Max Reitz <mre...@redhat.com> writes: > On 09.01.19 15:32, Markus Armbruster wrote: >> Max Reitz <mre...@redhat.com> writes: >> >>> On 08.01.19 11:36, Markus Armbruster wrote: >>>> Copying block maintainers for help with assessing the bug's (non-)impact >>>> on security. >>>> >>>> Christophe Fergeau <cferg...@redhat.com> writes: >>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 04:47:44PM +0100, Markus Armbruster wrote: >>>>>> Eric Blake <ebl...@redhat.com> writes: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 1/2/19 12:01 PM, Christophe Fergeau wrote: >>>>>>>> Adding Markus to cc: list, I forgot to do it when sending the patch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Also worth backporting via qemu-stable, now in cc. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Christophe >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 02, 2019 at 03:05:35PM +0100, Christophe Fergeau wrote: >>>>>>>>> commit 8bca4613 added support for %% in json strings when >>>>>>>>> interpolating, >>>>>>>>> but in doing so, this broke handling of % when not interpolating as >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> '%' is skipped in both cases. >>>>>>>>> This commit ensures we only try to handle %% when interpolating. >>>>>> >>>>>> Impact? >>>>>> >>>>>> If you're unable to assess, could you give us at least a reproducer? >>>>> >>>>> This all came from >>>>> https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/spice-devel/2018-December/046644.html >>>>> Setting up a VM with libvirt with <graphics type='spice' autoport='yes' >>>>> passwd='password%'/> >>>>> fails to start with: >>>>> qemu-system-x86_64: qobject/json-parser.c:146: parse_string: Assertion >>>>> `*ptr' failed. >>>>> >>>>> If you use 'password%%' as the password instead, when trying to connect >>>>> to the VM, you type 'password%' as the password instead of 'password%%' >>>>> as configured in the domain XML. >>>> >>>> Thanks. >>>> >>>> As the commit message says, the bug bites when we parse a string >>>> containing '%s' with !ctxt->ap. The parser then swallows a character. >>>> If it swallows the terminating '"', it fails the assertion. >>>> >>>> We parse with !ctxt->ap in the following cases: >>>> >>>> * Tests (tests/check-qjson.c, tests/test-qobject-input-visitor.c, >>>> tests/test-visitor-serialization.c) >>>> >>>> Plenty of tests, but we still failed to cover the buggy case :( >>>> >>>> * QMP input (monitor.c) >>>> >>>> * QGA input (qga/main.c) >>>> >>>> * qobject_from_json() >>>> >>>> - JSON pseudo-filenames (block.c) >>>> >>>> These are pseudo-filenames starting with "json:". >>>> >>>> - JSON key pairs (block/rbd.c) >>>> >>>> As far as I can tell, these can come only from pseudo-filenames >>>> starting with "rbd:". >>>> >>>> - JSON command line option arguments of -display and -blockdev >>>> (qobject-input-visitor.c) >>>> >>>> Reproducer: -blockdev '{"%"}' >>>> >>>> Command line, QMP and QGA input are trusted. >>>> >>>> Filenames are trusted when they come from command line, QMP or HMP. >>>> They are untrusted when they come from from image file headers. >>>> Example: QCOW2 backing file name. Note that this is *not* the security >>>> boundary between host and guest. It's the boundary between host and an >>>> image file from an untrusted source. >>>> >>>> I can't see how the bug could be exploited. Neither failing an >>>> assertion nor skipping a character in a filename of your choice is >>>> interesting. We don't support compiling with NDEBUG. >>>> >>>> Kevin, Max, do you agree? >>> >>> I wouldn't call it "not interesting" if adding an image to your VM at >>> runtime can crash the whole thing. >>> >>> (qemu-img create -f qcow2 -u -b 'json:{"%"}' foo.qcow2 64M) >> >> "Not interesting" strictly from the point of view of exploiting the bug >> to penetrate trust boundaries. >> >>> Whether this is a security issue... I don't know, but it is a DoS. >> >> I'm not sure whether feeding untrusted images to QEMU is a good idea in >> general --- there's so much that could go wrong. How hardened against >> abuse are out block drivers? > > They are supposed to handle such cases gracefully, that's for sure. At > least for qcow2 we do care about it. > >> I figure what distinguishes this case is how utterly trivial creating a >> "bad" image is. > > I don't think an untrusted image should be able to crash qemu.
"Should" in the sense of "if they don't, it's a bug, and we'll do what we can to fix it", or "if they don't, I'll be surprised"? >> Anyway, you are the block layer maintainers, so you get to decide >> whether to give this the full security bug treatment. I'm merely the >> clown who broke it %-/ > > Er, then I suppose it is no security bug? O:-) I'm not charging toll for the bridge I built for you ;)