On Wed, 10 Apr 2019 at 00:40, Markus Armbruster <arm...@redhat.com> wrote: > > If the value of get_image_size() exceeds INT_MAX / 2 - 10000, the > computation of @dt_size overflows to a negative number, which then > gets converted to a very large size_t for g_malloc0() and > load_image_size(). In the (fortunately improbable) case g_malloc0() > succeeds and load_image_size() survives, we'd assign the negative > number to *sizep. What that would do to the callers I can't say, but > it's unlikely to be good. > > Fix by rejecting images whose size would overflow. > > Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <arm...@redhat.com>
I think this patch is missing some attributions for the security researchers who found the issue initially. PJP's patch for this from a couple of weeks back has a reported-by credit: https://patchew.org/QEMU/20190322073555.20889-1-ppan...@redhat.com/ thanks -- PMM
