protocols (NBD, NFS, etc.) +''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' + +When using QEMU to access remote storage over a network (such as QEMU +acting as an NBD or NFS client) or to provide remote storage access +(such as QEMU acting as an NBD server), it is important to realize +that an unencrypted connection can allow any external process a +potential attack vector via the network port. When possible, QEMU +should be configured to require TLS to prevent a man-in-the-middle +attack, as well as use x509 client certificates with the +tls-creds-x509 object set with 'verify-peer=on' to check that the peer +is allowed to connect. It may also be worth using 'tls-authz' to +filter which certificates are allowed if the CA issues certs more +broadly. + +Proper hardening of network connections cannot prevent a client from +violating protocol, but does increase the complexity of an attack, +because a malicious actor must first find a way to convince an +authenticated client to send the bytes that will trigger any QEMU +misbehavior. Use of a hardened connection is therefore an +environmental factor used in determining the risk and severity of a +network-triggered bug. -- 2.56.0
