On Thu, 3 May 2018 05:51:01 -0700 (PDT) "Daniil .Travnikov" <loadc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>Thank you very much for your clarify about Whonix-Workstation. Now I >understand how it is working much better. > > >> 3. Use regular firefox in a debian/fedora based appVM connected to >> sys-whonix (no tor over tor, and all traffic from the VM is routed >> through tor, but it would be easier for adversaries to fingerprint you >> because most tor users use tor browser, not firefox, so you're more >> unique this way) > >Totally agree with all ways, but it has 1 more way about which I know: >https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15800 > >When you change on 'false' in network.proxy.socks_remote_dns TorBrowser >setting. > >And this type of browsing you could use in a debian/fedora based appVM >connected to sys-whonix. And it will be the same like in your 1 way (tor >browser in a whonix-ws) without any fingerprint, because it is the same Tor >Browser. > The tor browser as a lot of other defaults as well, such as not running scripts...https everywhere etc... The pair of whonix-ws and whonix-gw have been developed together (even for use with other virtualization platforms) to minimize exposure to fingerprint detection. For maximum privacy, I would use the whonix-ws tor browser with the whonix-gw for tor browsing. Stuart -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/20180503100503.0d9427f7%40gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
