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‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On Thursday, August 1, 2019 9:40 PM, Andrew David Wong <a...@qubes-os.org> 
wrote:

> Dear Qubes Community,
>
> Fixed packages are now available for Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) #050:
> Reinstalling a TemplateVM does not reset the private volume.
>
> Instructions for installing the new packages are included in the latest
> version of QSB #050, which is reproduced below.
>
> View QSB #050 in the qubes-secpack:
>
> https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-050-2019.txt
>
> Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read it:
>
> https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
>
> View all past QSBs:
>
> https://www.qubes-os.org/security/bulletins/
>
>
>
>                  ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin #50 ]===---
>
>                                  2019-08-01
>
>
>           Reinstalling a TemplateVM does not reset the private volume
>
>     History
>     ========
>
>     2019-08-01: Added list of fixed packages and patching instructions
>     2019-07-24: Initial version
>
>     Description
>     ============
>
>     In Qubes OS, we have the ability to reinstall a TemplateVM by running
>     `qubes-dom0-update --action=reinstall qubes-template-...` in dom0. [1]
>     This is supposed to reset the corresponding TemplateVM to the state of
>     the published package, i.e., no local changes should remain.
>
>     One uncommon reason to perform such a reinstallation is that you suspect
>     that a TemplateVM may be compromised. In such cases, it is very
>     important that no local changes persist in order to ensure that the
>     TemplateVM is no longer compromised.
>
>     Due to a regression in R4.0 [2], however, reinstalling a TemplateVM
>     using qubes-dom0-update does not completely reset all local changes to
>     that TemplateVM. Although the tool itself and our documentation claim
>     that the private volume of the TemplateVM is reset during
>     reinstallation, the private volume does not actually get reset. This
>     could allow a TemplateVM to remain compromised across a reinstallation
>     of that TemplateVM using qubes-dom0-update.
>
>     Patching
>     =========
>
>     The specific packages that resolve the problems discussed in this
>     bulletin are as follows:
>
>       For Qubes 4.0:
>       - qubes-core-admin-client, python3-qubesadmin version 4.0.26
>
>     The packages are to be installed in dom0 via the Qubes VM Manager or via
>     the qubes-dom0-update command as follows:
>
>       For updates from the stable repository (not immediately available):
>       $ sudo qubes-dom0-update
>
>       For updates from the security-testing repository:
>       $ sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-security-testing
>
>     These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
>     current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
>     by the community.
>
>     Workaround
>     ===========
>
>     Independently of patching (see above), the following workaround is
>     available:
>
>     Rather than using the qubes-dom0-update method of reinstalling a
>     TemplateVM, you can instead manually remove the TemplateVM, then install
>     it again. Detailed instructions for this manual method are documented
>     here:
>
>     https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/reinstall-template/#manual-method
>
>     Credits
>     ========
>
>     Thank you to Andrey Bienkowski <hexagonrecurs...@gmail.com> for
>
>     discovering and reporting this issue.
>
>     References
>     ===========
>
>     [1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/reinstall-template/
>     [2] 
> https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-admin-linux/commit/552fd062ea2bb6c2d05faa1e64e172503cacbdbf#diff-6b87ee5cdb9e63b703415a14e5a505cdL192
>
>     --
>     The Qubes Security Team
>     https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
>
>
> This announcement has also been updated on the Qubes website:
> https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/24/qsb-050/
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Andrew David Wong (Axon)
> Community Manager, Qubes OS
> https://www.qubes-os.org


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