David,
I beg to differ. The session key is a hash of the endpoint addresses,
key identifier (which changes with every packet) and server private
seed. The terrorist cannot predict the hash and cannot fake any field or
guess the server private seed, which changes on a daily basis. Session
keys are unpredictable, can't be faked and used only once. Replays of
old keys are detected and discarded. Session keys are cryptographical
bound to a signed certificate trail and group key.
Dave
David Schwartz wrote:
"Danny Mayer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
No it is not a flaw in the protocol design. It would be if it were put
in. The address doesn't belong there, it belongs in the IP header which
the receiving server always gets.
It is a flaw. Its absence requires the receiver to assume that the
origin address of the UDP packet received is the IP address of the sending
server. This assumption may or may not be correct. But if the address were
in there, the assumption would not be needed.
DS
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