On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 12:19:47PM -0800, theinnovativeinven...@gmail.com wrote: > I was looking at the canaries, and I liked the idea of a proof of freshness > with the latest news headlines. While people can't create canaries ahead of > time, it is possible to conspire to modify or backdate one of them after they > have been published. To prevent this, we could use a blockchain-based > timestamp, where the hashes of each canary are placed within the blockchain > of a powerful cryptocurrency. Something similar to these services: > > https://opentimestamps.org/ > http://originstamp.org/home > > This way, if there ever is a interruption of canaries, followed by a court > order or something forcing you guys to backdate a falsified canary or modify > old ones, we will all be able to check.
The easiest way to do this is to simply use the OpenTimestamps (OTS) git integration. This blog post explains how: https://petertodd.org/2016/opentimestamps-git-integration Addiitionally, while not covered in that blog post, OTS also supports a mode where it rehashes the git tree in such a way that an efficient, SHA256-based, timestamp proof can be extracted later for each file. In the next release this will be done by default, but for now you have to add the --rehash-trees option where the ots-git-gpg-wrapper command is called. FWIW, as of this week, Bitcoin Core maintainer Wladimir J. van der Laan started using OTS to timestamp Bitcoin Core commits and tags. -- https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/20180309221208.GA4487%40fedora-23-dvm. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
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