Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <phi...@redhat.com> writes: > On 4/9/19 7:40 PM, Markus Armbruster wrote: >> If the value of get_image_size() exceeds INT_MAX / 2 - 10000, the >> computation of @dt_size overflows to a negative number, which then >> gets converted to a very large size_t for g_malloc0() and >> load_image_size(). In the (fortunately improbable) case g_malloc0() >> succeeds and load_image_size() survives, we'd assign the negative >> number to *sizep. What that would do to the callers I can't say, but >> it's unlikely to be good. >> >> Fix by rejecting images whose size would overflow. >> >> Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <arm...@redhat.com> >> --- >> device_tree.c | 4 ++++ >> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/device_tree.c b/device_tree.c >> index 296278e12a..f8b46b3c73 100644 >> --- a/device_tree.c >> +++ b/device_tree.c >> @@ -84,6 +84,10 @@ void *load_device_tree(const char *filename_path, int >> *sizep) >> filename_path); >> goto fail; >> } >> + if (dt_size > INT_MAX / 2 - 10000) { > > We should avoid magic number duplication. > That said, this patch looks safe. > > Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <phi...@redhat.com>
Thanks! > BTW how did you figure that out? Downstream handling of upstream commit da885fe1ee8 led me to the function. I spotted dt_size = get_image_size(filename_path). Experience has taught me to check the left hand side's type. Bad. Then I saw how dt_size gets increased. Worse. >> + error_report("Device tree file '%s' is too large", filename_path); >> + goto fail; >> + } >> >> /* Expand to 2x size to give enough room for manipulation. */ >> dt_size += 10000; >>