Michael Haynes: > *Question: Is there a simple way to setup a dedicated "server" VM* > *using WebDAV to allow qubes to [automatically / periodically] exchange > encrypted data even without Internet access? If so, what are the > security implications of doing this? If not, what are some alternative > ways of automating data transfers between qubes? > *
Not really a simple way to do it, because like you said, the point of Qubes is isolation. However, Qubes does have a mechanism (Qubes RPC) to transfer data between qubes. Look into split-gpg or https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-proxy, for example. I don't know if that mechanism could be adapted for your use case. There are several security implications common to browser extensions in general: - As an extension, it may have access to your browser history among other browser contents. Some extensions have been found surreptitiously phoning home that data. - Some extensions can uniquely mark your requests, so web browsing across different qubes could be linked. - Probably more I'm not thinking of. Simplest approach might be to only have one Joplin enabled web browser, then copy & paste links you want to keep to it from browsers in other qubes. You could then script a qvm-copy to run periodically, or develop something with qubes-rpc to make it available to other qubes. -- - don't top post Mailing list etiquette: - trim quoted reply to only relevant portions - when possible, copy and paste text instead of screenshots -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/275c600c-90fc-36a4-1b4a-a91dda3055cd%40danwin1210.me.
